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Abstract 
Concerns about climate changes and greenhouse gas emissions is one of the key challenges in 
our century. In order to obtain a greener and more sustainable future, a major portion of 
future energy sources must come from renewables. Today, wind power is one of the 
technologies that shows the greatest potential in contributing to this goal. However, 
innovative ideas must be successfully brought to the market and made profitable if the wind 
segment is to be deemed sustainable and competitive to other alternatives. This paper aims 
to contribute to the research on renewable technology commercialization, by addressing how 
Norwegian companies can successfully commercialize new wind energy technologies.  
A multiple case study investigating six different Norwegian B2B wind technology providers 
through several in-depth interviews is used as a basis for analysis and discussion. Findings from 
each case are contrasted to each other and linked to extant literature. The aim of the thesis is 
to provide a holistic view of the commercialization process, and to integrate theories about 
commercialization and product launch strategy with practical views of corporate decision 
makers in various companies. The research is divided into three main parts, namely a 
systematic literature review, an empirical case study analysis and a chapter that discusses the 
findings, practical implications for Norwegian companies and theoretical implication for 
scholars. The study concludes with two frameworks and a set of propositions on how wind 
technology firms can best commercialize their products.  
The research shows that wind technology providers should create a whole product to 
overcome the chasm between early innovators and mass-market customers. Complementary 
assets and services could contribute to this, in addition to provide a strong competitive market 
position. Furthermore, a minimal initial investment base is needed to reduce the presence of 
the death valley threat. Cooperation is also deemed as essential for success, and the challenge 
is to find the appropriate collaboration mode that fits with the overall company strategy. In 
addition, market orientation is also a success factor. In relation to this, market testing could 
increase the rate of market adoption, which in turn is translated into commercialization 
success. Mixed findings were found about the role of venture capital. Some types of firms may 
find it useful, while it is less suitable for others. The thesis also analyzes the difference in 
commercialization strategy with respect to whether the firm is large and mature or a start-up, 
and whether the innovation is radical or incremental. This topic is not well covered by extant 
literature. It is concluded that practitioners must take these differences into consideration 
when formulating product launch strategies and that scholars to a larger degree should embed 
this in future research. Finally, decision makers should also be aware of external factors such 
as competitors, the government and the fact that the wind industry is dynamic and immature.  
All the findings are organized into two frameworks that can be utilized by practitioners in order 
to increase their company’s product commercialization performance, and thus increase their 
competitive advantage in a demanding industry. In long-term, this can create the necessary 
foundation for an energy future that is greener and more sustainable.       
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Sammendrag 
Klimaendringer og –utslipp er et av nøkkelutfordringene i vårt århundre. For å skape en 
grønnere og mer bærekraftig fremtid, må mer av fremtidige energikilder komme fra fornybare 
ressurser. I dag er vind en av de av de mest lovende energiteknologiene for å oppnå dette 
målet. Imidlertid må innovative ideer på en vellykket måte bli lansert i markedet og i tillegg 
være lønnsomme for at vind-industrien skal kunne bli betraktet som bærekraftig og 
konkurransedyktig sammenlignet med andre alternativer. Dette studiet har som mål om å 
bidra med kunnskap innenfor denne problemstillingen ved å drøfte hvordan norske selskaper 
kan kommersialisere sine vindenergi-teknologier på en suksessfull måte.   
En multippel casestudie som undersøker seks norske B2B vindteknologi-leverandører 
gjennom en rekke dybdeintervjuer er brukt som grunnlag for analyse og diskusjon. Funn fra 
hvert case blir sammenlignet med hverandre og videre knyttet opp til eksisterende teori og 
litteratur. Målet med denne oppgaven er å gi et holistisk perspektiv på 
kommersialiseringsprosessen, og å integrere akademiske teorier om kommersialisering og 
produktlanseringsstrategi sammen med praktiske syn blant beslutningstagere i industrien. 
Studiet er delt inn i tre hoveddeler, nemlig en systematisk litteraturgjennomgang, en empirisk 
casestudie-analyse og et kapittel som diskuterer funnene, de praktiske implikasjonene for 
norske selskaper og teoretiske implikasjoner for forskere. Oppgaven avsluttes med to 
rammeverk og et sett med proposisjoner på hvordan vindteknologi-leverandører best kan 
kommersialisere sine produkter.  
Forskningen viser at vindteknologi-selskaper bør skape et komplett produkt for å overkomme 
gapet mellom tidlig innovatører og massemarkeds-kunder. Komplementære produkter og 
serviceavtaler kan forsterke dette, i tillegg til å skape en sterk markedsposisjon for selskapet. 
Videre er en minimal investeringsprofil ved produktlansering nødvendig for å redusere 
likviditetsproblemer under oppstart. Samarbeid er også ansett for å være essensielt for 
suksess. Utfordringen er først og fremst å finne en samarbeidsform som passer den 
overordnede strategien til selskapet. I tillegg er markedsorientering vurdert som en 
suksessfaktor. I relasjon til dette kan markedstesting øke graden av produktaksept blant 
kunder, som igjen er knyttet til kommersiell suksess. Blandede data om venture-kapitals rolle 
ble funnet. Mens enkelte selskaper mener de er relevante og nyttige, argumenterer andre 
med at de ikke er det. Studiet analyserer også ulikhetene i kommersialiseringsstrategi mellom 
store og små selskaper og mellom inkrementelle og radikale innovasjoner. Dette er ikke et 
område som er godt dekket av eksisterende litteratur. Det konkluderes med at praktikere må 
ta hensyn til disse forholdene når de skal formulere sine produktlanseringsstrategier, og at 
akademikere bør ta med elementene videre i sin forskning. Til slutt må vindteknologi-
leverandører være oppmerksomme på eksterne faktorer som konkurrenter, myndigheter og 
det faktum at vind-industrien er dynamisk og umoden. Alle funnene i oppgaven er presentert 
i to praktiske rammeverk som beslutningstagere i industrien kan benytte seg av for å forbedre 
selskapets evne til å kommersialisere nye produkter. På sikt kan dette styrke 
konkurransefortrinnet til selskapet i en viktig industri som er meget krevende og utfordrende.               
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1. Introduction and background 
1.1 Problem statement 
Innovation is a commonly used buzzword in the discussion about value creation in today’s 
society. Many in Norway call for more generation of new ideas and start-ups in order to ensure 
a future that is less dependent on oil and gas revenues. A very important condition to achieve 
this is a successful commercialization and product launch process. Indeed, Reve and Jacobsen 
(2001) claim that there is no lack of good ideas and innovations in Norway, but rather on the 
ability to transfer these into sustainable and profitable products in the market. In parallel with 
this discussion, there is fierce debate on how Norway should fulfill its ambitious international 
climate targets. The use of carbon offsets and purification has dominated the agenda, but new 
technology development will also be an inevitable part of the solution. In order to provide a 
small contribution to the two aforementioned issues, this master thesis aims to provide 
actionable recommendations for corporate decision makers in the Norwegian wind 
technology industry, as well as theoretical contributions to the extant research literature. As 
far as the author knows, this theme has not been thoroughly investigated by any researchers 
so far. Specifically, the problem statement of this study is how can Norwegian companies 
successfully commercialize new wind energy technologies? A broad and holistic definition of 
the commercialization process is utilized in accordance with Balachandra et.al. (2010: 1843) 
and Jolly (1997*: 4) (cf. section 3.2.1). By thoroughly answering the problem statement, my 
hope is to achieve the following goals: 
 To describe how a representative sample of Norwegian wind technology firms 
commercialize and launch their products and what challenges they face. 
 To establish a best-practice model on how to successfully commercialize new wind 
energy technologies in a Norwegian industry context. 
 To operationalize generic theories into useful and tangible recommendations for 
business managers that want to create new products and value propositions in a 
Norwegian industry context. 
 To provide theoretical contributions and modifications on established theories and 
models that challenge how we view the extant literature.    
The focus of the thesis is on internal firm specific factors that influence product 
commercialization performance, such as resources and financing. These are elements that a 
company has under its influence of control, thus creating tools that business managers can 
use when developing and marketing new products. However, some attention is also devoted 
to external factors such as governmental support and funding. These are elements that 
stimulate successful conception and market introduction of new renewable energy 
technologies among firms in the industry. They are however not within the decision domain 
of companies. Thus, the focus is more on how practitioners can meet the challenges 
companies face in their environment and use external opportunities in their own advantage.  
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1.2 Why is this study relevant? 
In the following sections, several arguments for why people should spend their time reading 
this thesis is presented. I hope that corporate decision makers, researchers and other 
interested stakeholders are encouraged to reflect on the bigger picture of the thesis.       
1.2.1 Ensuring sustainable growth in the future 
One of the great challenges of this century is how to supply energy to sustain economic growth 
in a world with growing population, while at the same reducing carbon emissions and ensure 
sustainable growth. In the past few years, several technological innovations have provided us 
with the means to meet these challenges and dilemmas (IEA, 2013a). However, these new and 
immature innovations must be commercialized in a viable and cost effective way if wind power 
is to be competitive with traditional and cheaper non-renewable energy sources. Energy 
technology companies will play an important role in this process. This study shows how the 
business community can be part of the solution by providing new and clean technologies to 
the market, instead of being the problem.   
1.2.2 Meeting ambitious long-term climate targets 
Norway has ambitious targets for reducing carbon emissions. The Norwegian government 
aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 30% within 2020 relative to its national emissions 
in 1990, and to become carbon neutral within 2030 (St.meld. nr 1, 2009-2010). Similarly, the 
European Union targets a 20% reduction in greenhouse gases by 2020 (European Commission, 
2013). On a long-term basis, a major portion of this effort must come from a shift from the 
use of fossil based energy sources, to renewable and greenhouse gas neutral energy 
resources. Wind power represents a renewable energy source with huge potential that is yet 
to be fulfilled (IEA, 2013b: 7). However, cheaper and more reliable innovations must be 
available in the market in order for renewables to be competitive with conventional energy, 
thus contributing to the ambitious targets of the Norwegian government in a sustainable 
manner. This study explores how this can be done.  
1.2.3 Seizing the industrial opportunities in the renewable sector 
IEA (2013c: 200) estimates that in the period 2011 to 2035, wind power generation will 
increase by 519% in its low-case scenario. In 2035, the electrical generation from renewable 
energy is expected to be 31% of total generation, up from 20% in 2011 (IEA, 2013c: 202). These 
trends show substantial industrial opportunities for Norwegian wind technology providers in 
the future. In order to be successful, these firms need to best commercialize their innovations, 
such that healthy profits and return on investments are achieved, consequently creating 
further business opportunities. This thesis aims to create tools for corporate decision makers 
on how to meet these challenges and create new market opportunities.  
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1.2.4 Making the theories of commercialization operational and more relevant 
There is a large number of academic articles in the field of commercialization and product 
launch strategies, like the works of authors such as Hultink, Frattini and Easingwood (cf. 
chapter three). However, these are generally often simplified and with little or no 
customization to different industries and companies. Therefore, this study aims to make the 
research on commercialization more relevant and operational for wind technology providers 
in Norway.  
Now that the problem statement and its motivation have been presented, the next step is to 
create an appropriate research design that answers the issue in a scientific way. The next 
chapter is devoted to this. Note that the methodology is placed before the literature review, 
which is not according to research traditions within the field of strategic management. This 
has been deliberately chosen, in order for the reader to get a better idea of the literature 
review method before actually reading it.   
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2. Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
This part provides a comprehensive documentation about the methodology utilized in this 
study, and the next sections is devoted to clarify how the research question on wind 
technology commercialization is approached. Section 2.2 provides a high-level overview of the 
case study design, its boundaries and unit of analysis. Part 2.3 is related to chapter three about 
the conducted systematic literature review, and explains in detail the approach. The 
methodology for chapter four about the company case studies found in 2.4, explains how 
interviews and firm specific documents have been used as part of the research. 2.5 presents 
how the discussion part in chapter five uses data interpretation, cross-case synthesis and 
rivalry explanation to validate findings. Finally, 2.6 makes a critical assessment of the utilized 
methodology, and adds a couple of remarks on what can be done differently the next time 
such a study as this is undertaken.  
2.2 Case study design and thesis structure 
2.2.1 Clarification of methodical terms 
The remaining part of the chapter will use a set of important methodical concepts. These are 
related to the quality of empirical social research. For convenience, these are first defined 
below (Yin, 2014: 46) and later discussed continuously throughout this chapter:   
 Construct validity: the identification of correct operational measures for the concepts 
studied.   
 Internal validity: refers to which degree the relationship between two or more 
elements is causal as opposed to spurious.  
 External validity: the domain where a study’s findings can be generalized. 
 Reliability: explains to which degree the procedures can be repeated with the same 
results. 
2.2.2 Research design 
This paper is of an explanatory nature, because the aim is to explain how Norwegian 
technology suppliers best can commercialize their new innovations in a competitive and 
profitable manner. This makes the use of a case study (Yin, 2014) the preferred research 
method. Yin (2014: 16) defines a case study as an “empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-world context”. Furthermore, it is 
elaborated that “case studies cope with many more variables of interest than data points, and 
as a result relies on multiple sources of evidence” (Yin, 2014: 17). The definition fits well with 
the overall theme of this thesis, as the wind energy industry is complex and many variables 
are likely to determine the success of various commercialization strategies. A qualitative 
approach with multiple sources of data, in contrast to a quantitative approach, will ensure 
that the uncertain variables are managed in the most appropriate way. The qualitative study 
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in this thesis is predominantly normative, but some descriptive elements are taken into 
consideration in the case company analysis to provide relevant background information.      
A multiple case study method has been chosen, with six different Norwegian wind technology 
suppliers being the cases. This research design provides the opportunity to compare different 
cases to each other, increase external validity, and lead to more interesting findings than 
single case studies. It will allow further analysis into what is unique and what is common across 
cases, and contrast these findings to each other. In order to increase reliability of the thesis, a 
case study protocol has been used as an instrument to guide the author in carrying out data 
collection from cases (Yin, 2014: 84). It is an essential tool to use during multiple case studies 
(Yin, 2014: 84), and has helped the author to keep a consistent mental line of inquiry during 
the research. The case study protocol can be found in its entirety in appendix 8.1.   
As shown in table 1, companies commercializing new technologies can generally be organized 
along two different variables: whether the product of interest is successfully commercialized 
or not, and whether the innovation is of a radical or incremental nature. The first variable was 
selected to include both best practice cases and lessons from the industry, while the latter 
variable gives us insight into whether commercialization strategies for incremental and radical 
innovations should be any different and if so, how. Referring to the first variable, commercial 
success is defined by the degree of customer acceptance, financial performance and technical 
product performance (Hultink et.al., 1997; Frattini et.al., 2012: 3). The second variable 
discerns between those innovations that indicate a breakthrough in the market and those that 
are refinements on existing technology, cf. section 3.2.2 (Debruyne et.al., 2002: 161; Walsh 
et.al, 2002: 343; Frattini et.al., 2012: 4). It is desirable to include at least one company from 
each category in table 1, in order to ensure a good spread in empirical data and to increase 
external validity. Furthermore, since this thesis includes both start-ups and larger and more 
mature firms, established firms have also been added to the data sample. Indeed, it is 
interesting to investigate whether there are any differences in success criteria between small 
and large firms. A discussion about this is provided in section 5.12.  
With respect to table 1, it is hard to identify which category a firm belongs to before the 
interviews are conducted, especially among small companies where little public information 
is available beforehand. Thus, the framework has been used more as a tool for discussion, 
rather than a rigid way to classify each case company in this study. The discussion part in 
chapter five will present how success criteria and commercialization strategy is connected to 
the framework in table 1. Further information about how the six companies have been 
sampled can be found in section 2.4.  
Table 1: Categories of companies commercializing technology 
 Incremental innovation Radical innovation 
Successful product strategy Incremental product success Radical product success 
Failed product strategy Incremental product failure Radical product failure 
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2.2.3 Unit of analysis and boundaries 
The unit of analysis in the thesis is limited to Norwegian technology suppliers in the renewable 
wind energy sector, implying that power operators are not taken into consideration. 
Commercialization and product launch strategy is primary a concern among suppliers, since 
power producers mainly operate and maintain the products that they have purchased from 
vendors. Furthermore, since technology providers solely sell products to other businesses, this 
thesis is only concerned with business-to-business (B2B) aspects and not on business-to-
consumers (B2C). Another limitation is that only products and not services are part of the 
analysis, as these offerings have very different characteristics. Finally, only Norwegian firms 
are part of the study. Consequently, the industry scope has been limited to the Norwegian 
market, focusing less on rest of the world. By limiting the scope to Norwegian companies, it is 
easier to tailor-make and operationalize the strategic recommendations, than it would have 
been if also international companies were regarded. However, this comes at the price of lower 
degree of external validity, which is deemed as a necessary trade-off in order to ensure high 
degree of customization of the recommendations.    
Both internal company factors and external market factors determine a company’s ability to 
successfully launch new products. However, I am only concerned with factors that constitute 
a variable for company’s commercialization performance and that they can control and 
influence. For example, how governments and other stakeholders can contribute to successful 
market introductions is not regarded, but rather on how wind technology vendors can utilize 
this to their own advantage. 
2.2.4 Level of analysis 
According to de Wit and Meyer (2010), there 
are four levels of strategy, namely functional, 
business, corporate and network level. As 
shown in figure 1, the level of analysis in this 
thesis is at the interface between product 
level and firm level. For example, the cases in 
chapter four are mainly focused on the 
products of each company. However, 
products and firms are inevitably 
interconnected and dependent on each 
other, since product strategy constitutes an 
important part of the overall company 
strategy. Hence, the analysis is also brought to a company level. Industrial and environmental 
factors at a macro level are of little concern, although they are taken into consideration when 
having a significant impact on the companies. For example, governmental support could 
provide the necessary means to commercialize product innovations, and is analyzed when 
deemed relevant.   
Figure 1: Level of analysis (de Wit & Meyer, 2010) 
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2.2.5 Thesis structure 
A deductive method is used as a framework to organize this thesis. The method is mostly used 
in quantitative studies, but a similar qualitative approach has been applied during the 
research. According to Bryman and Bell (2011: 11), the deductive methodology is 
characterized by deducing a hypothesis based on what is already known within the field of 
interest and theoretical considerations. The propositions are subsequently tested based on 
findings from data collection. Finally, existing theory is revised based on the findings during 
the deductive process. However, since there is not entirely consensus in the research method 
literature, some may argue that this thesis is rather inductive. The inductive approach makes 
first observations, and then constructs a theory based on the data analysis (Bryman & Bell, 
2011). For example, a similar study as this one by Holgersen and Lillebo (2002*), claims that 
their research method is inductive. Despite this, by using the definition of Bryman and Bell 
(2011), we can conclude that this thesis is of a deductive nature.     
In line with the deductive method, the thesis is structured along these lines: First, relevant 
academic literature is discussed in chapter three and is used as a basis to formulate a set of 
propositions about how Norwegian wind technology providers can successfully commercialize 
their products. Second, chapter four provides in-depth empirical data from six different 
companies using semi-structured interviews. The aim of this is to bridge the gap between 
theoretical models and real-world industry specific cases. The propositions from chapter three 
are discussed in chapter five, and conclusions on the contentions are given. A particular focus 
is put on the strategic implications of the findings. Finally, the study is concluded in chapter 
six, together with a short discussion on further research questions. Most of the research has 
been done in an iterative manner, where the propositions have been developed in tandem 
with exploration of new theory and empirical findings. The methodology of chapter three, four 
and five is further explained in section 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5, respectively.     
2.3 Literature review approach 
The purpose of a literature review is to identify what is already known within a specific field 
of interest, and at the same time build on the ideas of other people (Jesson et al., 2011). This 
thesis will perform a systematic literature review, and also include some snowballing 
references. Snowballing is a technique for gathering data through the identification of an 
initial subject, which is subsequently used to provide with new sources (Sage, 2013). The 
literature review will go through the major theories of commercialization and product launch 
strategies in a critical way by assessing their strengths and weaknesses. In order to maintain a 
clear chain of evidence in the literature review, almost all data found is clearly cited with page 
number on where the exact piece of information was found. This practice increases the 
reliability of the thesis. Based on the literature review, a set of propositions related to the 
problem statement will be developed and later tested in the discussion in chapter five. Several 
gaps in the current theory is likely to be revealed, and the aim is to fill in this gap later in the 
analysis and discussion part of this paper. 
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Sections 2.3.1 to 2.3.3 explain the steps performed in the systematic literature review 
methodology, and is largely based on Jesson et al. (2011). Part 2.3.4 outlines the use of 
snowball sampling and grey literature, while 2.3.5 describes the role of propositions.  
2.3.1 Review questions 
The aim of the literature review is to answer the following generic questions, broken down 
into two parts:  
 Theory review: How should companies successfully commercialize and launch their 
new product innovations?  
 Empirical review: What empirical evidence is available on how wind technology 
providers successfully can commercialize and launch their new innovations? 
The first question uses primarily peer-reviewed journal articles as sources. The goal is to utilize 
high quality literature in the theory review, and peer-reviewed journals provide the means to 
achieve this. However, the author acknowledges that a lot of empirical material about wind 
energy and commercialization strategy can be found in reports and other sources. Thus, the 
second question also includes grey literature to complement the articles.   
2.3.2 Systematic search  
The systematic literature search was conducted in Elsevier’s database, Scopus, and Google 
Scholar, and was undertaken in the period from 3rd to 6th February 2014. The literature review 
was done with two different purposes in mind: first to give a balanced and critical review of 
available literature about commercialization and product launch strategies, which is 
addressed by the first two keyword searches in table 2, and second to find out how this 
empirically can be related to the wind energy sector, addressed by the four last keyword 
searches.   
The purpose of using both Scopus and Google Scholar is to ensure a broad sweep of the 
available literature. Scopus is a comprehensive and reputable database, and ensures a high 
academic standard in the hits. On the other hand, Google Scholar provides a broader overview 
and often includes non-peer reviewed articles, although with lower degree of academic 
rigidity. The use of a third database, ISI Web of Science, was contemplated but discarded due 
to high degree of overlap with the Scopus database (Academic Assessment Database Tool, 
2013) and limitations in available time and resources for this master thesis.  
The inclusion and exclusion criteria are shown in table 2. No limitation on time period was 
made in the literature search, as a complete overview of the research field and its 
development over time was desired. Furthermore, articles with a B2B focus was emphasized, 
as the problem statement in this thesis is mostly relevant for sales and marketing between 
industry companies. The empirical review includes both English and Norwegian language, 
since the aim is to reveal findings in the Norwegian industry. Finally, to ensure that possible 
relevant empirical sources are not filtered out due to narrow inclusion criteria, findings within 
Europe and the renewable industry are included.     
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Table 2: Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
Theory review 
The initial search was done in Scopus, searching for the previously mentioned keywords within 
titles and abstracts in the database. The keyword commercialization strategy gave 1906 hits, 
but was narrowed down to 274 hits after having limited the search to the subject area of 
business, management and accounting, language in English, and document type of articles 
from journals and books.  
The same aforementioned search, but with the keywords product launch strategy, was also 
conducted. The initial search yielded 586 hits, ending up with 181 document results after 
limiting the search to business, management and accounting, English language and articles 
from journals and books.   
In order to ensure a 360-degree sweep of the available literature, a search with the keyword 
commercialization strategy and product launch strategy was done in Google Scholar, although 
with fewer functionalities and options than Scopus. The first case resulted in 158,000 hits, 
while the latter case yielded 369,000 hits. By limiting the search to articles in English, without 
patents and citations the search yielded 151,000 and 357,000 hits, respectively. Due to the 
infeasibility of reading the abstracts of all these hits, only results on page 1 to 5 sorted by the 
degree of relevance was screened, representing 50 documents in each keyword search. This 
simplification represents the biggest deviation from this review to a systematic literature 
review done by the book (Jesson et al., 2011). Ideally, all of the hits should have been part of 
the screening process, but it would have not been feasible to go through all the hits given the 
time and resource constraints of this master thesis.   
 Theory review Empirical review 
Keywords Commercialization strategy, product 
launch strategy 
Commercialization strategy AND “wind 
energy”, commercialization strategy AND 
“renewable energy”, product launch 
strategy AND “wind energy”, product launch 
strategy AND “renewable energy” 
Inclusion 
criteria 
English language, generic or wind 
specific theories, peer-reviewed articles 
from reputable journals, theory 
relevant for problem statement, B2B 
focus.      
English and Norwegian language, empirical 
findings within Europe, renewable energy, 
peer-reviewed articles from reputable 
journals, books from academic presses, 
reports, B2B focus.  
Exclusion 
criteria 
Grey literature, not directly related to 
commercialization or product launch, 
service industry, theories on industries 
other than wind energy, non-journal 
articles/books. 
Empirical findings outside Europe, non-
renewable energy sources. 
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Table 3 gives a general overview of the theory reviewing process. In summary, 555 non-unique 
hits in the initial screening are scanned through by reading its abstracts, ending up with 37 
articles after the first screening. In the final screening, each article was read through. Seven 
articles were rejected in this phase, because they provided little additional value to the 
problem statement of the thesis or were outside its scope. As a result, 30 articles were then 
finally used in the literature review in chapter three. The entries in non-italic letters in 
appendix 8.2 indicate these articles. The figure in parenthesis in table 3 refers to the number 
of overlapping articles that were found with other keyword searches. These are not taken into 
count in the total remaining numbers of articles. 
Table 3: Number of hits before and after screening 
Empirical review 
This part of the literature review focuses on how the commercialization and product launch 
strategies identified in the theory review can be operationalized and used in a wind energy 
industry context. To keep this part relevant for Norwegian companies, only empirical findings 
from Europe is considered. This has been done for two reasons: to increase the number of 
relevant hits and the fact that the power markets in Norway and Europe are integrating into 
each other (NORWEA & Energi Norge, 2013). Documents from all time periods have been 
included in order to ensure that potentially important works are not filtered out. However, 
the author acknowledges that the renewable energy industry is complex and fast-paced. 
Therefore, a particular emphasis is put on post year 2000 articles, such that the newest and 
most up to date information is used.   
To keep a broad industry perspective, more document types such as working papers, in 
addition to peer-reviewed articles, have been included in the empirical review. However, only 
those that are written by authors with good credentials have been taken into consideration.  
The initial search in Scopus using the keyword commercialization strategy AND “renewable 
energy” resulted in 47 hits, and two hits after refining the search to documents in English and 
Norwegian within the subject area of business, management and accounting. In contrast to 
the theory review, Norwegian language was added in order to increase the amount of 
No. of hits/documents – Theory 
review 
Before 
search 
limitation 
After 
search 
limitation 
After 
relevance 
sort 
After 
initial 
screening 
After final 
screening 
Scopus  
Commercialization strategy 1,906 274 274 22 (1) 18 
Product launch strategy  586 181 181 12 (1) 10 
Google Scholar 
Commercialization strategy  158,000 151,000 50 0 (4) 0 
Product launch strategy 369,000 357,000 50 3 (8) 2 
Total 529,492 508,455 555 37 30 
11 
 
empirical findings from Norway. The same approach was used for the five remaining keyword 
searches, and the results of these are shown in table 4.  
Google Scholar initially gave 22,500 hits for the keyword commercialization strategy AND 
“renewable energy”. After filtering out non-English/Norwegian results, patents and citations, 
the search yielded 22,100 hits. Again, to keep the review at a manageable level, the 50 most 
relevant documents sorted by Google Scholar was used as a base for the first screening. The 
same approach was used for the five remaining keyword searches, and the results of these 
are shown in table 4. 
Table 4 gives a general overview of the empirical reviewing process. In summary, 202 non-
unique hits are scanned through in the initial screening, ending up with two articles that were 
used in the literature review. Appendix 8.3 provides an overview of these papers. The figure 
in parenthesis in table 4 refers to the number of overlapping articles that were found in other 
keyword searches. These are not taken into count in the total remaining numbers of articles.  
Table 4: Number of hits in empirical review before and after screening 
2.3.3 Screening and assessment 
The title and abstract of each article was read through during the initial screening, using the 
inclusion/exclusion criteria specified in the table 2. This resulted in 39 papers, 37 from the 
theory review and two from the empirical review. These were printed out and read through. 
No. of hits/documents – Empirical 
review 
Before 
search 
limitation 
After 
search 
limitation 
After 
relevance 
sort 
After 
initial 
screening 
After final 
screening 
Scopus 
Commercialization strategy AND 
“renewable energy” 
47 2 2 0 (1) 0 
Commercialization strategy AND 
“wind energy” 
3 0 0 0 0 
Product launch strategy AND 
“renewable energy” 
2 0 0 0 0 
Product launch strategy AND “wind 
energy” 
0 0 0 0 0 
Google Scholar 
Commercialization strategy AND 
“renewable energy” 
22,500 22,300 50 1 1 
Commercialization strategy AND 
“wind energy”  
7,200 7,060 50 1 (1) 1 
Product launch strategy AND 
“renewable energy” 
27,300 27,200 50 0 0 
Product launch strategy AND “wind 
energy”  
14,200 13,900 50 0 0 
Total 71,252 70,462 202 2 2 
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After having filtered out the less relevant articles and those that did not meet the quality 
criteria, the final number of articles included in the literature review ended up with 32. 
The primary source for assessing the quality of each article is whether the research is 
published in a reputable journal, the number of citations and the credentials of the authors. 
The impact factors for the journals used in this literature review is listed in table 5, and gives 
an easy assessment of the potential quality of each article, though the methods used in such 
metrics have been debated. As can be seen by table 5, a major part of the articles comes from 
renowned and reputable journals.  
Table 5: Impact factor of journals used in systematic literature review (Thomson Reuters ISI Web of Knowledge: JCR, 2012) 
Journal/Publisher 
Impact factor 
(Thomson 
Reuters JCR) 
No. of articles 
in literature 
review 
International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal 5.053 1 
Strategic Management Journal 3.367 1 
The Review of Financial Studies 3.256 1 
Technovation 3.177 2 
Renewable Energy 2.989 1 
Journal of Business Venturing 2.976 1 
Research Policy 2.850 5 
Journal of Business Logistics 2.020 1 
Industrial Marketing Management 1.933 2 
Management Science  1.859 1 
International Journal of Research in Marketing 1.781 1 
R&D Management 1.580  1 
Journal of Product Innovation Management 1.572 9 
Journal of Business Research 1.484 1 
Business Horizons 1.416 1 
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 0.893 1 
International Journal of Engineering Business Management Not listed 1 
The Journal of High Technology Management Research Not listed 1 
Several of the articles in the systematic review provided relevant references to other useful 
works, and these have been included in the theory review as well. In the text, these sources 
are marked with an asterisk in the ongoing references. This can be regarded as snowball 
sampling, as explained in the beginning of section 2.3. Note that the overview in table 5 only 
includes articles found in the systematic literature search, and not from the snowball 
sampling. However, these articles are marked in italic in appendix 8.2 and 8.3.       
2.3.4 Grey literature 
Grey literature are all documents that is not an academic journal article, and as a result are 
not peer-reviewed and seldom published (Jesson et al., 2011: 54). The purpose of using such 
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sources in the empirical literature review is to provide more empirical data either from the 
wind sector or from a Norwegian industry context through the use of various reports and 
anthologies. As table 4 shows evidence of, the number of relevant academic articles and books 
about commercialization in wind power industry or in Norway is very limited, thus making it 
needed to move into the field of grey literature to keep a broad treatment of the problem 
statement.  
In order to be flexible and up to date with the recent developments in the industry, a snowball 
sampling approach was chosen to find the relevant grey literature. This would give the author 
the opportunity to explore different relevant topics in a consistent way, but at the same time 
not be constrained by the rigidity of an academic review. The snowball sampling started off 
by searching for the keywords in table 2 in Google and the university library at NTNU, which 
in turn led to a few relevant sources written by credible authors or institutions. References 
from these were in turn used to arrive at the final documents, which are marked in italic letters 
in appendix 8.3.    
2.3.5 Propositions 
The literature review is used as a foundation to formulate a set of propositions, which in turn 
provide the basis for a theoretical framework. The propositions are used to provide a red 
thread throughout the case analysis in chapter four and discussion in chapter five. Although 
most of the articles in the literature review are generic and not necessarily related to the wind 
industry, the propositions are formulated specifically for the Norwegian wind technology 
sector. Some may perceive this as a logical gap. However, this is merely done for the sake of 
methodology.     
2.4 Case study approach 
The case study part represents the empirical findings in the thesis. The aim is to gather data 
from professionals with experience from commercialization, strategy and business 
development of wind technologies, and to get a better sense of how business is conducted in 
the practical world. The empirical data is then used as an important input to discuss the 
validity of the formulated propositions and to operationalize the theories and models from 
the literature review. It is also used to discuss how valid the theories in chapter three are in a 
Norwegian wind technology context.   
The purpose of conducting interviews in the case study is to obtain “qualitative descriptions 
of the life world of the subject with respect to interpretation of their meaning” (Kvale, 1996: 
124). Interviews were performed with both company respondents and interviewees from 
various external institutions. The purpose of this is to increase the amount of unbiased data, 
and to provide a better foundation for data triangulation (cf. section 2.5). Several interviews 
within a few selected companies was emphasized compared to single interviews with many 
companies. This was deliberately chosen for two reasons. First, to improve internal validity of 
the data from each case company, and second to bring the level of analysis to a company and 
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product level, rather than an industry level which would have been the case if interviews with 
many companies had been conducted.       
A total of six different case companies and three external institutions represent the data 
sample. Data from one of the firms, Fedem Technology, is not as widely used as the other 
cases in the discussion chapter, since the empirical findings proved to be less relevant for the 
propositions. Approximately half to one-hour long interviews with 14 company respondents 
and three external interviewees were conducted during the end of February to end of April. 
Blaaster, Fedem Technology and SmartMotor were identified among 54 entries in Windcluster 
Norway’s supplier database (Windcluster Norway, 2014), while Statoil/Hywind and Windflip 
were used based on previous knowledge about these companies. Finally, Chapdrive was 
included after the interviewees at Blaaster recommended further investigation of this firm as 
a case company. Although several of the companies are sampled because of convenience and 
close location to Trondheim, emphasis has also been put on finding firms that have good 
spread in accordance with table 1. First contact with the interviewees was initiated by the 
author through communication on telephone. People with different backgrounds were 
deliberately chosen to be interviewees, such that several perspectives are included.   
A semi-structured interview approach was used. This was deliberately chosen, since it allows 
for flexibility and opportunities to explore interesting topics more in detail (Sage, 2013). This 
is in line with the exploratory nature of case studies. However, in order to provide structure 
and focus in the interviews, an interview guide was prepared before each session (cf. appendix 
8.4). This was sent in advance to the interviewees, so that they would get a better idea of the 
topic. During the interviews, the interview guide served as a helping hand for the interviewer.  
All of the interviews was conducted by one person who asked questions and took notes at the 
same time. This method is a threat to construct validity of the case study. The interviewer can 
misinterpret certain pieces of information from the interviewee, thus making wrong 
assumptions about the operational measures. A higher degree of consistency could have been 
achieved if several people had participated as observers. To remedy this potential problem, 
all of the summaries and transcripts from each interview was sent to the interviewees shortly 
after to maintain conformability of the gathered data. Minor commentaries were given as 
feedback, and these were implemented to the final interview transcripts.  
2.5 Discussion approach 
Triangulation of data from chapter four is the prime method used to arrive at conclusions 
regarding the propositions. The idea is to use findings from different sources, which in this 
case are interviews, grey literature and firm documents, to achieve convergence of evidence 
(Yin, 2014: 121). According to table 6, how strongly each proposition is supported depends on 
how many data sources that are consistent with the proposition. This method of data 
triangulation is used throughout the analysis in chapter five. This strengthens construct 
validity of the case study, since multiple sources of evidence provide multiple measures of the 
same phenomenon (Yin, 2014: 121).  
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Table 6: Degree of support on propositions 
Degree of support Data points  
Strong support Proposition supported by more than three firm interviewees, in 
addition to one or more external interviewees  
Medium support Proposition supported by two to three different firm interviewees 
No support  Proposition supported by less than two firm interviewees or too 
many diverging data points   
Inconclusive Not enough data to conclude on anything 
Cross-case synthesis is used as a technique to analyze case study evidence from chapter four. 
Each of the six case companies are regarded as independent research studies, and the method 
aims to compare findings with each other and explain potential commonalities and 
differences. According to Yin (2014: 164), this is likely to lead to more robust findings than 
single case studies. The technique is also believed to increase internal validity, as synthesizing 
among several cases decreases the likelihood of establishing non-causal relationships.        
Finally, rival explanation is utilized to increase internal validity of the thesis. This analytic 
strategy tests and compares rivaling models to existing explanations. The technique is mostly 
used in conjunction with discussions of the case studies, as the interviewees will have different 
opinions and explanations of different concepts, either across or within the case companies. 
The approach is also used in relation to the various theories discussed in chapter three. Lastly, 
rival explanations is used as a mean to either strengthen or weaken each proposition. For 
example, propositions with few rivalling theories and findings are supported, while those that 
to a large degree are addressed by rivalling data are rejected.           
2.6 Evaluating the research methodology  
This section gives a short discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the utilized methods 
in the literature review-, case study-, and discussion part, respectively. Furthermore, 
reflections on what in retrospect could have been differently is also included.  
2.6.1 Literature review 
A major strength is that the literature review has been thoroughly documented in section 2.3, 
which increases the reliability of the systematic search process. However, there are two 
weakness points that readers should be aware of. First, the literature review is done solely by 
one person. This increases the probability of biasedness, both in the chosen selection of 
articles and the analysis and synthesis of them (Jesson et al., 2011), thus posing a threat 
towards construct validity. Since the project thesis is done by one person alone, it has been 
difficult to remedy this problem. However, peer reviewing the literature search itself is a 
possibility that could have been utilized better during the work of the thesis. Second, the 
empirical literature review did not go through all relevant literature due to the large number 
of hits in Google Scholar. The simplification to only address the most relevant articles sorted 
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by Google Scholar was deemed necessary given the time and resource constraints of the 
master thesis.   
In hindsight, other theories than those identified in the literature review could have been 
utilized. This would have led to different but complementary propositions compared to those 
formulated in the review. For example, the resource-based view (RBV) might have revealed 
themes such as human resources, which is not covered by this thesis. This theoretical 
approach is used in a study on commercialization in the Norwegian ICT-industry by Holgersen 
and Lillebo (2002*). Even more interesting, RBV can be contrasted with opposing theoretical 
models, such as the positioning view of Michael Porter. While the former model has inside-
out perspective on competitive advantage, the latter has outside-in focus (De Wit & Meyer, 
2010: 254). Thus, by using a dialectical approach to organize and compare different academic 
opinions, more intriguing discussions and rival explanation (cf. section 2.5) are provided. This 
in turn leads to proposition analysis that are addressed by several rivaling views, thus 
increasing the robustness of various findings.          
2.6.2 Case study approach 
The strength of this part is the empirical analysis of several different case companies, and that 
each case study relies on several interviews and sources. Considering the relatively low 
number of relevant wind technology providers among the 54 entries in Windcluster Norway’s 
supplier database (Windcluster Norway, 2014), six companies provide the means to increase 
external validity. Another strength is the use of external interviewees to add further 
perspectives on a less company dependent basis. On the other hand, the issue of subjectivity 
is always prevalent in a qualitative study, especially those involving interviews of firm 
employees. The interviewees might be biased, since some may have interest in putting their 
own company in a good light. This is rather inevitable (Kvale, 1996: 285), but the use of several 
interviews within a company is believed to reduce the possibility of spurious conclusions. The 
case study on Chapdrive included one interviewee representing a venture capital fund as an 
active owner. This does also add unbiased views to the study. Furthermore, it is believed that 
data triangulation provides a good solution to the problem. This is because conclusions are 
always based on several sources, which significantly reduces the risk of ending up with 
spurious inferences. 
Before conducting the interviews, it was decided not to tape-record them. The author felt that 
the use of recording devices would have been obtrusive for the interviewees. Due to 
sensitivity issues, it would have made them less open to share firm-specific information. 
Furthermore, all of the interviewees were approached through cold calls with no former 
relationship. Thus, the author stressed the significance of an open and comfortable interview 
setting to establish initial mutual trust, which was partly achieved by not recording the 
interviews. In retrospect, validity and reliability could have been increased by using tape-
records. However, it is believed these issues have been properly taken care of through the use 
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of data triangulation among interviewees, thorough and clearly written interview notes, and 
having the interviewees review and correct the summaries.   
2.6.3 Discussion 
Analytic strategies such as cross-case synthesis, triangulation and rival explanation provide a 
strong fundament for a study with high degree of internal validity. However, additional means 
to achieve this are possible. Several techniques such as pattern matching, explanation 
building, time-series analysis and logic models could have been used in the thesis to increase 
internal validity (Yin, 2014: 48). However, these are methods that require significant practice 
to master (Yin, 2014: 142), and it has not been within the time and resource constraints of this 
thesis to develop these capabilities.  
As pointed out in 2.4, the author met several challenges of conducting this study alone. 
Another one of them was experienced during the empirical analysis and discussions. It is easy 
to be colored by its own perceptions and opinions of the data material, and opportunities for 
critical academic discussions are reduced when not having a co-author to consult with during 
the work. This was somewhat remedied through fruitful discussions with the supervisor. 
Nevertheless, similar future studies will benefit from being done by at least two researchers.               
2.7 Summary 
This chapter started off by presenting the important concepts of internal validity, construct 
validity, external validity and reliability. As a final summary, table 7 shows how different 
methodical choices affect these terms. In general, it is believed that the set of actions below 
contribute to a high-quality research design, although some trade-offs are necessary.    
Table 7: Impact of methodical choices on various research quality criteria 
Criteria Positively affected by… Negatively affected by… 
Construct validity Multiple sources of evidence (data 
triangulation), having interviewees 
confirm transcript, chain of evidence  
Interviews and literature review 
conducted by one person, interviews 
not tape-recorded 
Internal validity Several interviews within each case, 
address rival explanations, cross-
case synthesis 
Interviews not tape-recorded 
External validity  Multiple cases, successful/failed 
products and radical/incremental 
innovations regarded 
Focus on the Norwegian wind 
technology market, B2B and products 
Reliability Case study protocol, clear citations, 
thorough documentation of 
literature review 
 
The next chapter starts off the actual discussion and treatment of the problem statement by 
presenting a series of relevant articles and theories about commercialization and the product 
launch process.  
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3. Literature review 
3.1 Introduction 
This part of the thesis is organized along a thematic way, focusing less on the chronology of 
the articles. Development of theoretical propositions is an important part in this chapter, as 
they provide a common thread throughout the later analysis and discussions. In sections 3.3 
to 3.6, these propositions are presented at the end of each part in an ongoing basis, and finally 
summarized in a theoretical framework in section 3.8.   
A general overview of the literature in terms of definitions, commercialization process models, 
methodology, types of innovations and commercialization decisions is given in section 3.2. 
Central concepts such as radical and incremental innovations, strategic – and tactical launch 
decisions are introduced in this part. Next, section 3.3 explores the reasons why so many 
commercialization efforts fail. Part 3.4 constitutes the largest and heaviest presentation in this 
literature review. It discusses decision-making, various strategic orientations among 
managers, and the relationship between different strategies and product performance. 
Cooperation and licensing issues are then presented in section 3.5, before part 3.6 addresses 
venture capital (VC) funds’ role in financing start-ups and new product launches. The empirical 
review is found in section 3.7, and evaluates what the literature says about how specifically 
wind technology providers best can commercialize their products. Whereas the theory review 
in 3.2-3.6 is not concerned with any industry in particular, the empirical review is based on 
articles with empirical data from the renewable energy sector and the IT industry. Finally, the 
literature review is summed up in a framework in section 3.8, using the established 
propositions in previous parts. This will provide the basis for the case studies in chapter four 
and discussion in chapter five.       
3.2 Overview of the extant literature 
3.2.1 Definition, commercialization process models and methodology 
The terms product launch and commercialization are often used interchangeably in the 
literature, and in the rest of the thesis, I will continue to do so. There is not much controversy 
around the definition of commercialization. Frattini et.al. (2012: 2) uses the definition of 
Hultink et.al. (1997: 245), which states that commercialization or launch strategy are “those 
decisions and activities necessary to present a product to its target market and begin to 
generate income from sales of the new product”. Balachandra et.al. (2010: 1843) expands on 
this view, and adds that the creation of the product must be self-sustaining and thrive in the 
market without any kind of subsidies, and at the level of other competing technologies. In the 
remaining thesis, I will use this definition in addition to Jolly (1997*: 4).       
New product development consists of several phases. According to Balachandra et.al. (2010: 
1845) the innovation chain starts with basic research, followed by applied research, 
development, design, engineering and manufacturing, which results into a physical device. 
The final stage, which is the main concern of this thesis, involves marketing and 
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commercialization, and is the part that often requires the most commitment in terms of time, 
money and managerial resources (Hultink et.al., 1998; Beard & Easingwood, 1996: 87). It is 
also associated with a large amount of risk, as new product launches have an expected failure 
rate of 30% (Beard & Easingwood, 1996: 87). Roessner (1984) outlines a simple model of 
industrial development made by Mueller and Tilton (1969*), expanding on the innovation 
chain of Balachandra et.al. (2010). Following an innovation and product launch stage with 
much uncertainty, the imitation stage opens up for entry of new firms, since uncertainty is 
reduced and the commercial viability of the product is demonstrated. Market intensity 
increases in the technological competition stage, before the margins reduce and products 
standardize in the fourth and final phase. In this thesis, I am predominantly interested in the 
innovation and product launch stage of Mueller and Tilton’s model.     
Complementary to the framework of Balachandra et.al. (2010), Jolly (1997*) presents a 
commercialization process model with a somewhat different perspective. This model is more 
normative than the work of Balachandra et.al. (2010). Furthermore, it has a rather broad view 
on the commercialization process, and this thesis uses this model as boundary and definition 
of the product launch phase. Jolly (1997*) argues that a set of activities must be carried out in 
an iterative manner, if a product is to be successfully commercialized. As depicted in figure 2, 
the odd-numbered activities are key sub-processes that are needed for the product to be 
brought to the market, while the even-numbered ones refer to bridges between each sub-
process that are meant to satisfy and mobilize stakeholders at each stage (Jolly, 1997*: 3). The 
commercialization process is started off by imagining, which refers to when ideas are 
combined with potentially attractive market opportunities (Jolly, 1997*: 3). In order to realize 
this opportunity, interest must be captured from stakeholders that can bring the idea further 
to a research and development phase (Jolly, 1997*: 13). The third point in figure 2 stresses 
the importance of proving that the idea fulfills a distinct need and is technically viable. The 
second bridge, denoting point four in figure 2, argues that substantial resources must be 
gathered from both actors within and outside the organization. For example, the potential of 
the innovation must be communicated in an unequivocal manner, such that grants and 
support from venture capital funds are secured (Jolly, 1997*: 6). Process five is about 
demonstrating the technology in marketable products, and can be regarded as the product 
development phase of figure 2 (Jolly, 1997*: 8). While the two previous bridges relate to 
Figure 2: Technology commercialization process (Jolly, 1997*: 4) 
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technology transfer issues, the final two bridges are market related (Jolly, 1997*: 13). Thus, 
point six marks the start of market-oriented activities, and emphasizes the first product 
acceptance among customers and other market constituents. At this point, many 
commercialization efforts fail (Jolly, 1997*: 10). The promotion stage aims to persuade 
customers to adopt the technology, and to convince the development of an infrastructure that 
must be in place in order to provide the technology’s full benefits (Jolly, 1997*: 11). The latter 
point can be regarded as especially important among discontinuous innovations, which is 
discussed in section 3.2.2 in relation to the work of Frattini (2012). The final bridge, or point 
eight in figure 2, is decisive for a broader technology diffusion to mass markets. At this point, 
suppliers must provide the necessary complementary products and infrastructure for the full 
benefit of the customers (Jolly, 1997*: 13). This contention is very much in agreement with 
Moore (2002*) and his theory on whole product configuration (cf. section 3.3). The final sub-
process is to sustain the commercialization, a phase Jolly (1997*: 11) point out to be hard due 
to rapid product obsolescence and constant entry of new competitors. Several propositions 
could have been developed from this paragraph alone, but many of the elements in Jolly’s 
model are further discussed in the next sections. Thus, the framework is rather used to 
support and elaborate the formulated propositions in the next sections.           
As seen in table 8, there are significantly more conceptual than deductive studies in this 
literature review. The latter method uses case studies and interviews to arrive at conclusions, 
while deductive studies construct a set of hypotheses based on extant research and 
subsequently test their validity on a given data sample. All of the articles below are presented 
in this chapter.  
Table 8: Overview of methodologies used in the articles 
Conceptual studies (28 sources) Deductive studies (13 sources) 
Balachandra et.al. (2010), Beard and 
Easingwood (1996), Benedetto (1999), Bower 
and Christensen (1995*), Christensen (1997*), 
Easingwood and Beard (1989), Easingwood and 
Harrington (2002), Erikson et.al. (2009*), Frattini 
et.al. (2012), Gans and Stern (2003), Golicic and 
Sebastiao (2011), Holgersen and Lillebo (2002*), 
Hultink and Robben (1999), Hultink and 
Schoormans (1995), Hultink et.al. (1997), Jolly 
(1997*), Laird and Sjoblom (2004), Mazzarol and 
Reboud (2006), Moore (2002*), Mueller and 
Tilton (1969*), Olleros (1986), Roessner (1984), 
Slater and Mohr (2006), Teece (2006), Timmons 
and Bygrave (1986), Teece (1986*), Walsh 
(2012), Widding et.al. (2002*).  
Aggarwal and Hsu (2009), Debruyne et.al. 
(2002), Frattini et.al. (2013), Hellman and Puri 
(2000), Hsu (2006), Hultink et.al. (1998), Kasch 
and Dowling (2008), Kollmer and Dowling 
(2004), Langerak et.al. (2004), Lin et.al. (2006), 
Mu and Benedetto (2011), Talke and Hultink 
(2010), Walsh et.al. (2002). 
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3.2.2 Typology of innovations and commercialization decisions 
Strongly connected to product characteristics and its related strategy, is the various types of 
innovations. Although researchers use different and sometimes confusing types of terms, the 
literature distinguishes mainly between radical and incremental innovation (Debruyne et.al., 
2002: 161; Walsh et.al, 2002: 343; Frattini et.al., 2012: 4). The former refers to offerings that 
represents a discontinuity in the market, and further advances the technological state-of-the-
art that characterizes the industry. The latter is associated with logical extensions and 
refinements to existing technology, and are often not regarded as a breakthrough. Although 
Walsh et.al. (2002) use very much the same differentiation of innovation, they use the terms 
discontinuous and continuous innovation. Furthermore, it is highlighted that the former 
evolves from disruptive technologies, while the latter develops from sustained technologies 
(Walsh et.al., 2002: 344). Sustained technologies maintain the rate of improvement, and are 
often modifications of existing value offerings, whereas disruptive technologies introduce very 
different “attributes from the one mainstream customers historically value” (Bower & 
Christensen, 1995*: 4). It is important to note that the performance of disruptive products can 
be worse than other, but creates value by catering to the needs of completely new customers 
and businesses. It is clear that Walsh et.al. (2002) separate the concepts of technology focus, 
referring to product itself, and innovation type, which is related to commercialization of the 
invention (Walsh et.al., 2002: 344).  
Frattini et.al. (2012: 4) contend that the characteristics of an innovation must not only rely on 
the product characteristics itself, but also on the existence of an infrastructure that supports 
the product. Thus, a discontinuous innovation, not to be confused with the term that Walsh 
et.al. (2002) use, is an innovation that require a profound change in the infrastructure that 
supports it. On the other hand, continuous innovations work efficiently within the current 
infrastructure. Finally, Beard and Easingwood (1996) differs between four innovations along 
technology and market maturity dimensions, each of which requires its own set of strategic 
and tactical launch decisions. These are normal -, technology -, market – and revolutionary 
innovations. This article is further discussed in section 3.4.2.        
Several researchers distinguish between long-term strategic decisions and short-term tactical 
decisions in the product launch literature (Benedetto, 1996; Frattini et.al., 2013; Hultink et.al., 
1997; Hultink et.al., 1998). According to Hultink et.al. (1998: 271), strategic launch decisions 
define the boundaries of the commercialization effort, influence which of the tactical 
elements that most likely lately will maximize profit over the product’s lifetime, are difficult 
or expensive to alter in a later stage once made and addresses the questions of what, when, 
where and why to launch a new product. On the other hand, tactical decisions are made 
relatively late in the project, can be easily modified and often considers marketing mix 
elements such as product, price, promotion and distribution (Hultink et.al., 1998: 272). 
Benedetto (1999: 532) provides support to the concept of strategic and tactical decisions, but 
adds marketing information-gathering activities as a third crucial element in developing a 
commercialization strategy. This is aimed at supporting the strategic and tactical launch 
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decisions by providing valuable customer insights, competitive intelligence and market 
information (Benedetto, 1999: 532). Additionally, Frattini et.al. (2013) and Hultink et.al. (1997) 
further elaborate the linkage between strategic and tactical launch decisions. Frattini et.al. 
(2013: 176) point out that existing literature stresses the prominence of consistency between 
the two elements. Hultink et.al. (1997: 245) show the implication of this to product strategy 
formulation by building a typology of four generic launch strategies (cf. section 3.4.3). 
3.3 Why do so many commercialization efforts fail? 
Several theories offer an 
explanation to why so many 
start-up firms fail during the 
launch of a new product. 
According to Frattini et.al. 
(2013: 186), the more radical 
the product is, the greater the 
likelihood of an early product 
exit. The well-cited work of Moore (2002*), explains why such high-technology products fail. 
According to him, the marketplace consists of innovators, early adopters, early majority, late 
majority and laggards, with each segment representing in size a certain portion of the normal 
distribution curve (cf. figure 3). Innovators and early adopters are easily susceptible to new 
high-technology products. However, the market for these segments is not very big, thus most 
of the value in monetary terms is found in the mass-market segments. Nevertheless, Moore 
(2002*: 17) asserts that these customers are fundamentally different from the early market 
adopters, thus demanding a different approach to marketing and selling of products. This gap 
in consumer behavior is termed the chasm, and the reason why many firms fail to 
commercialize their innovations in long term, is that they do not manage to cross this chasm. 
Moore’s model is applicable for both B2B and B2C markets, thereby making it possible to use 
in later analysis of the thesis’ problem statement.  
In similar fashion to Moore (2002*), Laird and Sjoblom (2004) remark that deep understanding 
of the customers is essential. Additionally, they contend that improper strategic partnerships, 
mismanagement of the project and stakeholder interests and lack of exit opportunities 
characterize a failed product strategy (Laird & Sjoblom, 2004: 65). One must use a disciplined 
approach to avoid these pitfalls. This can be achieved through a simple and timely product 
prototyping, lean funding of new product developments, managing expectations, considering 
exit opportunities up front and staying on a given track (Laird & Sjoblom, 2004: 69).      
Older research by Olleros (1986), criticizes the notion that it is always an advantage to be a 
pioneer in the industry. Several groundbreaking innovations end up in early demise. Olleros 
(1986: 8) argue that the standard explanation of size-shakeout explaining this, i.e. that 
pioneering firms lose to larger companies that are standardizing and reducing the cost of the 
product as the industry is maturing, is not a valid reason alone. Rather, Olleros (1986: 9) claims 
Figure 3: Customer segmentation and crossing the chasm (Moore, 2002*) 
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that it is the burnout of early pioneers that cause their early exit, and this is especially 
prevalent in the market for new radical technologies. Two driving forces are associated with 
this. First, market uncertainty, in terms of long payback time due to slow adoption rate, 
creates financial instability (Olleros, 1986: 11). The pioneer firm, especially start-ups with little 
up-front financing, burns cash faster than it can generate income, thus limiting how long it can 
stay competitive in the marketplace. This explaining factor is closely related to the term valley 
of death (Balachandra et. al., 2010: 1844), which points out that in the transition phase 
between product demonstration and commercialization, cost per unit is high and market 
penetration low, leaving many ventures out of business. The lack of a wholly developed 
product enhances the effect market uncertainty. This is in line with Moore’s research, which 
states that mass markets will only adopt a whole product. Second, technological uncertainty 
penalizes start-ups due to incompatibilities with other products (Olleros, 1986: 14). The 
related formulated proposition (P1b) in next page focuses on market uncertainty and the 
death valley phenomenon to limit its scope and extent. Olleros (1986: 16) suggests that 
pioneering companies can escape the burnout trap by minimizing their initial investment base. 
This can be achieved through subcontracting of manufacturing work, joint ventures with 
established mass-marketers and licensing of technology.    
The seminal work of Teece (1986*) is one of the most cited articles in the commercialization 
literature, and his model has been later discussed and refined in Teece (2006). I will focus on 
the original research from 1986, as it is well established and known among scholars. Teece 
(1986*: 285) attempts to explain why innovators often fail to gain economic rent from a new 
product, while imitators benefit. He argues that ownership of complementary assets, i.e. 
services or products used in conjunction with the innovation, help to determine the winners 
and losers of the product introduction (Teece, 1986*: 304). These are needed in the long term 
if the product is to become whole (Moore, 2002*) and survive in the market. If imitators are 
able to quickly copy the innovators technology, which is more likely in an environment with 
weak patent protection, the competitive advantage of the innovator is eroded. Furthermore, 
if the imitator is better positioned with respect to complementary assets, the competitive 
advantage may turn in favor of the imitator.    
In summary, the articles in this section provide quite different views on commercialization 
pitfalls. Moore (2002*) is mostly centered on the importance of customers, while Olleros 
(1986), Teece (1986*) and Balachandra et.al. (2010) relate more of their work to products and 
internal firm factors. On the other hand, Laird and Sjoblom (2004) use elements of both. 
However, some similarities can be found. The notion of a whole product can be found in 
Moore (2002*), Olleros (1986) and Teece (1986*) as a crucial ingredient to cross the chasm, 
reduce market uncertainty and increase market survival. Norwegian wind technology 
companies must be aware of the dangers mentioned in this section during product 
commercialization. Thus, the following three propositions are postulated, where P1a is related 
to the work of Moore (2002*), P1b to Olleros (1986) and P1c to Teece (1986*): 
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P1a: Norwegian wind technology providers should develop a whole product and cross the 
chasm, in order to avoid early market exit.    
P1b: Norwegian wind technology providers should minimize its initial investment base, in order 
to avoid early market exit and reduce the consequences of the death valley phenomenon. 
P1c: Norwegian wind technology providers should gain a strong position in complementary 
assets, in order to avoid early market exit.   
The propositions above are mostly focused on how to avoid commercialization failure. Equally 
important and very much related, is how companies can achieve commercial success. This is 
discussed in the next section.                     
3.4 Strategic orientation 
3.4.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in section 3.2.2, several authors contrast between strategic and tactical launch 
decisions, and this is often used as a basis to formulate various strategic orientations when 
commercializing products. This section analyzes this theme in depth by comparing and 
contrasting each article with another. The literature regarding product launch and 
commercialization strategies can be organized along two streams. First, section 3.4.2 
examines articles of a descriptive nature. These say little about the linkage between strategy 
and product performance, but describe decision-making in companies. Second, section 3.4.3 
discusses papers with normative characteristics and reveals the anteceding factors to product 
performance. Finally, section 3.4.4 summarizes the articles and establishes a set of four 
different propositions based on previous discussions.   
3.4.2 Descriptive research 
The articles of Beard and Easingwood (1996) and Easingwood and Beard (1989) provide a 
rather descriptive research on a group of managers and marketers in UK high technology 
companies. Marketing operations and decisions are investigated, and an overview of various 
strategies and tactics are given. Based on empirical data, the latter article divides launch 
tactics into market preparation (licensing, distributions arrangements), targeting (innovators, 
early adopters, late adopters, existing customer’s, competitors’ customers), positioning (price, 
technological superiority, exclusivity, special applications) and attack (opinion leaders, 
reference sites, winner image, lease of product, educating customers). Furthermore, Beard 
and Easingwood (1996: 96) assert that the choice of these tactics is dependent on market 
maturity and technological uncertainty. The final result is shown in figure 4. The second article, 
Easingwood and Beard (1989), shifts the focus to long-term strategic decisions, rather than 
short term tactical ones. They present four different groups of strategies, namely cooperation 
with other producers (licensing, education program), positioning of the product (approach 
innovators or heavy users), reducing the risk of adoption (trial without purchase, absorb the 
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risk) and winning market 
support (opinion leaders, 
winner reputation, legitimize 
the product) (Easingwood & 
Beard, 1989: 125). It should be 
noted that several elements, 
such as positioning, is 
overlapping with the 
previously discussed article, 
thus it is clear that the authors 
are not entirely consistent 
with the use of terms. 
Furthermore, the two articles 
can be criticized for giving few 
tangible recommendations to 
managers. First, they do not clearly distinguish between B2B and B2C marketing in their data 
sample, and second, the strategies and tactics are not linked to firm and product performance.  
Research performed by Debruyne et.al. (2002) focuses more on external factors. The paper 
describes competitive reactions new product launches meet in the market. Through the study 
of a number of successful and failed industrial product launches, the authors conclude that 
two thirds face competitive reactions after its launch, implying that a competitor orientation 
is necessary (Debruyne et.al., 2002: 167). Furthermore, it is found that the likelihood of 
competitive reactions increases with incremental product launches compared to radical 
innovations, high marketing efforts, products using broad rather than niche strategies and in 
markets with high growth (Debruyne et.al., 2002). Similarly as the preceding articles, this 
paper is rather descriptive and does not link any research to firm or product performance. 
However, it proposes that companies should be competitor oriented to succeed in markets 
with intense competition.    
The link to firm and product performance is clearer in the work by Hultink and Schoorman 
(1995), which too is rather descriptive in nature. They discuss the impact of tactical decisions, 
in terms of pricing, promotion, competitive advantage and product assortment on product 
success. The analysis is performed on a group of managers, where each is asked to evaluate 
which launch decisions they would use on a certain product to maximize its success. They find 
out that the result can be grouped into two clusters. The first one focuses on small product 
assortment and price skimming, while the second concentrates on penetration pricing, broad 
assortment and pull promotion (Hultink & Schoormans, 1995: 238). The research shows that 
there is no right or wrong answer in how a product should be launched. Decision makers 
emphasize different means and objectives, even when assessing the same product. The article 
is more interested in the decision-making among managers than explicitly analyzing the 
Figure 4: Launch tactics in various markets (Beard & Easingwood, 1996: 101) 
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anteceding factors of product and firm performance. This gap in theory, which was also 
revealed previously, is remedied by several authors in the next section.         
3.4.3 Product performance and success factors 
The focus in this section lies in explaining various success factors for a viable and long-term 
profitable product strategy. Research by Hultink and Schoormans (1995), Hultink et.al. (1997), 
Hultink et.al. (1998), Benedetto (1999), Hultink and Robben (1999), Slater and Mohr (2006), 
Talke and Hultink (2010), Mu and Benedetto (2011), Frattini et.al. (2012) and Frattini et.al. 
(2013), revolve around the linkages between strategies, decisions, product- and firm success. 
The following paragraphs will present and compare these articles in a critical manner. Several 
strategy typologies are introduced by each paper, but I will emphasize on those that are 
positively related to product or firm performance.  
The papers Hultink et.al. (1997) and Hultink et.al. (1998) both distinguish between strategic 
and tactical product launch decisions. The former especially emphasize the importance of 
alignment between the two elements (Hultink et.al., 1997: 247). Four different strategies are 
presented, but it is the niche innovator strategy that maximizes product launch success. This 
approach targets niche markets with technology driven and innovative products (Hultink 
et.al., 1997: 252). Tactical decisions such as broad product assortment, skimming pricing policy 
and exclusive distributions are utilized. Conversely, misaligned strategies are related to low 
product success. Major strengths with the study, is that it is exclusively B2B related and 
regards both successful and failed products in the data sample. The article from 1998 is quite 
similar as Hultink et.al. (1997), but concentrates on the B2C industry. It finds evidence that 
managers do indeed use a set of generic strategies when launching products and that these 
influence product success to a varying degree. Furthermore, offensive improvements strategy 
was deemed more effective than innovative new products launch, in terms of customer, 
financial and product performance (Hultink et.al., 1998: 280). The strategy focuses on 
improvements on existing products in markets with few competitors in order to raise 
competitive barriers. The tactical decisions are associated with broad product assortment, 
higher prices, use of customer promotion and use of current distribution channels. This is 
somewhat contrary to Hultink et.al. (1997), which considers new products in its niche 
innovator strategy. This discrepancy is most likely explained by difference in B2B and B2C 
focus.    
In line with several previously mentioned authors, Benedetto (1999) and Hultink and Robben 
(1999) do also differ between strategic and tactical launch decisions. The former also adds 
market information gathering activities as a central element. However, Benedetto’s analysis 
is more relevant to this thesis, as he assesses which commercialization activities are the most 
critical for product success. Regarding the strategic constituent, cross-functional teams when 
making decisions and involving logistics and distribution early in the planning are deemed 
decisive for product success (Benedetto, 1999: 535). Important tactical launch decision drivers 
are high quality selling effort, good product launch management and launch timing 
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(Benedetto, 1999: 539). Finally, market testing and customer feedback are central market 
information gathering activities (Benedetto, 1999: 539). Despite the relevance of the article, 
it does not differentiate between B2B, B2C and product type, which represent several flaws 
in the research. On the other hand, Hultink and Robben (1999) do regard both successful and 
failed products in order to increase external validity. The empirical data conclude that product 
innovativeness, early launch timing, penetration pricing, broad product assortment and 
offensive launch objectives are positively related to new product performance (Hultink & 
Robben, 1999: 553).      
The article of Frattini et.al. (2012) undertake a historical analysis on a series of successful and 
unsuccessful technological innovations, thus distinguishing a good commercialization strategy 
from a bad one. By analyzing each case, the researchers argue that successful 
commercialization strategies are highly dependent on context of the product and the market. 
Innovative launches demand a whole product, cf. Moore (2002*), good timing, careful and 
proactive targeting and communication of the product to early adopters (Frattini et.al., 2012: 
5). On the other hand, discontinuous innovations must be supported by a well-functioning 
infrastructure before it diffuses into the mainstream market. This can be achieved through 
partnerships and alliances, which can incorporate the innovating company’s underlying 
technology (Frattini et.al., 2012: 6). Finally, products targeted at mainstream customers must 
have a clear positioning, educate users through distribution channels, configure a whole 
product and initially use a price skimming strategy, followed by penetration pricing as the 
market matures (Frattini et.al., 2012: 7). The authors point out that companies must identify 
the degree of discontinuity and innovativeness of the product, then isolate which of the three 
aforementioned strategies are most relevant, and finally pick a set of decisions that maximize 
its effectiveness (Frattini et.al., 2012: 9). It should be noted that the authors do not measure 
the effect of each decisions on product performance, but do rather present factors that can 
lead to commercialization success. The focus the article has on customer positioning and 
communication, makes it clear that it relies its research on B2C products, which can be 
regarded as a weakness. A later article by Frattini et.al. (2013), do also discuss the relationship 
between strategic-, tactical launch decisions and product performance in the B2C industry, 
but through a deductive method. They conclude that there is positive relationship between 
investment in advertisement and use of partners on the one hand, and early market survival 
on the other (Frattini et.al., 2013: 183). This is especially prevalent among radical innovations 
compared to incremental products.   
Building on the works of Moore (2002*) and Christensen (1997*), Slater and Mohr (2006) 
argue that companies commercializing high technology products must overcome the 
innovator’s dilemma and at the same time cross the chasm. They must avoid cases where they 
focus too much on existing customers, and allocate more resources to understand potential 
customers and react to possible threats such as disruptive technologies and newcomers in the 
future (Slater & Mohr, 2006: 32). Furthermore, the chasm must be crossed to ensure a 
continuous and healthy profit stream. The authors contend that building resources to handle 
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these two critical problems, predominantly in the form of proactive market learning (Slater & 
Mohr, 2006: 32), is essential to product success.     
The article of Easingwood and Harrington (2002) does also further elaborate on the research 
of Moore (2002*). They claim that a company must launch its high technology products twice; 
once when the product is introduced to the market, and afterwards before the product 
crosses the chasm (Easingwood & Harrington, 2002: 658). A successful initial product launch 
consists of comprehensive market preparation, the use of a high-level sales force to target the 
technology enthusiasts and visionaries, positioning the technological superiority of the 
product and cultivate a winner image of the value offering (Easingwood & Harrington, 2002). 
In the next stage, a whole product should be assembled through several complementary 
assets and services, such that mainstream customers easily can adopt the products. The last 
phase consists of the re-launch. Decisive market preparation activities are finding value-added 
resellers who can supply the product and cooperation with external partners to establish a 
market leader positions, as mainstream customers prefer to buy from market leaders. 
Furthermore, specific customer targeting and positioning are also crucial.        
 
So far, the articles mention little about the antecedents of launch strategy. Talke and Hultink 
(2010: 220) argue that corporate mind-set, i.e. the firm’s general posture toward corporate 
behavior and performance, is a central anteceding factor to launch strategy and market 
performance. The impact of an analytical -, risk-taking - and aggressive posture is analyzed on 
product launch strategy in terms of launch objectives, market segmentation and product 
relationship. The influence of these launch decisions are then analyzed on market 
performance. Figure 5 shows the positive relationships between each element in blue lines, 
while the red lines mark the rejected hypotheses. As Talke and Hultink (2010: 232) point out, 
the implication of the study is that launch strategy alone is not enough to ensure superior 
market performance. In order to succeed, all activities and decisions must be rooted to the 
corporate mind-set of the company. On a final note, a strength with this article is that the data 
are exclusively based on B2B firms.     
Figure 5: Anteceding factors of launch strategy and market performance (Talke & Hultink, 2010: 227) 
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The papers presented thus far, perform most of the analysis at a micro level. In opposition, 
Mu and Benedetto (2011) bring the discussion of strategic orientation and product 
commercialization to a more holistic level. They argue that the extant literature lacks research 
on the impact of combining various strategic orientations. Four different strategy modes are 
presented. First, market orientation is defined by the organization’s focus on customer 
segment targeting, fulfilling customers’ needs and deliver superior value to them (Mu & 
Benedetto, 2011: 340). Second, technology orientation concentrates on the use of 
sophisticated technologies to create new product ideas (Mu & Benedetto, 2011: 340). Third, 
entrepreneurial orientation refers to which degree the firm pursuits new market 
opportunities, and renewal of existing markets through introduction of innovations (Mu & 
Benedetto, 2011: 341). Finally, network orientation reflects to what extent the firm stresses 
effective location of network partners, management of network relationships, and network 
performance improvements (Mu & Benedetto, 2011: 341). The authors find evidence that all 
of these strategy modes have a positive effect on product commercialization success. More 
interesting is their claim that the modes support each other, leading to complementary effects 
(Mu & Benedetto, 2011: 343). A single strategic orientation is not enough. Furthermore, the 
authors contend that environmental dynamism increases the importance of strategic 
orientations, and finally that organizational learning mediates the positive relationship 
between strategy modes and commercialization performance (Mu & Benedetto, 2011: 344). 
Although it would have been interesting to test this contention in the Norwegian wind 
segment, the method in this thesis is deemed less appropriate to analyze it. Other methods 
such as causal mapping might be more suitable.                 
Langerak et.al (2004) support the notion Mu and Benedetto (2011) have on the positive 
relationship between market orientation and new product performance. However, they have 
a slightly differing point of departure in their research. The authors do not relate market 
orientation to other strategic modes. Instead, the aim of the article is to reveal which activities 
a market-oriented culture is translated into superior customer value (Langerak et.al., 2004: 
80). Figure 6 shows the 
accepted hypotheses 
marked in blue, while the 
red lines represent the 
rejected hypotheses. 
Indeed, Langerak et.al. 
(2004) support the findings 
of Mu and Benedetto 
(2011) and Lin et.al. (2006). 
However, it disagrees with 
Talke and Hultink (2010) in 
that there is a significant 
positive relationship 
between launch strategy 
Figure 6: Anteceding factors of product and organizational performance (Langerak 
et.al., 2004: 82) 
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and product performance. Only launch tactics is related to product success. Moreover, 
Langerak et.al. (2010) assert that market orientation leads to product advantage, which in turn 
mediates product performance. Finally, they point out that a market-oriented culture can be 
achieved through organizational commitment to core values and to develop the necessary 
skills, incentives and systems to implement the core values (Langerak et.al., 2010: 89).  
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, Lin et.al. (2006) find a positive relationship between 
market orientations, or what they term as commercial orientation, and product and firm 
performance. Additionally, they argue that market orientation interacting together with R&D 
intensity releases further synergies, as they are complementary (Lin et.al., 2006: 684). Finally, 
the contention that knowledge stocks of technology-based firm positively affects its 
performance is confirmed.     
3.4.4 Summary 
Section 3.4 divided the research about strategic orientation and firm performance into a 
descriptive and normative part. 3.4.2 presented a group of articles distinguishing between 
strategic and tactical launch decisions, and how these were used by managers when 
commercializing their products. A commonality in the research was how the tactical and 
strategic decisions change with respect to the degree of product radicalness. Furthermore, 
the lack of focus on the relationship between launch decisions and firms and product 
performance was criticized. Due to the descriptive characteristics of the articles in section 
3.4.2, it is hard to develop propositions that are relevant for the normative nature of the 
problem statement in this thesis. However, Debruyne et.al. (2002) argues that competitor 
orientation is necessary in a market dominated by fierce competition. Thus, the following 
proposition related to part 3.4.2 is established:  
P2: Norwegian wind technology providers should be competitor oriented, in order to best 
commercialize its products. 
Section 3.4.3 discusses the important issue of the relationship between launch decisions and 
product success, but the literature provides no clear answer to the topic. However, most of 
the articles seem to agree on the importance of alignment between strategic and tactical 
launch decisions (Hultink et.al., 1997; Hultink et.al., 1998; Benedetto, 1999; Hultink & Robben, 
1999; Frattini, 2013). Hence, the following proposition is presented:  
P3: Norwegian wind technology providers should align its strategic and tactical launch 
decisions, in order to best commercialize its products. 
In addition to discussing strategic and launch decisions, Benedetto (1999) adds market 
information gathering as a central element in the strategic planning process. In order to reflect 
this in the discussion part, the subsequent proposition is formulated: 
P4: Norwegian wind technology providers should utilize strong market information gathering 
activities, in order to best commercialize its products.  
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Whole product configuration and chasm theory is discussed by another stream of research 
(Frattini et.al., 2012; Slater & Mohr, 2006; Easingwood & Harrington, 2002) as significant 
anteceding factors. This theme is very much covered by the research question in proposition 
1a, therefore a new proposition is not formulated in this section.  
Market orientation is mentioned by Mu & Benedetto (2011), Langerak et.al. (2004), Lin et.al. 
(2006) to be a decisive ingredient in product success. The following proposition is identified 
to reflect this:  
P5: Norwegian wind technology providers should be market oriented, in order to best 
commercialize its products.   
On a final note, the articles in this section agree on the major lines of what constitutes a 
successful commercialization strategy. However, the researchers conclude differently on 
which strategic and tactical decisions are critical for product performance. This discrepancy is 
most likely because of varying methods and data samples in different contexts and industries. 
Thus, more in-depth studies of the Norwegian wind energy industry is needed in order to get 
a complete picture on how Norwegian technology providers should commercialize their 
products. This done in chapter four.  
3.5 Cooperation and licensing 
A common theme in the literature is the use of cooperation in various modes as part of the 
commercialization strategy. While Gans and Stern (2003), Hsu (2006) and Aggarwal and Hsu 
(2009) provide a general analysis of various cooperation strategies, Kollmer and Dowling 
(2004) exclusively discuss licensing. On the other hand, Golicic & Sebastiao (2011) use a supply 
chain framework to illustrate strategic implications for companies launching new to the world 
products. Finally, Kasch and Dowling (2008) discuss the propensity to integrate or cooperate 
in the market. The next paragraphs in this section will further discuss and compare these 
articles, with a particular attention to the implications of the findings on product level.  
The well-cited article of Gans and 
Stern (2003) discusses how 
product launch strategy and 
cooperation depend on the 
economic environment of the 
firm. They differ between 
product markets and markets for 
ideas in the commercialization 
environment, where the former 
refers to the traditional market of 
physical product transactions, 
whereas the latter denotes the 
selling or licensing of intangible Figure 7: Commercialization strategy environments (Gans & Stern, 2003: 340) 
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innovations before they are produced (Gans & Stern, 2003: 334). Similarly as Kollmer and 
Dowling (2004), the authors stress that capabilities and complementary assets must be 
developed to participate in the product markets, while cooperation strategies in the market 
for ideas may soften competition, reduce the need for in-house investments and benefit from 
complementary technology development (Gans & Stern, 2003: 337). Moreover, the 
researchers develop a commercialization strategy framework based on two different 
elements of the external environment. First, the excludability environment measures the 
degree of expropriation potential of patents in the market. Appropriability is a related term 
that is used by several other authors, such as Kasch and Dowling (2008: 1767) and Aggarwal 
and Hsu (2009: 840). Both of these works give support to the framework of Gans and Stern 
(2003), namely that the degree of expropriation potential is a variable for cooperation mode 
choice. Second, complementary asset environment refers to what extent “the incumbents 
complementary assets contribute to the value propositions of the new technology” (Gans & 
Stern, 2003: 339). It is underlined that control over such costly assets is a key wedge between 
the capabilities of incumbents and start-ups. Thus, access to complementary assets through 
cooperation is often a viable alternative compared to wholly owned investments. Contrary to 
Gans and Stern’s model, Aggarwal and Hsu (2009: 841) use governance capabilities, instead 
of complementary assets as the final dimension, following the resource-based view (RBV) 
literature tradition. As a result of the two external factors, Gans and Stern (2003: 340) 
identifies the environments attacker’s advantage, greenfield competition, ideas factories and 
reputation-based ideas trading, each with its own required strategy (cf. figure 7).     
According to Kollmer and Dowling (2004: 1141), liability of newness and smallness among new 
technology-based firms makes licensing an appropriate commercialization strategy. 
Conversely, smaller companies with fewer commercialization obstacles, tend to downgrade 
the significance of external partners, and rely more on customer responses as part of the 
product launch feedback process (Mazzarol & Reboud, 2006: 261). The notion of Kollmer and 
Dowling (2004) is further supported by Aggarwal and Hsu (2009: 835), who point out the 
resource constraints among start-ups. Based on empirical data from a large number of US 
biotechnology firms, the article of Kollmer and Dowling (2004) finds evidence that both 
integrated and non-fully integrated companies enjoy benefits of being part of a licensing 
agreement (Kollmer & Dowling, 2004: 1148). Non-integrated start-ups may choose licensing 
as a successful commercialization channel, since it requires less in-house sales and marketing 
resources, implying that integration is of less prevalence on a long-term basis. This is further 
supported by findings that state that the degree of licensing is independent of company age, 
hence a licensing and non-integrated business strategy is sustainable in the long-run (Kollmer 
& Dowling, 2004: 1149). However, integrated firms may also capitalize on licensing, since it 
can focus its internal resources on its core business by out-licensing non-core products 
(Kollmer & Dowling, 2004: 1148). Despite this, the authors claim that the importance of 
licensing perceived by decision makers in mature and integrated firms, decrease with the 
degree of internal sales and marketing resources (Kollmer & Dowling, 2004: 1148). It should 
be noted that the biotechnology industry is characterized by extensive cooperation (Kollmer 
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& Dowling, 2004: 1144; Aggarwal & Hsu, 2009: 837), which may reduce the external validity 
to other industries. Thus, the results of the study should be used with care when analyzing the 
Norwegian wind industry.    
Hsu (2006) investigates the impact of venture capital on the cooperative strategies of 
commercialization. The author states that cooperative commercialization may be limited due 
to high search costs, potential expropriation of firm assets and know-how, unknown quality 
of the start-up among cooperators and start-ups’ less developed cooperative relationship 
skills. However, based on an empirical study, Hsu (2006: 206) argues that all of these elements 
may be reduced with the partnership of a venture capital fund. First, involved investors can 
reduce search costs through information mediation with its extensive monitoring and due 
diligence processes. Second, lessen the fear of expropriation by participating in the fund’s 
network, since information about opportunistic behavior among cooperators will spread 
faster. Third, endorsements by the venture capitalist can increase the information 
cooperators have about the firm, and finally the investor can transfer knowledge and 
experience to the start-up, thereby increasing its cooperative relationship skills.   
 
Perspectives on supply chain management in nascent markets with new products is provided 
by Golicic and Sebastiao (2011). They narrow the unit of analysis to the information and 
material flows of product development and distribution (Golicic & Sebastiao, 2011: 255), and 
conduct a multiple exploratory case study on five different US companies. Based on cross-case 
findings from these companies, Golicic and Sebastiao (2011: 266) construct a theoretical 
framework for initial nascent market supply chain strategy (cf. figure 8). A supply chain 
strategy that combines market legitimacy, the building of supply chain capabilities and the 
continuous refinement of value propositions results in successful commercialization (Golicic 
& Sebastiao, 2011: 266). The three aforementioned elements must be pursued through an 
iterative process between supply chain formation, which is established by personal network, 
geographic proximity and champions, and supply chain structure, which consists of core and 
Figure 8: Nascent market supply chain strategy framework (Golicic & Sebastiao, 2011: 266) 
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flexible peripheral relationships (Golicic & Sebastiao, 2011: 266). This indicates that Golicic 
and Sebastiao (2011: 268) support an emergent and evolutionary oriented supply chain 
strategy. Finally, it is stressed that other influencing factors such as the stage of 
commercialization, access to resources and interdependence may affect the successfulness of 
product launch.   
In summary, all of the articles agree on the causes and benefits of cooperation. However, they 
do have differing points of view. Gans and Stern (2003), Aggarwal and Hsu (2009), Kasch and 
Dowling (2008) and Golicic and Sebastiao (2011) are particularly interested in the external 
environment’s impact on commercialization strategy. This is not very surprising, since drivers 
of cooperation is mainly in the domain of the external market. Kollmer and Dowling (2004) 
exclusively focus on licensing, and argue that both mature companies and start-ups can 
benefit from licensing agreements. Finally, Hsu (2006) explains how the barriers of 
cooperation may be reduced by collaborating with a venture capital fund. Given the all of the 
articles in this section advocate cooperation as positive factor in product commercialization, 
the following proposition is established: 
P6: Norwegian wind technology providers should cooperate with external parties, in order to 
best commercialize its products.    
3.6 Venture capital and financing 
There is a wide amount of different types of financing sources among start-ups. Hellmann and 
Puri (2000: 964) outline angel investors, corporations, banks, venture capital, government and 
self-financing as the most important ones. A majority of the articles in the literature search 
focuses on venture capital, and thus the remaining paragraphs in this section will revolve 
around this issue.    
Support from venture capital funds can be seen as a special kind of cooperation with external 
parties, and can provide important financial resources during a firm start-up. They carefully 
scrutinize potential investments before making any decisions. Once the investment deal is 
completed, the venture capitalists take an active ownership during the lifetime of the 
investment, where they continuously monitor and mentor the company. Finally, they often 
have a central role in guiding the exit role of the investment, such as influencing the initial 
public offering (IPO) of the company (Hellmann & Puri, 2000: 963). According to Timmons and 
Bygrave (1986: 163), several studies done in the US show that high technology ventures 
backed by venture capital achieve higher rates of survival and success.  
Contrary to Timmons and Bygrave (1986), Hellmann and Puri (2000) differentiate between 
firm characteristics and financing strategy. Ex ante strategy is related to the decisions prior to 
financing, and can be distinguished between an innovator and imitator. Innovators are often 
the first ones to introduce new products, for which there are no clear substitutes in the 
market, whereas imitators do not follow a first-mover strategy (Hellmann & Puri, 2000: 960). 
On the other hand, the ex post product market outcome refers to the specific type of financing 
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strategy chosen (Hellmann & Puri, 2000: 964). The authors aim to find the interaction between 
these two elements. Based on empirical findings from Silicon Valley companies, the paper 
argues that firms with innovator strategy are more likely to receive venture capital financing 
than imitators, and also more quickly than its imitator counterparts (Hellmann & Puri, 2000: 
973). Furthermore, the study also concludes that entrepreneurs consider it more important 
to obtain financing from venture capital funds than other financing sources (Hellmann & Puri, 
2000: 978). The implication of the study is that the appropriateness of choosing an involved 
investor, such as a venture capitalist, depends on the firm strategy. However, since the study 
is conducted in California, where the venture capital environment is much more intense than 
in Norway, one can question the generalizability of these findings to a Norwegian context.         
Several researchers have pointed out the advantages of early financing from venture capital 
funds. Timmons & Bygrave (1986: 169) focus on the catalytic role that venture capitalists can 
have in finding and combining people, technology and opportunities to bring ideas into 
commercial reality. In addition, the literature emphasizes on the time to market for venture 
capital-backed companies. Both Timmons and Bygrave (1986: 170) and Hellmann and Puri 
(2000: 976) find empirical evidence of reduced time to market among start-ups backed by 
venture capitalists, especially within highly innovative and technology intensive firms. 
Moreover, Hellmann and Puri (2000: 960) outlines several other benefits such as the venture 
fund providing mentoring, strategic advice, monitoring, corporate governance, 
professionalization of the firm and recruitment of senior management, while Timmons and 
Bygrave (1986: 162) also point out the extensive networks of venture capital firms as an 
important benefit. Finally, as mentioned in section 3.5, venture capital funds can limit the 
barriers to cooperation that new ventures might have through information mediation, 
participation in a large existing networks, endorsements and knowledge transfer (Hsu, 2006: 
217).   
On the other hand, Hellmann and Puri (2000: 960) contend that there are several drawbacks 
in attending to venture capital partnerships. They argue that entrepreneurs can experience 
loss in control of the company, time-consuming activities with investors and a high cost of 
capital relative to other financing alternatives can be potential costs.  
The two final articles in this section is based on excerpts from the anthology Teknologibasert 
nyskaping i Norge (2009) edited by Aspelund et.al. Compared to the previous articles, the 
findings are exclusively based on a Norwegian environment, hence increasing their relevance 
to the problem statement. Although the findings are based on technology intensive start-ups, 
it is a drawback that the wind industry itself is not analyzed.  
First, the study of Widding et.al. (2009*) investigates non-financial contributions from 
Norwegian venture capitalists, and is partly tied to proposition 6. Based on a survey sent to 
both venture capital investors and companies financed by venture funds, the authors analyze 
the importance of value adding activities such as product development, marketing, 
organization, financial management and financing. Contributions in product development 
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and marketing is given the lowest and second lowest scores among the five groups, 
respectively. Within marketing, activities such as building relationships, customer knowledge 
and internationalization are regarded as more significant. This is in line with the study of 
Timmons and Bygrave (1986), which suggests the prominence of networking as a value adding 
activity in VC-backed companies. Organization is given the next highest score in the survey, 
together with financial management. Widding et.al. (2009*: 78) points outs that strategy, 
professionalization and strategic alliances are rated as high within organization. On the other 
hand, recruitment of leaders is regarded as less important, which is in contrast to Timmons 
and Bygrave (1986). In financial management, activities such as budgeting and liquidity 
management are perceived as the most value adding. Finally, competence in financing, 
including valuation, exit opportunities and future financing, receive the highest scores in terms 
of value added. In summary, VC-backed companies rate activities that they themselves do not 
have competence in as highly value adding (Widding et.al., 2009*: 83). This underlines the 
need for companies to complement their areas of expertise.   
Quite interestingly, Widding et.al. (2009*: 81) find empirical evidence that investors and 
entrepreneurs perceive venture funds’ positive contributions to be very different. This gap is 
prevalent in all of the five aforementioned areas of competence. An implication of this is that 
firms must clarify mutual goals and interests with venture capital funds, before entering a 
contract (Widding et.al., 2009*: 83). Furthermore, companies need to get a good idea of 
venture fund’s offerings, such that their bargaining power is increased during the contract 
negotiations (Widding et.al., 2009*: 83).        
The second relevant article in Teknologibasert nyskaping i Norge is a study about venture 
capital ownership written by Erikson et.al. (2009*). It analyzes the impact of relationship-
based governance versus contract-based management. Based on qualitative and quantitative 
data from venture-financed companies, the authors conclude that relationship-based 
management increases the mutual trust to each other, while there is neither a positive nor a 
negative correlation between contract-based governance and mutual trust (Erikson et.al., 
2009*). Conflicts are less likely to occur in a relationship-based environment, and are at the 
same time easier to handle. Finally, the authors point out that while contracts are designed to 
protect against opportunism, they can nevertheless inhibit the cooperation between the 
entrepreneur and the investor and potentially destroy the values the collaboration was meant 
to create (Erikson et.al., 2009: 99*).  
As a final summary, the sample of articles in this review about venture capital do generally 
have a positive view on it as a source of financing in start-ups. However, the appropriateness 
of it depends on the type of strategy the firm is committed to, and on how technology 
intensive and innovative the firm is (Timmons & Bygrave, 1986; Hellmann & Puri, 2000). 
Moreover, Widding et.al. (2009*) discuss benefits from venture capital cooperation, while 
Erikson et.al. (2009*) argue that relationship-based management is the most appropriate 
form of venture capital governance. As a result of the previous discussion, the following 
proposition is formulated: 
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P7: Norwegian wind technology providers should cooperate with venture capital funds, in 
order to finance and best commercialize its products.       
3.7 Empirical review 
The aim of this section is not to present any new propositions, but rather to shed light on 
those that I have previously established based on specific empirical findings. Papers presented 
in this section are thus used as part of the proposition analysis in chapter five, and must be 
regarded as empirical data in line with the interviews in chapter four. Only two articles related 
to commercialization of renewable energy was found during the systematic literature search. 
This assertion is supported by Walsh (2012: 32), who claims that the commercialization 
literature is voluminous, but lacks research on renewable energy technologies. On the other 
hand, a study on success criteria in the IT-sector was found through snowballing, and is 
presented after the articles of Balachandra et.al. (2010) and Walsh (2012). Balachandra et.al. 
(2010) provide some perspectives to the commercialization of sustainable energy 
technologies, by stating that technology diffusion follows an S-curve over time, and that the 
technology will be adopted differently among customers. Other than that, the article is found 
less relevant due to its focus on the Indian market, external market dynamics and measures 
that the government can undertake to increase the viability of new renewable technologies. 
This is not within the domain of this master thesis, and thus the article is deemed less relevant.  
On the other hand, the research of Walsh (2012) fits well with the overall theme of this thesis. 
He asserts that the choice of commercialization strategy must be based on the type of product 
innovation, i.e. disruptive, discontinuous or incremental, and the commercial risk connected 
to the product launch, which is broken down into cost-, product- and market risk (Walsh, 2012: 
33). Market dynamics is heavily focused on. The author contends that technology-push, and 
demand-pull are crucial drivers for the diffusion of new technologies into the market place. 
Technology-push refers to when emerging technologies create value offerings that convince 
the market that the product is needed, while demand-pull is associated when the users 
persuade the innovator that an innovative product is desired to satisfy the needs of the 
customers (Walsh, 2012: 34). Sophistication of the market is used as a proxy variable to 
measure the degree of technology-push, while demand growth for renewable energy is used 
to quantify the pull forces (Walsh, 2012: 35). Consequently, these two dimensions are used to 
identify four different commercialization environments, namely innovation wasteland, 
innovation pull, innovation push and innovation nirvana, each of which need various strategies 
for firms to succeed in. Based on historical data, Walsh (2012) concludes Norway to be in the 
innovation push cluster1, implying a high degree of eco-sophistication and relative low 
renewable energy demand growth. Walsh (2012: 39) points out that this environment is 
characterized by strong bargaining position among technology providers due to their superior 
technology product ownership. Since the market is quite uncertain because of the demand, 
                                                     
1 The original paper does have a few mistakes, mixing up the commercial environment of Norway. However, this 
has been clarified with the author through mail correspondence, and should be corrected by the journal editors.    
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the most appropriate commercialization strategy among start-ups is the use of strategic 
alliances and joint ventures with major incumbent energy firms. This contention is embodied 
in proposition 6, thus Walsh (2012) has not yielded any new research questions. As a 
summary, Walsh (2012) follows the tradition of Gans and Stern (2003), Aggarwal and Hsu 
(2009) and Golicic and Sebastiao (2011), when giving attention to the external market in 
assessing the most relevant commercialization strategy.      
Snowball sampling resulted in the finding of an interesting case study by Holgersen and Lillebo 
(2002*), which investigates success factors among Norwegian IT companies. In terms of 
methodology, the work is quite similar to this master thesis. A set of propositions are 
formulated based on theory, and then discussed using data from interviews with seven 
different successful firms. Although Holgersen and Lillebo (2002*) analyze the IT-sector, the 
study is believed to give important empirical data to this master thesis as it focuses on 
Norwegian high-tech companies. Some of the propositions are in accordance with those I have 
previously established. First, active ownership from venture capitalists is thought to be 
positively related to successful commercialization. Holgersen and Lillebo (2002*) find mixing 
evidence of this. The interviewees argue that venture capital provides little more value than 
financing. This is generally in agreement with Widding et.al. (2009*), who find out that 
financing aspects receive higher scores than strategic value adding activities (cf. section 3.6). 
Second, a proposition related to marketing find support for the importance of market 
orientation. Successful companies are characterized by customer focus and their needs are 
put on the agenda throughout the organization (Holgersen & Lillebo, 2002*: 99). This is very 
much in accordance with several articles discussed in section 3.4.3. Third, network relations 
and cooperation are found to be crucial for finding capital and gaining knowledge, which was 
discussed in section 3.5.   
The remaining four propositions differ from those that have been formulated in this thesis, 
mainly because Holgersen and Lillebo (2002*) use a different theoretical fundament to arrive 
at their propositions. First, Holgersen and Lillebo (2002*) propose that a board and 
management consisting of people with complementary skills is correlated with 
commercialization success. They found evidence of this, and add that technology and market 
competence are vital. Second, it is argued that good market understanding and the ability to 
operationalize these into tangible strategies are success criteria. Furthermore, it is believed 
that this can positively affect marketing and customer orientation abilities. Third, the authors 
contend that companies must manage organizational growth and the transition from start-up 
to a full-fledged professional firm. Fourth and finally, a strong organizational culture and 
willingness to work hard is argued to be success criteria. The last four propositions are decided 
not to be part of this master thesis, as the literature research has not provided any theoretical 
foundation for these.              
There are several weaknesses with the study of Holgersen and Lillebo (2002*). First, the work 
is based on findings in the IT-sector, which limits the validity of using the data when analyzing 
wind technology companies. Second, it is only concerned with successful companies, thus 
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leaving perspectives on what causes failure and how to avoid this. Third, the study does not 
include data from people interviewed outside the case companies, which may cause several 
biasing issues during the analysis. Fourth, only one interview for each case company is 
conducted, which limits the opportunities for data triangulation within the cases. Fifth and 
finally, the study does not distinguish between incremental and radical innovations, for which 
I believe to have various commercialization success factors. These flaws are aimed to be 
remedied in this thesis.              
3.8 Summary and theoretical framework  
The aim of this literature review has been to identify theories and models of best practice 
commercialization strategies in the academic literature. Section 3.2 gave a short introduction 
to definitions and methodologies used in the commercialization literature, and discerned 
various types of innovations and launch decisions. Part 3.3 discussed different theories on why 
many commercialization efforts fail. On the other hand, section 3.4 presented models showing 
the success criteria in product launch strategy. These differed in focus and does not provide a 
converging answer to the problem statement of this thesis. Next, section 3.5 and 3.6 dived 
deeper into the particularities of cooperation and venture capital, respectively. The presented 
papers were generally positive to these elements as an ingredient in successful product 
launches. Finally, section 3.7 reviewed only three relevant articles, as little empirical research 
was found. Altogether, section 3.3 to 3.6 yielded nine different propositions. These will be 
tested and analyzed in the discussion part, and their accuracy will either be strengthened or 
reduced based on empirical findings from six case companies, three external interviews and 
various company documents. In order to simplify and organize further discussions, the 
propositions have been summarized in a single theoretical framework, as depicted in figure 9. 
Proposition 1a, 1b and 1c are hypothesized to lead to lower probability of commercial failure. 
If we assume that the outcome of product commercialization is a dichotomous variable, that 
is either success or failure, then lower probability of commercial failure must logically imply 
higher probability of product commercialization success. This relationship is shown in figure 
9. The remaining propositions of 2 to 7 are postulated to be directly related to higher degree 
of product commercialization performance.          
The research so far provides no clear answer to our problem statement on how Norwegian 
wind technology providers best can commercialize their products. Although a comprehensive 
review of academic theory literature has been conducted, there remains a clear gap between 
theory and industry practice. The empirical review gave us little information on how a 
successful commercialization strategy is developed among wind energy technology providers. 
My belief is that the best practice model is closely dependent on a series of company and 
product specific factors. Research combining academic theories and experience from the 
industry is needed in order to come closer to an answer. Thus, the next step is to bring the 
academic theory into a real life industry context, which is the aim of the next two chapters.  
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Figure 9: Propositions and theoretical framework 
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4. Case companies and their product commercialization  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents six different case companies and their products, each contributing to a 
major portion of the empirical data in the thesis. The section includes some technical and wind 
specific terms and concepts, and readers who are not familiar with these should consider 
reading about wind energy fundamentals in appendix 8.5. It also provides some relevant 
background information about the industry.  
Interviews and key informants are the most important sources in the case studies. However, 
company websites, presentations and other documents are also used when deemed relevant. 
In order to contrast different views and perspectives among interviewees and documents, 
each case company is presented holistically. Each case is introduced with a brief description 
of the interviewees and the firm. The information revealed during the interviews, can be 
grouped into seven sections, namely product, strategy, financing, cooperation, competitors, 
challenges and lessons and success criteria. In order to increase the comparability of each case, 
the company studies are organized along this way, although some sections for certain 
companies are omitted. Moreover, three external interviewees has been included in order to 
increase the validity of the data and provide further perspectives on product 
commercialization. They come from Innovation Norway, the renewable energy industry and a 
venture capital fund. Finally, all of the cases and the interviews are summarized and compared 
in section 4.11.    
The case companies are different to each other with respect to several variables. First, the size 
and maturity of the companies vary significantly. Blaaster, Windflip and Chapdrive represent 
the small and young start-up firms in the sample, with less than ten employees and less than 
six years in the industry. SmartMotor and Fedem Technology are medium companies with 18 
to 20 years in the market. As an outlier, Statoil with its Hywind project is a large and mature 
company with significant international operations. I believe that such mix of case companies 
give opportunities to analyze differences in commercialization strategy in companies with 
different resources, and whether there are any variances in success factors between these. 
Second, the companies are positioned in different parts of the value chain. A simplified value 
chain is illustrated in figure 10, and shows where each case company is situated. Wind power 
operators get supplies such as wind turbines from the product providers, or what can be 
termed as tier 1 suppliers. Moreover, tier 1 suppliers often buy products or services from 
subcontractors, which can be regarded as tier 2 suppliers. The classification of each case 
company will come more apparent for the reader in the product description section of each 
Figure 10: Value chain classifications of the case companies 
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case. Third, and finally, the companies vary in how far they have come in the product 
commercialization process. Using the model of Balachandra et.al. (2010) from section 3.2.1, 
figure 11 shows that whereas SmartMotor and Fedem Technology have finalized their product 
development and initiated sales and marketing, Statoil and Blaaster are still in the engineering 
and demonstration phase. Chapdrive is also in this stage, but is currently out of business. 
Finally, Windflip is still in its conceptual product development phase, but is currently on hold. 
Figure 11: Case companies in their commercialization phase 
In other words, Chapdrive and Windflip are historical cases in contrast to the others. I believe 
that this variation represents a strength in the study, as the problem statement of this thesis 
can be assessed based on the views of decisions makers in quite different managerial 
situations. Furthermore, compared to companies in the midst of their commercialization 
efforts, interviewees that are entering the product launch phase might be less biased by its 
own successes or failures.  
4.2 SmartMotor – Permanent magnet motors 
4.2.1 Interviewee profile 
The tables below show the details of the two separate interviews conducted with SmartMotor.  
Interviewee Sigurd Øvrebø 
Interview date March 19th, 2014 
Current position Chief Technology Officer (CTO), SmartMotor 
Previous experience Electrical Engineer, Aker Solutions 
PhD in Electrical Machinery, NTNU 
Interview location SmartMotor’s offices in Trondheim 
 
Interviewee Trond Schwenke 
Interview date March 19th, 2014 
Current position Director of Business Development, SmartMotor 
Previous experience Engineer, Kongsberg  
Consultant, Edge Consultants 
Interview location SmartMotor’s offices in Trondheim 
4.2.2 Firm background 
SmartMotor is a spin-off company from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
(NTNU), established in 1996. They produce and sell high torque electrical machines, using a 
patented permanent magnet technology platform (SmartMotor, 2014). Core segments are 
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renewable energy, oil and gas and marine applications. Within wind energy, SmartMotor 
delivers its products to wind turbine producers, specifically as a central component to the 
power generator. Thus, the firm is a sub-contractor in line with figure 10. Currently, 
SmartMotor is wholly owned by the Rolls Royce group.  
4.2.3 Product 
Mr. Øvrebø explains that there are two main products in the wind power portfolio. One 
commercialized product, providing permanent magnet system motors (PMSM) to direct drive 
turbines, and one larger and much more radical edition, which is currently part of the 
development of a 10 MW wind turbine (SmartMotor, 2014). Since the latter product is still in 
development phase generating little revenue, and the thesis is concerned with product 
commercialization, the former product will be the unit of analysis for this case company. 
Furthermore, Mr. Øvrebø contends that the differentiating factor in SmartMotor’s technology 
is higher efficiency and lower weight, drastically increasing the performance of the motors in 
direct drive turbines. At the moment, the product has been less successful in the wind energy 
segment, compared to other industries SmartMotor operates in (Schwenke, 2014; Øvrebø, 
2014).  
4.2.4 Strategy 
Both Mr. Øvrebø and Mr. Schwenke contend that the commitment to wind energy has not 
been a success, and is not currently an area of strategic focus. However, they point out that 
the technology has experienced more sales in the oil and marine industries. Mr. Øvrebø states 
that prices on raw materials, such as magnets, soared up in 2010, which was just after the 
product launch of the PMSM. Together with the entry of Chinese competitors, this made it 
hard to establish contracts with wind turbine producers. Furthermore, he argues that Norway 
lacks the brand name within wind energy, as the oil and marine segments have. This has made 
it even harder to compete in the wind industry.   
According to Mr. Øvrebø and Mr. Schwenke, the product strategy of the company has been 
to enter markets and segments where the PMSM fits well in with customer requirements. 
Final entry decision is based on market and competitor analysis. Mr. Schwenke further 
elaborates that creating contact networks through participation in councils and fairs, has 
played an important part in gathering market information and getting a general impression of 
the market dynamism and temperature.  
When asked about the differences between early innovative adopters and mass-market 
customers, Mr. Schwenke claims that the distance between the segments is significant. 
SmartMotor has tried to cater to the needs of larger and more risk-averse customers such as 
the Spanish wind turbine producer Gamesa, but with little success because of little experience 
with mass commercialization. Yet, Mr. Schwenke emphasizes that the most important 
customers at this point are the early innovators, whom there are very few of. The interviewee 
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sees the potential and rationale behind a whole product when entering the mass market, but 
states that the key bottleneck is the requirement for large investments in the product.    
4.2.5 Financing 
SmartMotor has utilized different strategies to fund their product developments. According 
to Mr. Øvrebø, the firm was initially financed through local investors following its inception in 
1996. In 2003-2005, the company used to finance from its own balance sheet, a strategy that 
did not go very well. Verdane Capital entered an active ownership stake in the SmartMotor in 
2006, before being sold to Rolls Royce in 2013 (Verdane Capital, 2013). Mr. Øvrebø states that 
the cooperation with the venture capital fund has been very useful, in terms of business 
development, corporate governance, networking and to some extent competence. 
Furthermore, both Mr. Schwenke and Mr. Øvrebø point out the significance of commercial 
development programs with external partners. The strategy is to enter contracts with 
potential customers, who finance some of the product development costs and R&D of 
SmartMotor in exchange of patent rights and other benefits. Mr. Schwenke contends that this 
adds flexibility, minimizes the fixed cost base of the company and contributes to early cash 
flow. When asked about how to avoid the valley of death phenomenon, Mr. Schwenke argues 
that this commercial partnership model can be possible solution.  
4.2.6 Cooperation 
The firm has mostly followed a licensing model when cooperating with external parties. First, 
most of the production is licensed to partners in Central Europe (Øvrebø, 2014). Production is 
not part of the overall company strategy, mainly because of the need for a substantial 
infrastructure to facilitate manufacturing and transport. The focus is rather on engineering, 
product development and prototyping. Second, a licensing agreement with the Norwegian 
offshore wind technology provider Sway Turbine is used on more innovative products, such 
as a 10 MW wind turbine concept. According to Mr. Øvrebø, benefits are reduced risk and less 
need for capital investment. On the other hand, a major drawback is the less exclusivity 
perceived among partners in the industry. The proprietorship of the technology decreases the 
more partners it is licensed to, thus reducing the bargaining power in contract negotiations. 
Despite this, the strategy has been to license the technology to many, rather than few 
companies.               
4.2.7 Competitors 
Mr. Øvrebø explains that there are few direct competitors in the market, and virtually none in 
Norway. He contends that this is due to the unique characteristics of SmartMotor’s product, 
implying that the company has not focused on the competitors.  
4.2.8 Challenges and lessons 
It is emphasized by both Mr. Øvrebø and Mr. Schwenke that one of the great challenges in the 
wind industry is the dominance of large and well-established actors, which often rely on 
proven and low-risk products. Mr. Øvrebø further points out that being a small player is a 
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disadvantage, and good references is a precondition if contracts is to be signed with the larger 
customers.   
The interviewees claim that a major challenge in the commercialization process has been the 
value propositions of the product. Mr. Øvrebø admits that they could have been clearer in the 
early years of the product launch, but points out that it takes time to build clear proposals. 
Unambiguous value propositions would have made it easier to sell, pitch and differentiate the 
product in its earlier years. Related to this, Mr. Schwenke argues that a major challenge when 
selling has been the lack of a whole and fully developed product with specific value 
propositions. Instead, commercial development partnerships (cf. 4.2.5) has provided the 
company with revenues. However, Mr. Schwenke adds that the PMSM is currently fully 
developed with compelling value proposals.          
Mr. Schwenke argues that many Norwegian companies are too shortsighted in their 
strategies. Focus on profits often come at the expense of long-term strategic decisions. 
Moreover, many start-ups are heavily focused on technical aspects and less on sales and 
marketing. Finally, he identifies high costs a potential threat to successful commercialization.    
4.2.9 Success criteria 
According to Mr. Schwenke, a good commercialization process is characterized by customer- 
and market orientation. There must be a consistency between the customer’s needs and the 
technical innovation, and everybody needs to pull in the same direction. Niche strategies are 
often favorable, as focus on narrow segments can render it easier to formulate and document 
value propositions. Mr. Schwenke explains that SmartMotor has become more market 
oriented in its strategy. Specifically, use of cross-functional teams and close collaboration with 
customers on product specifications are efforts that increase the focus on the market and 
customers.    
Finally, Mr. Schwenke is also concerned with the human resource perspective. A successful 
commercialization process needs people with impact, who can drive changes and carry on 
challenging implementation processes.  
4.3 Fedem Technology – Simulation software for wind turbines 
4.3.1 Interviewee profile 
The tables below show the details of the interviews conducted with Fedem Technology.  
Interviewee Kristian Sætertrø 
Interview date April 2nd, 2014 
Current position Engineer, Fedem Technology 
Previous experience Engineer, Reinertsen 
Interview location Fedem’s offices in Trondheim 
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Interviewee Svein Gjølmesli  
Interview date April 2nd, 2014 
Current position Chief Technology Officer (CTO), Fedem Technology 
Previous experience Product developer, Inventas 
CEO, Fedem Technology 
Interview location Fedem’s offices in Trondheim 
4.3.2 Firm background 
Fedem Technology is an engineering and software firm with 20 employees, located in 
Trondheim (Fedem Technology, 2014a). Since 1994, the company has developed and 
distributed software for turbine manufacturers, and since 2003 offered engineering and 
analysis services. Consequently, Fedem is a sub-contractor in line with figure 10. Fedem 
operates in the areas of oil and gas, renewable energy, marine and mechanical industries. The 
expertise in oil and gas has been used as foundation to further develop capabilities in the 
offshore wind energy segment (Fedem Technology, 2014b).    
4.3.3 Product 
The focus of this case is the software product Fedem Windpower, which has been developed 
incrementally since 2010. It is a simulation tool used for dynamical analysis of both onshore 
and offshore wind turbine systems (Fedem Technology, 2014c). According to Mr. Sætertrø, 
the software is used to analyze strength and fatigue in wind turbine components and 
optimization of windmill structures. Thus, the product can be used by wind turbine producers 
and power utilities for conceptual development and verification of the engineering design. 
The wind module is part of a larger software system, which can be used in marine and 
mechanical industries. Mr. Sætertrø argues that offering such a package is an advantage and 
a differentiating factor to competitors, since more comprehensive analysis can be undertaken. 
Finally, he contends that the need for the software is especially relevant offshore, since 
offshore turbines are often more complex than its onshore counterparts.  
Both Mr. Sætertrø and Mr. Gjølmesli agree that the sales of the product has not been 
successful, but emphasizes that this has not been a focus area compared to services. Few 
software licenses have been sold to external users. However, the product has been useful for 
in-house use during engineering services for the wind power clients. In recent years, services 
has grown to be bigger than product sales in terms of revenues.     
4.3.4 Strategy 
The wind energy segment was entered in 2009, when Fedem saw market opportunities in the 
Norwegian offshore wind market. According to Mr. Gjølmesli, this was not part of a deliberate 
strategy, but rather an emergent and opportunistic one.   
While around one third of the income came from the wind segment couple of years ago 
(Gjølmesli, 2014), the business is now only representing less than 10% of total revenues 
(Sætertrø, 2014). According to Mr. Gjølmesli, the wind segment is currently on hold, and up 
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for further strategic evaluation by the board of directors. He points out that a greater share 
of income has come from services the past years, which might be the future area of priority.  
Mr. Gjølmesli is somewhat hesitant when asked about the cause of the little success in the 
wind energy segment. He contends that the market for Fedem’s wind simulation program and 
services is limited in Norway. Furthermore, it is argued that there has been relatively little 
commitment from the company to the wind energy business. This is somewhat contrary to 
the website, which states that “renewable energy is a major focus area for Fedem Technology” 
(Fedem Technology, 2014b). Mr. Gjølmesli points out that there have been many different 
leaders in the company. However, he emphasizes that the company has hired a specific person 
to helm the wind energy business in the future, which might change the current status of the 
segment.   
4.3.5 Financing 
The company finances its operations from its own balance sheet and no capital from external 
actors has been injected into the company the past few years (Gjølmesli, 2014).   
4.3.6 Cooperation 
The software is sold through a distribution agreement with the Norwegian classifying 
company DNV GL, who sells their own and Fedem’s software products in domestic and 
international markets (Gjølmesli, 2014). Mr. Gjølmesli points out that it is too expensive to 
hire an in-house sales team, thus Fedem is using DNV GL’s already existing distribution 
channels. On the other hand, he notes that outsourcing the sales efforts might reduce the 
sellers’ ownership to the product and the incentives to sell it. Both Mr. Sætertrø and Mr. 
Gjølmesli admit that few licenses have been sold, and that the cooperation has not yielded 
any positive returns (Gjølmesli, 2014). When asked about the cause of this, Mr. Gjølmesli 
speculates whether it could be something with the product’s user friendliness. He underlines 
that the company has not yet discussed the lack of success in depth, mostly because product 
sales compared to services is not the key focus of the firm.     
4.3.6 Competitors 
The most central competitors are established actors such as Garrad Hassan (Sætertrø, 2014).  
4.4 Blaaster Wind Technologies – Wind turbines 
4.4.1 Interviewee profile    
The tables below show the details of three separate interviews conducted with Blaaster.  
Interviewee Camilla Jørås Larsen 
Interview date March 27th, 2014 
Current position Administration Manager, Blaaster Wind Technologies 
Previous experience Secretary, ScanWind  
Interview location Blaaster’s offices in Trondheim 
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Interviewee Torolf Pettersen  
Interview date March 27th, 2014 
Current position Founder and CEO, Blaaster Wind Technologies 
Previous experience Hydropower Engineer, Kværner 
Founder and CEO, ScanWind 
Interview location Blaaster’s offices in Trondheim 
4.4.2 Firm background 
Blaaster is a Norwegian wind turbine developer based in Trondheim, thus characterized as a 
product provider in line with figure 10. It was established in 2008 by former Scanwind founder 
Torolf Pettersen, and is currently owned by him and his two children, Ove Pettersen and 
Camilla Jørås Larsen, all of whom are interviewed in this case study. Torolf Pettersen started 
Blaaster after Scanwind was sold to GE Wind, and still believes in industrial wind power 
development in Norway. Blaaster is still in its product commercialization process. A 3 MW 
wind turbine prototype was installed and put into operation in 2012 in Valsneset test park in 
Bjugn, Norway (Blaaster, 2014), and the company plans to further expand into the market 
with their product offering.     
4.4.3 Product 
Blaaster offers gearless, direct drive wind turbines. The unit of analysis for the case company 
is their wind turbine platform, DL101. The main differentiating factor of their offering is lower 
maintenance, decreased operational expenses and low weight solutions (Larsen, 2014; 
Blaaster, 2014). Another value proposition is the ease of transporting the wind turbine 
between manufacturers and sites. The most important customers are power utilities. 
According to Mr. Ove Pettersen, the product can be regarded as an incremental innovation, 
rather than a radical one. He points out that the possibilities for radical innovation is relatively 
small in Blaaster, as the capital requirements for such products are large.  
Part of the company strategy is the offering of a complete wind turbine product, including the 
tower, blades and the nacelle. Mrs. Larsen argues that it is much easier to gain access to the 
large and relatively risk-averse customers, when the product is complete and easy to install 
and operate. Furthermore, the goal is to minimize the total life cycle cost of the wind turbine, 
since power utilities are price sensitive. Another element of Blaaster’s product strategy is that 
the technology can be used on wind turbines of varying size, which is termed technology 
platform strategy by Mrs. Larsen. This solution adds flexibility to the operations, and is also 
unique in the wind turbine market. It has deliberately been part of the company strategy in 
Interviewee Ove Pettersen  
Interview date March 27th, 2014 
Current position Technical Manager, Blaaster Wind Technologies 
Previous experience M.Sc. Mechanical Engineering, NTNU 
Interview location Blaaster’s offices in Trondheim 
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order to differentiate Blaaster from competitors and to offer maximum flexibility to its 
customers.   
In terms of product development, Mr. Ove Pettersen asserts that Blaaster has achieved its 
goals. The concept is within the original target cost set at the beginning of the development 
phase. However, a challenging commercialization process is still ahead.    
4.4.4 Strategy 
According to Mrs. Larsen, it initially took one year of planning, market - and competitor 
analysis before the company started to develop products. Market information gathering 
activities still play a central role. Sources such as public documents and dialogs with industry 
people are used to monitor the market, and especially to stay updated on the cost level in the 
industry (Ove Pettersen, 2014). According to Mr. Ove Pettersen, it is essential to communicate 
with people working in the field to get a full understanding of the market dynamism. He 
further asserts that reverse engineering can be used as a tool to further understand 
competitor’s products. However, he acknowledges that the company has not been as market 
oriented as it should have been. A problem has been the lack of feedback from Norwegian 
wind power operators regarding Blaaster’s products.  
When asked about Blaaster’s customers, Mr. Ove Pettersen claims that there indeed is a 
chasm between early innovators and the mass market. He points out that there are very few 
wind operators willing to test new and unproven technologies, which leaves a virtually non-
existent early innovator segment. The market is rather dominated by mass-market players. 
This presents a challenge for Blaaster’s product commercialization, since it is hard to 
transform a prototype to a fully working product that the mass market can use without a test 
period where the new product is adjusted and debugged. Late adopters are less inclined to 
take part in the test period. Due to these customer characteristics, Mr. Ove Pettersen 
contends that complementary services are important, and often a necessity to successfully 
enter the market. Related to this, he also states that developing a market for turnkey 
deliveries is a possible strategy.            
4.4.5 Financing 
The company met a challenging financing environment when it started up in 2008, in the midst 
of financial crisis (Larsen, 2014). No venture capital funds were willing to inject equity into the 
firm, thus Blaaster financed its operations the first years through own savings. In 2010, the 
company was granted a financial support of 32.8 MNOK by the Norwegian state enterprise, 
Enova, and 1.7 MNOK by Innovation Norway (Teknisk Ukeblad, 2010). The grant was part of 
the funding for the first turbine demonstration project in Valsneset test park in 2012. 
According to Mrs. Larsen, Blaaster is past the venture capital phase, and is looking for long-
term industrial partner, who can financially support the company. Both Mrs. Larsen and Mr. 
Torolf Pettersen prefer an industrial partner rather than a venture capital fund. They criticize 
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the funds to be speculative and shortsighted in nature, and furthermore that they lack in-
depth knowledge of the wind industry.  
4.4.6 Cooperation 
Blaaster uses a cooperation strategy where the manufacturing of standard components are 
outsourced, while product development and assembly are kept in-house (Larsen, 2014). 
Furthermore, it is noted that the company does not approach a licensing strategy, as the goal 
is to establish an industry in Norway and continue with proprietary product development. 
However, both Mr. Ove Pettersen and Mrs. Larsen see the potential of partnerships based on 
technology sharing. In exchange for financing, the customers want access to Blaaster’s 
technology, rather than a license. This is especially prevalent among customers in countries 
such as India and China.  
Going forward, Mr. Torolf Pettersen states that alliance building, either with financial or 
industrial partners, will be a prerequisite for future success. He points out that the partnering 
potential is small in Norway, and that they most likely will need to enter partnerships with 
foreign players. The focus will still be on higher commitment cooperation modes, thus 
excluding licensing. Production will still be conducted outside Norway, while product 
development will continue from its base in Trondheim.   
4.4.7 Competitors 
The competition in the wind turbine market is fierce, and dominated by large players (Larsen, 
2014). A direct competitor to Blaaster’s products is the German producer Enercon. Most of 
the players are based in Europe and the US, but Chinese producers copying incumbent’s 
technology, are also prevalent. In certain sites in Norway with high wind speed, few 
competitors exist, and both Mr. Ove Pettersen and Mr. Torolf Pettersen point out that these 
are possible niche markets for Blaaster.       
4.4.8 Challenges and lessons 
The company is currently in a critical face, and claims that they are still in the middle of the 
death valley in terms of financing. The prototype concept has not accumulated any 
operational revenues, which will be crucial looking forward (Ove Pettersen, 2014). In order to 
reduce current expenses, the company utilizes a small and lean technical team, and is only 
focusing on the on prototype model. According to Torolf Pettersen, the prototype plays a 
decisive role in the late commercialization process.  
A significant challenge in the market is that the Norwegian industry is rather conservative 
(Larsen, 2014; Torolf Pettersen, 2014). The power utilities are risk-averse, and emphasize on 
cooperation and procurement from large and established technology providers. This poses a 
challenge for Blaaster’s product commercialization, and they are dependent on good 
references in the market in order to sell in their own products to the customers.   
51 
 
When asked about commercialization lessons in the Norwegian wind technology market, both 
Mrs. Larsen and Mr. Ove Pettersen point to the failure of the wind turbine producer 
Chapdrive. A thorough discussion about this case is found in section 4.7.    
4.4.9 Success criteria 
The three interviewees are quite unison in the assessment of what characterizes a successful 
product commercialization. Both Mrs. Larsen and Mr. Ove Pettersen mention the importance 
of solid financials. Furthermore, Mrs. Larsen stresses how essential it is to have a working 
prototype and product demonstration, which clearly documents the product performance. 
Mr. Torolf Pettersen also emphasizes that one must have the best technology in the market 
to succeed in the tough competition. Providing another perspective, Mr. Ove Pettersen asserts 
that market understanding and time to make the right decisions are key factors. Finally, Mr. 
Torolf Pettersen points out that start-ups need a personal drive and motivation to succeed in 
the business.  
4.5 Windflip – Offshore wind installation barge 
4.5.1 Interviewee profile 
The table below shows the details of the interview conducted with Windflip.  
Interviewee Ane Christophersen  
Interview date April 7th, 2014 
Current position Business Acquisition, Ocean Installer 
Previous experience Co-founder and General Manager, Windflip 
Master in Marine Technology, NTNU 
Interview location Telephone between NTNU Trondheim and Rica Bakklandet 
Trondheim 
4.5.2 Firm background 
Windflip is a venture started up by the NTNU students Ane Christophersen and Torbjørn 
Mannsåker in 2010. Their offshore wind installer concept was well covered by media during 
the start-up. Currently, the venture is on hold, as the company awaits the market situation. 
The plan is to continue with the conceptual product once the market has matured and 
customers are more willing to use the Windflip-concept. At this point, the firm has no full time 
employees, despite still having financial resources available.  
4.5.3 Product 
The concept of the product is a barge used to transport and install floating offshore windmills, 
and can consequently be regarded as a product provider in line with figure 10. Whereas 
established technology has relied on vessels towing components to the sea, where they are 
finally assembled and installed, Windflip transports the whole windmill from land and installs 
it more conveniently by flipping the barge 90 degrees. According to Mrs. Christophersen, this 
reduces costs and is much more practical when installing large-scale offshore wind farms. 
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These value propositions have been used to position the concept in the market. Moreover, 
the interviewee contends that the product can be regarded as a radical innovation within the 
wind industry, but points out that some principles are based on known concepts used in other 
industries. 
4.5.4 Strategy 
The formal product development started as a result of dialog with Statoil’s offshore wind 
power department. They had few other alternatives than to use towboats to transport and 
install their floating wind turbine, Hywind. Thus, Windflip could be used as viable substitute 
to the established technologies. Mrs. Christophersen claims that Windflip has been customer 
oriented from the beginning of with its cooperation with Statoil. However, she argues that a 
major challenge has been the lack of potential customers. This has inhibited further feedback 
from customers and the market.       
4.5.5 Financing 
The company has received funding from Innovation Norway, Statoil, The Research Council of 
Norway and private investors. Mrs. Christophersen contends that these financial grants have 
been critical for the development of the company. Venture capital has not been considered, 
due to the early start-up phase of the company.  
Mrs. Christophersen argues that the death valley phenomenon has not yet been a threat. This 
is mainly due to low costs during the conceptual product development. However, she points 
out that large capital expenditures will occur once full-scale prototyping and production starts, 
thus increasing the risk of entering a long period with negative cash flow.       
4.5.6 Cooperation 
Only informal cooperation modes has been used by Windflip. Dialog with Statoil and 
Innovation Norway, although not exclusive, has been essential for the company 
(Christophersen, 2014). However, the long-term strategy for Windflip is to enter a formal 
industrial partnership, such that the later phase of the product development is financed. 
Furthermore, the idea is that the partner can bring in complementary expertise such as within 
marine operations, which is deemed necessary for the product to fully function.   
4.5.7 Competitors  
The interviewee points out that there is little direct competition to Windflip, due to an 
immature market with a small customer base. Offshore installation through the use of 
towboats is generally the method that gives the most competition to Windflip.  
4.5.8 Challenges and lessons 
According to Mrs. Christophersen, the major challenge has been to develop and 
commercialize a product with a very limited market and customer base. The original plan was 
to sell the concept to other companies with similar operations as Statoil’s Hywind project. 
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However, this opportunity has withered away, as the few potential customers have chosen 
other methods to install their floating wind turbines. The interviewee admits that the market 
is not mature enough for Windflip’s technology. A large number of offshore wind farms must 
be commissioned, before the technology is profitable. In other words, the timing of the 
product has not been ideal.   
4.5.9 Success criteria 
The interviewee contends that market orientation, close contact with customers, clear value 
propositions and financing are success factors for a successful commercialization. Companies 
that fail are often too technology intensive. Finally, based on Windflip’s own experience, good 
timing of the product launch is essential.  
4.6 Statoil/Hywind – Floating windmills 
4.6.1 Interviewee profile  
The tables below show the details of the three separate interviews conducted with Statoil.  
Interviewee Jan Fredrik Stadaas 
Interview date March 25th, 2014 
Current position Technology Manager Floating Wind, Statoil (Hywind) 
Previous experience Engineer Wind Power, Statoil (Hywind)  
Interview location Statoil’s offices in Oslo 
 
Interviewee Niklas Eric Indrevær  
Interview date March 25th, 2014 
Current position Business Development Floating Wind, Statoil (Hywind) 
Previous experience Management Consultant, Accenture 
HR and organizational development, Statoil 
Interview location Statoil’s offices in Oslo 
 
Interviewee Trine Ulla  
Interview date April 4th, 2014 
Current position Head of Business Development, Floating Wind, Statoil (Hywind) 
Previous experience Engineer, Statoil 
Engineer, Hydro 
Interview location Telephone between Hotel Alsterhof in Berlin and Statoil offices in 
Oslo 
4.6.2 Firm background 
Statoil is an international energy company, operating in 34 countries with 23,000 employees 
(Statoil, 2014a). Their focus remains on oil and gas production, with particular emphasis on 
the Norwegian continental shelf. In recent years, the firm has entered the renewable energy 
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segment, with substantial investments in the offshore wind industry, where they utilize their 
expertise from oil and gas. As of now, Statoil operates the Sheringham Shoal wind farm 
outside the British coast and plans to realize the Dogger Bank field through a consortium. Thus, 
the company is a power producer in line with figure 10. Innovation in the offshore wind 
segment is done through the Hywind project, the world’s first floating offshore wind turbine 
(Statoil, 2014b). A full-scale floating wind turbine prototype was installed 10 kilometers of the 
south-west coast of Karmøy in 2009, and Statoil has been granted a lease for a demonstration 
park off the coast of Scotland with five floating wind turbines (Wind Power Monthly, 2013). 
The aim is to see of the turbines can operate as part of an array. In the remaining case study, 
the Hywind product will be unit of analysis, thus focusing less on Statoil.    
4.6.3 Product 
Unlike traditional offshore windmills that are fixed to the seabed, Hywind is a floating 
structure consisting of a steel cylinder filled with a ballast of water and rocks (Statoil, 2014b). 
According to Mr. Stadaas, the product is developed for a new market, and the aim of Statoil is 
to create new market space and opportunities. Hywind differentiates itself from competing 
alternatives by giving the opportunity to install wind turbines on deeper water depths 
(Stadaas, 2014). Mr. Indrevær adds that the Hywind concept offers lower cost and is less 
specified for each wind site compared to fixed platforms, which leads to higher potential for 
standardized mass production.   
The Hywind project is still in its demonstration phase, implying that not all of the value 
propositions have been fully realized in the product. According to Mr. Indrevær, Hywind is still 
not a cheaper alternative to fixed installations. This is believed to be achieved through further 
technology development and economies of scale once mass production is initiated.  
Mr. Stadaas, Mr. Indrevær and Mrs. Ulla agree that the product is an incremental innovation 
with elements of radicalism. Mr. Stadaas explains that Hywind primarily uses already known 
technology, but the fact that it is utilized in a different way and in a new market, shows some 
elements of radical innovation.  
Mrs. Ulla contends that Hywind so far has been a technical success. The full-scale prototype 
in Karmøy has shown great promise in terms of high utilization and production output, despite 
improvement potential in cost. Future product success will depend on whether the 
demonstration park in Scotland can reduce the operational expenses (Indrevær, 2014).   
4.6.4 Strategy 
The long-term goal of the Hywind project is to operate profitably in a wind market without 
any kind of subsidies (Stadaas, 2014). The demonstration park in Scotland is dependent on 
financial support, thus the commercial goal of the company has not yet been achieved. On the 
contrary, the company has not yet started to commercialize the product (Ulla, 2014). As a 
result, short term tactical decisions such as pricing, distribution and promotion has not been 
made.  
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Mr. Indrevær explains that the customers’ perspective is important in the Hywind 
commercialization process. Once a customer is identified, they should be followed closely by 
Statoil, such that a long-term relationship can be established. However, it should be noted 
that the Hywind concept has not yet been sold to any customers. Mr. Stadaas explains that it 
is a potential strategy to both use the product internally for power generation and externally 
as a sellable product to customers such as wind turbine producers, yards and power utilities.   
4.6.5 Financing 
Statoil invested 400 MNOK in the Hywind prototype, while the public enterprise promoting 
renewable energy, Enova, granted 59 MNOK (Statoil, 2014b). Venture capital has never been 
an alternative, since it is an expensive type of financing compared to capital directly from 
Statoil’s balance sheet (Indrevær, 2014). Despite the aim to show the commercial viability of 
the demonstration park in Scotland, the project is dependent on tradable green certificate 
(TGC) schemes in order for it to be profitable (Ulla, 2014).   
Mr. Stadaas and Mr. Indrevær provide different perspectives on how to avoid or reduce the 
effects of the death valley phenomenon. The former interviewee claims that a clear plan and 
a licensing strategy are necessary to achieve early income in the commercialization process. 
The latter interviewee emphasizes the significance of a large customer network, such that 
sales are not only dependent on one buyer. Furthermore, several projects and contracts in the 
pipeline are critical to generate a stable income stream. Still, Mr. Indrevær points out that 
there is a tradeoff between commitment to the product commercialization process, which 
costs money and resources, and flexibility and exit strategies, which are necessary if the 
product launch fails. High degree of commitment inhibits flexibility, as more investments are 
bounded in sunk costs that cannot be realized in an exit, but is on the other side necessary to 
succeed in the market.      
4.6.6 Cooperation 
According to Mr. Stadaas, cooperation with other companies in the full-scale prototyping has 
been decisive for the technical success of the concept. When Statoil was looking for a provider 
of the wind turbine, Mr. Stadaas explains that size and risk-willingness were important criteria 
for cooperation. Going forward, Mr. Stadaas also stresses the significance of an industrial 
partner that can share risk and provide economies of scale together with Statoil. As a potential 
risk of collaboration, Mrs. Ulla points out that too much cooperation can lead to dilution of 
the patent, since the vendors have more access to proprietary knowledge and assets through 
a partnership. Additionally, it is asserted that finding the appropriate partners is hard. Criteria 
such as access to new market opportunities, financing and technology collaboration are 
weighed as important by Statoil (Ulla, 2014).  
4.6.7 Competitors 
Mr. Indrevær argues that the market competition is relatively low. According to Mrs. Ulla, 
three other full-scale floating wind turbines have been installed in Portugal and Japan. She 
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admits that the competition has become stiffer, and that Hywind’s head start is partially 
eroded away. However, she contends that competition will not be the major challenge in the 
future. Rather, the most potent threat is the lack of a customer base that is willing to adopt 
the Hywind technology (Ulla, 2014).      
4.6.8 Challenges and lessons 
One of the great challenges is that Statoil has to develop the immature market itself, since 
they are the ones creating the new market segment (Ulla, 2014). Specifically, Mrs. Ulla points 
out that governments in many countries grant licenses to shallow water areas, which are not 
appropriate for the Hywind technology. They assert that the wind technology is not mature 
enough for deep-water depths, thus making it necessary for Statoil to proactively influence 
governmental decision makers to grant licenses in deep-water wind sites (Ulla, 2014).    
When asked about commercialization lessons, Mr. Stadaas criticizes Norwegian firms to lack 
complete understanding of the market, and for being too focused on its product. He uses 
Windflip as an example of a firm that has not succeeded due to bad entry timing in the market.   
4.6.9 Success criteria 
Both Mr. Stadaas and Mr. Indrevær emphasize market and customer orientation as 
prerequisites for a successful commercialization strategy. The former interviewee stresses 
that companies must understand what the market demands and how this will develop over 
time. Market intelligence and communication with customers must be prioritized in the 
commercialization process. In parallel, the company must be clear on the product’s value 
propositions and competitive advantage (Stadaas, 2014). Finally, Mr. Stadaas points out the 
prominence of partnership and cooperation with external stakeholders such as governments. 
Mr. Indrevær mostly agrees with Mr. Stadaas, and especially stresses customer focus as a 
success criterion. He further adds that bad commercialization processes are characterized by 
too much focus on the technical aspects of the product.  
Mrs. Ulla claims that a low cost level is critical in the wind energy business. In order to achieve 
this, Hywind must cooperate with companies that have expertise in areas where Statoil has 
not. As an example, Mrs. Ulla mentions potential cooperation with the Norwegian shipyard 
industry in marine operations of the offshore turbines.  
4.7 Chapdrive – Hydraulic transmission  
4.7.1 Interviewee profile 
The tables below show the details of the three separate interviews conducted with individuals 
with differing relation to the former Chapdrive. While Ole Gunnar Dahlhaug and Åsmund 
Furuseth were part of the company management, Jostein Vik served as board member 
representing Viking Venture as one of several active investors.    
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Interviewee Ole Gunnar Dahlhaug 
Interview date April 25th, 2014 
Current position Professor, NTNU 
Previous experience Technical leader and co-founder, Chapdrive 
Project Engineer, SN Power 
Researcher, SINTEF 
Interview location Dahlhaug’s offices in NTNU, Trondheim 
 
Interviewee Åsmund Grytting Furuseth  
Interview date April 28th, 2014 
Current position CEO, Mobitroll   
Previous experience CEO and co-founder, Chapdrive 
Project Manager, NTNU Technology Transfer 
Interview location Studentersamfundet in Trondheim  
 
Interviewee Jostein Vik  
Interview date April 29th, 2014 
Current position Partner, Viking Venture 
Previous experience Board Member, Chapdrive 
Trainee, Orkla 
Interview location Viking Venture’s offices in Trondheim 
4.7.2 Firm background 
Chapdrive was founded in 2006 as a spin-off from NTNU. The company was formally laid down 
in 2013. At its peak, the firm had 20 employees spread around offices in Norway, UK, Denmark 
and China (Chapdrive, 2012). The company provided technology for wind turbine 
manufacturers, and can thus be regarded as a sub-contractor in accordance with figure 10.  
4.7.3 Product 
Chapdrive utilized hydraulic power transmission in wind turbines, instead of the traditional 
mechanical gearboxes. This reduces the weight of the turbine nacelle, decreases the need for 
maintenance and provides the opportunity to move components from the nacelle to the 
ground (Dahlhaug, 2014; Furuseth, 2014, Chapdrive, 2012). Furthermore, the solution 
removes the need for permanent magnets and frequency converters. The result is significant 
cost of energy reductions of up to 20% (Chapdrive, 2012), especially among large wind 
turbines where the mechanical gearboxes can be very heavy. Key customers using the 
technology was mainly wind turbine producers. 
According to Mr. Dahlhaug, the innovation can be regarded as incremental. On the other hand, 
both Mr. Furuseth and Mr. Vik contend that the product has radical characteristics. They argue 
that a completely new design for wind turbines had to be developed. Mr. Vik further adds that 
the technology itself might not be a radical breakthrough, but that the commercial aspects of 
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the product are radical. A long verification phase was needed with significant risk and 
downside potential.  
The product underwent a lengthy development and verification process. A prototype of 50 
kW size was built in 2005, while a larger test was initiated in Valsneset wind park in 2007. 
Installation and verification on two wind turbines was completed in 2009 (Dahlhaug, 2014). 
Further tests on larger turbines were planned to happen during 2014 and 2015 (Chapdrive, 
2012).    
4.7.4 Strategy 
According to both Mr. Furuseth and Mr. Dahlhaug, an important part of the strategy has been 
verification and proof of concept that the product is actually working in a reliable manner. This 
is especially important in the wind industry, since wind turbine producers are risk-averse and 
operate with low margins in their production (Dahlhaug, 2014). The rationale was to present 
Chapdrive as an attractive investment among potential partners and venture funds (Furuseth, 
2014). On long term, the plan was to sell or license the technology to customers. Since these 
prefer to rely on well-proven technology, Chapdrive used significant resources to finalize the 
product development before initiating any sales. In retrospect, Mr. Furuseth ponder on 
whether the sales process could have been started earlier, but underlines that it is hard to 
know exactly when to launch the product.      
Providing perspectives from outside the company, Mr. Vik claims that the work on strategy in 
the company has been good. He points out that it changed a lot during the years, which was 
necessary. Two Danes with significant industrial knowledge and experience spearheaded the 
development of value propositions and had a deep understanding of end-customers’ needs. 
Furthermore, Mr. Vik points out that Chapdrive over time developed a clear positioning 
strategy to operate in the market for large wind turbines, a segment with future growth 
potential. Within this sector, a differentiation strategy focusing on low cost and maintenance 
needs compared to permanent magnet motors was utilized.    
Finally, Mr. Vik stresses the importance of having both market-driven and customer-driven 
products in the strategic product roadmap. Whereas, the former refers to offerings developing 
new markets that generate revenues on a long term, the latter one is related to short-term 
cash generation. Both of them are needed in the wind industry.     
4.7.5 Financing 
According to Mr. Furuseth, Mr. Dahlhaug and Mr. Vik, the venture capital environment was 
very favorable during the start-up of the firm. Chapdrive received 52 MNOK from Northzone 
Ventures, Hafslund Venture and Energy Capital Management in February 2009, and 86 MNOK 
from Viking Venture and Investinor in April 2010 (Adressa, 2010). Mr. Vik points out that Viking 
Venture used extensive time and resources before investing in Chapdrive. They decided to 
enter the firm when they saw potential in the technology, market and the management. Mr. 
Dahlhaug states that referring to the company’s patents was deliberately used as a strategy 
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to gain support from venture capitalists, as they desire tangible proof of potential products 
that can generate future cash flow. According to Mr. Dahlhaug, the firm had enough financing 
from venture funds to avoid the death valley phenomenon. However, all of the interviewees 
point out that the venture capital’s willingness to invest in the wind energy segment has dried 
up after the financial crisis. According to Mr. Furuseth, venture funds have shied away from 
the clean-tech sector due to high risk and long payback time.  
Mr. Dahlhaug argues that the venture funds have been decisive for the development of the 
company. They have provided with valuable competence and expertise, financing and 
network relationships. Specifically, the interviewee emphasizes the entry of the Danes with 
extensive in-depth knowledge of the wind industry as especially helpful. These people 
provided leadership and direction for Chapdrive.          
4.7.6 Cooperation 
All of the interviewees emphasize that cooperation was a critical issue, and within this topic, 
we can find the key reason for Chapdrive’s early demise. While the company had success with 
its technology on smaller prototypes, problems emerged when the innovation was to scale up 
to larger sizes (Vik, 2014). At this point, Chapdrive was dependent on product development of 
larger components, which required huge investments (Dahlhaug, 2014; Vik, 2014; Furuseth, 
2014). Thus, cooperation on further technology development with industrial partners such as 
wind turbine producers and component sub-contractors remained the only viable option. 
However, the financial crisis made this challenging, as potential partners were not willing to 
undertake high-risk projects and instead focused on its core competence areas (Vik, 2014; 
Furuseth, 2014). Although Chapdrive focused its efforts on establishing a partnership during 
the last year of its existence, the firm failed to achieve a cooperation agreement. Since the 
company could not carry the investments alone, the management ultimately decided to lay 
down all of its operations in 2013. Mr. Vik is adamant that the company would have done well 
if the technology development with an external partner had succeeded. Mr. Furuseth adds 
that Mitsubishi has acquired a company with similar technology to Chapdrive, and is currently 
performing well. He claims that this shows that the Chapdrive concept is technically viable.     
Mr. Dahlhaug points out that Chapdrive initially had Bosch and Hägglunds as industrial 
partners. The cooperation was only partly regulated through contracts, and even though 
Bosch and Hägglunds stayed cooperative, they were not willing to further invest into large 
component development (Dahlhaug, 2014).        
On a long-term perspective, Chapdrive had a strategy of being part of a wind turbine producer 
as a subsidiary (Dahlhaug, 2014). Mr. Dahlhaug argues that most of them perform production 
in-house, thus making the use of vendors to procure necessary sub-components less 
prevalent. Hence, it is hard to approach and sell products to wind turbine producers without 
being a part of them.    
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4.7.7 Competitors  
At the point when Chapdrive developed its product, the company had no other direct 
competitors with the same concept (Vik, 2014). However, Vik (2014) points out that several 
indirect competitors with other approaches to reduce wind turbine cost existed.  
4.7.8 Challenges and lessons 
According to the interviewees, there are several challenges in the wind industry with a number 
of related implications. First, wind technology customers are very risk-averse, which makes a 
longer and more thorough product verification phase necessary (Dahlhaug, 2014). Mr. 
Furuseth points out that Chapdrive did not expect the sheer amount of development efforts 
that went into the project. Furthermore, Mr. Vik agrees with SmartMotor’s and Blaaster’s 
contention that there are almost no early innovators in the wind segment, simply because the 
risk/reward ratio is too high. He points out that the oil and gas industry is just as conservative 
as the wind sector, but they are on the other hand more willing to invest and acquire, since 
the returns in the oil industry are significantly higher. Second, achieving foothold among the 
customers, that is the wind turbine producers, is very challenging. Dahlhaug (2014) claims that 
the Danes’ network relations have been key in actually getting entry to these during the selling 
and cooperation phase. Third, he further asserts that the death valley time period is longer in 
the wind industry compared to other sectors. This is mainly because of long verification 
processes and large up-front capital investments. Fourth and finally, the wind industry is very 
capital intensive (Vik, 2014).       
In retrospect, both Mr. Furuseth and Mr. Dahlhaug admit that the search for new partners 
could have been initiated earlier. The latter interviewee further asserts that the cooperation 
with Bosch and Hägglunds could have been more mutually committed. It was also 
characterized by a low degree of openness, and with no common goal and direction. Mr. 
Dahlhaug also points out the differences in size, and hence bargaining power between the 
firms as a major challenge.        
4.7.9 Success criteria 
The interviewees have different perspectives on what characterizes a good commercialization 
strategy. Both Mr. Dahlhaug and Mr. Vik stress the importance of reliable products that 
minimize potential downside. Mr. Dahlhaug further emphasizes cross-functional and 
competent teams, while Mr. Furuseth elaborates that industrial expertise is vital. Companies 
must have specific and clear knowledge about the product it is developing and the context it 
is operating within. Moreover, Mr. Furuseth argues that timing is essential and that is has to 
fit with the overall strategy and the product. He further adds that one must be committed to 
the overall strategy over a long time period in order to show results.  On the same note, Mr. 
Vik contends that companies must be positioned for the future and focus on market- and 
customer driven strategies. Finally, Mr. Vik points out that capital in the companies must be 
allocated and utilized effectively.  
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Mr. Vik gives OCAS as an example of a Norwegian company that has succeeded in the wind 
industry. The firm produces a warning system used on windmills, such that planes avoid 
collision with them. This is used as an alternative to visual alert systems, such as continuous 
lightning, which is annoying for the environment. According to Mr. Vik, OCAS has a clear 
positioning strategy within a niche segment and offers compelling value propositions. The 
company is now a subsidiary of the Danish wind turbine producer, Vestas, which has 
successfully implemented the system to their products.       
4.8 Venture capital interview  
Interviewee Lars Ekström  
Interview date March 25th, 2014 
Current position Investment Manager, Verdane Capital Advisors 
Previous experience PhD Engineering, University of Cambridge 
Project Manager, DNV 
Investment Analyst, Hitec Industries  
Interview location Verdane Capital Advisor’s offices in Oslo 
Company profile The firm was the first venture capital fund established in Norway 
in 1985. The main focus lies on investments portfolios consisting 
of small to mid-cap Nordic high-growth companies, and especially 
within the energy and ICT sector. Currently, 30% of their portfolio 
is on venture capital, and the company has invested in both solar 
and wind energy.  
4.8.1 Financing 
The interviewee explains that main modes of financing among high-tech venture firms in 
Norway are through venture capital, and to some extent business angels, support from the 
government and investments from larger companies. The focus of the interview is mainly on 
venture capital.  
Once the acquisition is complete, Mr. Ekström describes that the fund enters a phase of active 
ownership and cooperation with the venture’s management. A 100-day plan is established to 
set the course for future growth, value creation and restructuring. Furthermore, a three-year 
strategic rolling plan is revised each year. The interviewee claims that the focus is on long-
term strategic plans (3-5 years), rather than short term tactical decisions.      
Benefits from venture capital financing are good access to capital, partner collaboration at an 
early stage of the firm development, access to industry competence and network relationships 
(Ekström, 2014). Specifically, it is pointed out that the active partnership can assist in the 
formulation and development of value propositions. Conversely, a possible drawback is the 
short time frame of the investments. Most of the funds of Verdane Capital’s are divested after 
4 to 6 years, and within this horizon significant values and profits must be realized. With 
respect to decision-making, this can sometimes lead to less optimal and shortsighted strategic 
choices.   
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4.8.2 Challenges and lessons 
According to Mr. Ekström, one of the major challenges in the wind industry is the lack of a 
well-established infrastructure and value chains. This implies that product testing, which 
according to Mr. Ekström is an important criterion for market acceptance, financing and 
demonstration of value propositions, is much harder in comparison to for example the more 
mature oil and gas industry. Another implication is that the customer base is rather small and 
less willing to take on risk. This conservative market makes it harder for the technology 
providers to test their new products together with the customers, which is quite normal in the 
oil and gas industry.  
One of the problems in the wind industry is that many Norwegian ventures are too technology 
focused rather than customer focused. Mr. Ekström contends that technology providers must 
understand the customers and accordingly satisfy their needs. In other words, market 
orientation is essential.  
4.8.3 Success criteria 
The interviewee strongly believes in cooperation as a mean to achieve commercial success. 
High performing firms know what to outsource, what to keep in-house and establish strong 
network relationships. Those that fail often lack appropriate technology partners and keep 
much of their technologies a hidden secret among external actors. Moreover, Mr. Ekström 
argues that high-commitment cooperation strategies such as joint ventures are more 
effective, since they provide a better foundation for technology collaboration, knowledge 
sharing and can be viewed as a stamp of approval.        
Mr. Ekström emphasizes the importance of accelerated time-to-market, since early 
generation of cash flow is crucial for market survival. This is especially critical in the wind 
industry, since it is characterized by large up-front investments and dependence on subsidies.  
4.9 Industry interview 
Interviewee Jørgen Dale  
Interview date April 7th, 2014 
Current position Business Development Manager, Scatec  
Previous experience Process Engineer, Hydro 
Development Engineer, Think Nordic 
Interview location Telephone between NTNU Trondheim and Scatec offices in Oslo 
Company profile Scatec is a Norwegian incubator of new renewable technologies. 
The firm invests, develops and commercializes high technology 
renewable companies.  
4.9.1 Strategy 
According to Mr. Dale, there is clear difference between early innovators and late adopters. 
Drawing from his B2C experience in Think and B2B in Scatec and Hydro, he asserts that this is 
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prevalent in both B2B and B2C markets. The interviewee acknowledges that complementary 
product services can be used as a strategy to penetrate mass markets consisting of risk-averse 
and late adopters.    
4.9.2 Financing 
Large companies finance most of their product launches through their balance, while smaller 
ventures rely on investments from private persons, venture funds and governmental 
institutions such as Innovation Norway (Dale, 2014). Mr. Dale points out that the market for 
venture capital has dried up following the financial crisis in 2008, as funds are more inclined 
to invest on more mature and low-risk firms. However, the interviewee is generally positive 
to venture capital funds. Close follow-up of the management, knowledge transfer and the 
access to network contacts are mentioned as positive results following a venture capital 
cooperation.      
Mr. Dale outlines several models for avoiding or reducing the effects of the death valley 
phenomenon. First, licensing is a well-proven model that can generate early income for a start-
up company. Second, additional cash can be made from providing related services before the 
product launch. For example, the Norwegian provider of offshore sub-structures, OWEC, 
provided FEED studies on offshore foundations before it later launched its own product 
concept (Dale, 2014). Third, commercial development similar to the strategy of SmartMotor 
(cf. 4.2.5), can also be used. Finally, Mr. Dale asserts that start-ups must be disciplined in its 
operational expenses, such that liquidity and solvency is remained.    
4.9.3 Cooperation  
According to Mr. Dale, licensing is the most widely used cooperation model in the Norwegian 
wind energy industry. Joint ventures are used to some extent, but are most appropriate for 
larger companies. The interviewee states that licensing provides relatively easy financing and 
releases capacity in the focal firm, such that they can focus their efforts on other aspects than 
manufacturing. On the other hand, Mr. Dale emphasizes on two drawbacks in the licensing 
mode. First, a challenging task is to devise a fair and proper model for dividing the revenues 
between the licensee and the licensor. Often, these have differing opinions and perceptions 
on what constitutes a reasonable revenue distribution. Second, a licensing strategy leads to 
less customer contact for the licensor, as more of the customer relationship is transferred to 
the licensee. The licensee can possibly make product alterations based on customer feedback, 
thus dilute the original licensed product (Dale, 2014).   
4.9.4 Competitors 
In the company portfolio that Mr. Dale works with, the market is characterized by stiff 
competition. There are many players, despite the fact that the portfolio companies operate in 
niche segments. Mr. Dale states that entry barriers is a major challenge for many actors in the 
industry. As a response to this, the interviewee points out that companies must offer better 
and differentiable products compared to competitor’s offerings. Partner cooperation is also a 
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viable strategy, as the alliance can increase the bargaining power to customers when bidding 
for contracts.        
4.9.5 Success criteria 
When asked about what characterizes a good product commercialization process, Mr. Dale 
emphasizes the necessity to understand and satisfy customer’s needs. Early contact must be 
established in order to incorporate their views to the product development and launch 
process. Furthermore, Dale (2014) asserts that Norwegian firms are often too focused on the 
technical aspects in the product launch, which comes at the expense of customer orientation. 
An implication of this is that many companies do not allocate enough resources to the sales 
and marketing function.        
Adequate financing is also regarded as a success factor (Dale, 2014). The commercialization 
process is often long and resource intensive, which calls for enough money to survive the long 
period before income is generated. Finally, Mr. Dale argues that a skilled and motivated top 
management is a success criterion.      
4.10 Government interview 
Interviewee Ivar Singstad  
Interview date April 8th, 2014 
Current position Head of Wind and Marine Renewables, Innovation Norway 
Previous experience Advisor, Innovation Norway  
Interview location Telephone between NTNU Trondheim and Innovation Norway 
offices in Bergen 
Company profile Innovation Norway is a government-owned firm, with the goal to 
promote national industrial development, innovation and 
internationalization.   
4.10.1 Strategy 
The interviewee asserts that there are great differences between innovators, early adopters 
and mass-market customers. The established power utilities use proven technologies, and are 
characterized by risk-averse behavior. Indeed, Mr. Singstad is concerned that there might be 
few or no early innovators in the market, which can make it hard for technology providers to 
test and demonstrate their innovations in the market. The result is higher entry barriers for 
new venture that cannot finance their product development and commercialization process 
from its own balance sheet.  
When asked about the IPR regime in Norway, Mr. Singstad claims that the patent is only as 
strong as the company is willing to defend it from imitators. The firm must allocate significant 
resources to follow up the patent and potential lawsuits that might be initiated as a result of 
infringements. Moreover, the interviewee argues that patents are more easily filed in the early 
years of the innovation. However, companies must be aware that the patent is valid for 20 
65 
 
years in Norway. Wind technologies have a long development cycle, and the products should 
be realized before the patent period has expired.      
4.10.2 Financing 
According to Mr. Singstad, most of the venture capital within the clean technology sector has 
dried up. There were several transactions in 2008 and 2009, but significantly less after the 
financial crisis. The interviewee asserts that a major drawback with venture capital financing 
is the short time frame of the investments. Most of the technologies in the renewable energy 
sector have long development lifecycles, often minimum ten years (Singstad, 2014). Venture 
funds have shorter investment periods that must yield returns, and this could lead to 
differences in what venture capitalists and entrepreneurs perceive as strategically important. 
On the other hand, Mr. Singstad point out that venture funds can provide much-needed 
capital and competence to the start-up.   
The industry is characterized by significant upfront capital expenditures before any income is 
generated (Singstad, 2014), often between 500 and 1000 MNOK. This poses a major risk of 
entering the valley of death. Mr. Singstad argues that companies need to generate income as 
fast as possible, and at the same time cooperate with external parties in order to diversify risk. 
He mentions SmartMotor’s commercial development strategy (cf. 4.2.5) as successful model 
and a possible approach to avoid the lack of cash in companies’ start up.   
4.10.3 Cooperation 
In terms of collaboration, the interviewee argues that industrial partners are often more 
appropriate than venture funds. They can provide long-term financing of the product 
development and commercialization, which smaller firms are dependent on. However, few of 
the larger companies in Norway are willing to enter such agreements in the renewable energy 
sector, as many of them concentrate their efforts on the oil and gas sector. The domestic 
market needs more firms that are willing to invest and collaborate with wind technology start-
ups.  
Mr. Singstad claims that Norwegian firms can be better at collaborating with external parties. 
He especially sees the potential in licensing agreements. The major rationale and benefit 
behind the model is that it provides the opportunity to outsource the production to companies 
that are more specialized in manufacturing. This is especially useful for Norwegian companies 
since many lack competence and resources in production, while they are good at engineering 
and design (Singstad, 2014). However, a fundamental prerequisite for the licensing model to 
function is that the technology is patent filed.       
4.10.4 Success criteria 
Mr. Singstad argues that market orientation, customer focus and sufficient financing are 
factors that characterizes a successful commercialization process. Norwegian companies 
could benefit from more attention to customers, as many are overly focused on the technical 
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aspects (Singstad, 2014). Once the product is developed and demonstrated, a competent 
salesforce is key to expand the product into the market. Additionally, he points out that 
cooperation with vendors and other actors in the value chain is a benefit once the firm scales 
up its production.   
4.11 Summary 
By using six different case companies, this chapter has shed light on how Norwegian wind 
technology providers commercialize their products, what they regard as success factors and 
various lessons in the process that others can learn from. The independent views of three 
external interviewees have added further perspectives and balance to the problem statement 
of this thesis. In order to summarize and contrast the empirical data in a simple and organized 
manner, findings from each case company and external interviewee is presented in table 9. It 
will provide the basis for the discussion part in the next chapter. Note that the table discerns 
between descriptive statements in italic and normative opinions in non-italic. Be aware that 
some statements may have elements of both, which is not reflected in the table.    
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Table 9: Summary of case companies and external interviewees 
 
Product Strategy Financing Cooperation Competitors 
Challenges 
and lessons 
Success 
criteria 
SmartMotor 
- Incremental 
innovation 
- Less successful 
due to external 
factors 
- Alignment 
between product 
and customers 
- Market 
information 
gathering 
- Chasm 
- Successful VC 
- Commercial 
development 
programs 
- Licensing of 
production 
- Licensing 
reduces risk and 
gives access to 
capital, but less 
proprietorship 
- Few direct 
competitors 
- Conservative 
and large 
players 
- Value 
propositions 
- Short- 
sightedness 
 
- Market 
orientation 
- Niche strategy 
- Human 
resources 
Fedem 
- Incremental 
innovation 
- Less successful 
- Emergent 
- Little 
commitment to 
wind energy 
- From the 
company’s 
balance sheet 
- Sales 
distribution 
channel with 
little success 
- Some large 
competitors 
- - 
Blaaster 
- Incremental 
innovation 
- Whole product 
- Technical 
success, 
commercialization 
still ahead 
- Market 
information 
gathering 
- Few early 
innovators 
- Services for the 
mass market 
- Government 
support 
- Prefer 
industrial 
partners 
rather than VC 
- Technology 
sharing rather 
than licensing  
- Aim: high 
commitment 
industrial 
partnership 
- Fierce 
competition  
- Possible 
niches with 
less 
competition 
- Death valley 
- Conservative 
and large 
players 
- Chapdrive as 
example 
- Solid 
financials 
- Prototype 
- Best 
technology 
- Market 
understanding 
Windflip 
- Radical 
innovation 
- Less successful 
- Cooperation and 
customer 
orientation with 
Statoil 
- Government 
support 
- Too early-
phase for VC 
- Informal 
cooperation 
- Aim: industrial 
partner 
- Little direct 
competition, 
tugboats as 
substitute 
- Limited 
customer base 
- Timing 
- Market 
orientation 
Statoil 
- Incremental 
innovation 
- Technical 
success, 
commercialization 
still ahead 
- Internal and 
external sales 
- Customer 
orientation 
- Commercial goal 
to operate in the 
market without 
subsidies 
- Government 
support and 
company 
financing 
- Licensing, 
planning and 
customer 
network 
important to 
avoid death 
valley  
- Cooperation 
decisive for the 
technical success 
- Aim: industrial 
partner to pool 
risk and gain 
economies of 
scale 
- Drawback: 
dilution of 
patents 
- Little 
competition, 
but similar 
prototypes 
deployed in 
Japan and 
Portugal  
- Developing 
an immature 
market 
- Lack of 
market 
understanding 
in Norwegian 
firms 
- Market 
orientation 
- Market 
intelligence and 
customer 
communication 
- Value 
propositions 
- Cooperation 
- Low cost 
Chapdrive 
- Radical 
innovation 
- Long verification 
process 
- Technical 
success, 
commercial 
failure 
- Proof of concept 
- External people 
with good 
knowledge 
- Differentiation 
and positioning 
- Market and 
customer-driven 
- Significant VC 
grants 
- Patents to 
attract VC 
- VC decisive 
for company 
development 
 
- Industrial 
partner required 
for further 
development 
- Failure due to 
lack of partner 
- Aim: being part 
of a larger firm 
- No direct 
competitors 
with same 
concept as 
Chapdrive 
- Risk-averse 
customer 
- Capital 
intensive 
- Hard to gain 
access to 
customers 
- Death valley 
- Reliable 
product 
- Industrial 
expertise 
- Strategy 
commitment 
- Timing 
- Positioning 
L. Ekström - - 
- VC pros: 
access to 
capital, 
competence 
and networks 
- VC cons: 
short time 
frame 
- - 
- Lack of 
established 
value chains 
- Small and 
risk-averse 
customer base 
- Tech focus 
- Cooperation, 
especially high 
commitment 
modes 
- Accelerated 
time-to-market 
J. Dale - 
- Chasm 
- Complementary 
services to 
penetrate mass 
markets 
- Positive to VC 
- Licensing, 
services and 
commercial 
partnership to 
avoid death 
valley 
- Licensing 
mostly used in 
the industry 
- Licensing cons: 
less customer 
contact and 
revenue 
distribution 
- Stiff 
competition 
even in niche 
segments 
- 
- Market and 
customer 
orientation 
- Adequate 
financing 
- Skilled and 
motivated top 
management 
I. Singstad - 
- Few early 
adopters leading 
to high entry 
barriers 
- Patents only as 
strong as the 
company is willing 
to defend it 
- Critical to 
VC’s short 
investment 
time frame 
- Fast cash and 
cooperation to 
avoid death 
valley 
- Industrial 
partners more 
appropriate than 
VC 
- Norwegian can 
be better at 
collaboration 
- - 
- Market and 
customer 
orientation 
- Adequate 
financing 
- Competent 
sales force 
- Cooperation 
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5. Analysis and discussion  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter brings together the theoretical models and propositions in chapter three with the 
empirical research in chapter four. The aim is to holistically discuss how Norwegian wind 
technology providers successfully can commercialize their products, and to find out whether 
the propositions formulated in chapter three are strengthened or weakened based on 
empirical findings (cf. table 6). This will result in a set of tangible recommendations for wind 
technology firms. The empirical analysis in this chapter combines the data from 17 different 
interviews. In order to conveniently get an overview of these sources, appendix 8.6 provides 
a complete list of all the interviewees and their associated companies.  
The disposition in this chapter is as following: First, each proposition as illustrated in figure 9 
is discussed separately in sections 5.2 to 5.10. Whereas the first three sections are related to 
how firms can reduce the probability for commercialization failure, sections 5.5 to 5.10 discuss 
how they can increase the likelihood for success. The focus of the chapter is shifted in the next 
three parts. Whereas 5.2 to 5.10 uses the method of table 6, the final sections do not 
necessarily rely on it and provides a general discussion across different perspectives. Part 5.11 
reflects on the relationship between the propositions; whether there exists any synergies 
between them or if they are somehow negatively correlated with each other. As presented in 
chapter two, the thesis also discusses whether there are any differences in commercialization 
strategy between firms with differing sizes and product types. This is done in section 5.12. 
Moreover, 5.13 reflects on what impact external factors have on commercialization strategy 
and success. Finally, this chapter is summarized in 5.14 together with a revised and final 
framework that gives recommendations on how Norwegian companies should commercialize 
and launch their wind technologies.    
5.2 Proposition 1a – Chasm and whole product  
This proposition is related to chapter 3.3 in the literature review, and discusses the contention 
that Norwegian wind technology providers should develop a whole product and cross the 
chasm, in order to avoid early market exit. Relevant theory is provided by Moore (2002*). 
Section 5.2.1 analyzes the validity of proposition 1a based on the empirical data in chapter 
four. Next, section 5.2.2 connects and discusses the findings with relevant theoretical models 
from chapter three. The aim is to critically asses the extant literature in light of empirical 
findings from the Norwegian wind industry, thus providing new theoretical contributions. 
5.2.1 Empirical analysis and practical implications 
The existence of a chasm is largely confirmed by Schwenke (2014) (cf. section 4.2.4), Ove 
Pettersen (2014) (cf. section 4.4.4), Dale (2014) (cf. section 4.9.1) and Singstad (2014) (cf. 
section 4.10.1). The finding implies that Norwegian wind technology providers should be 
aware of the gap between early innovators and mass-market customers, and formulate 
strategies accordingly. As discussed in the theory review, whole product configuration is 
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needed to overcome the chasm issue and penetrate mass markets. Ove Pettersen (2014), Dale 
(2014) and Schwenke (2014) provide support for this contention, claiming that 
complementary assets and services are indeed necessary to cross the chasm and cater to the 
needs of risk-averse customers. However, the challenge remains on high investment costs in 
realizing whole products (Schwenke, 2014). The relationship between chasm theory, whole 
product and complementary assets is further discussed in section 5.11.1. 
The theory of Moore (2002*) is closely related to customer behavior, and it is evident that 
there are several critical industry specific characteristics among wind technology customers. 
Most importantly, Larsen (2014) and Torolf Pettersen (2014) from Blaaster, Dahlhaug (2014) 
from Chapdrive and Singstad (2014) from Innovation Norway argue that customers such as 
power utilities and wind turbine producers are very conservative and risk-averse. This suggests 
that they can be categorized as being part of the mass-market or majority market, since they 
are less willing to adopt early innovations. They demand a reliable and proven product, which 
is completely different from the innovations the wind technology providers offer at its early 
product lifecycle. More decisively, Schwenke (2014), Ove Pettersen (2014), Vik (2014) and 
Dale (2014) state that there are almost no innovators and early adopters in the market. This 
has significant implications on the commercialization strategy of a company:  
First, the possibilities for testing new and especially radical innovations will be lower in a 
market with few innovators and early adopters. According to Larsen (2014) (cf. 4.4.9), this is 
an important criterion for commercialization success. Section 4.4.4 exemplified this 
contention with Blaaster, which has challenges in testing its unproven technologies in 
collaboration with power utilities. This issue is even more of a problem when considering the 
long verification processes in the industry, which was discussed in conjunction with Chapdrive 
in section 4.7. Second, the possibilities for continuous customer orientation and feedback 
from them during the technology development are reduced, since the wind technology 
customers are focused on proof of concept before discussing further adoption of the product. 
For example, Chapdrive concentrated on verification before making efforts in selling the 
technology, a time period that entailed little connection with customers. Third and finally, the 
lack of innovators and early adopters raises the barriers to entry, particularly for start-ups. 
This is because the technology providers are more needed to obtain large amount of capital 
for proprietary development and testing on their own, when customers are less willing to 
engage in collaborative testing and development. Chapdrive is case in point illustrating this, 
as no players were eager to support their costly component development. Even though they 
had significant up-front capital at their disposal, it was not enough to finance the final stage 
of product development. This shows evidence of high barriers to enter and succeed in the 
wind industry, especially among those who are not granted resources from venture funds 
(Singstad, 2014) (cf. 4.10.1).   
Based on the analysis, we can conclude that proposition 1a is strongly supported, since more 
than three interviewees in additional to an external interviewee back the proposition.  Indeed, 
Norwegian wind technology providers should develop a whole product and cross the chasm. 
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This notion is supported by interviewees from two different companies and two external 
institutions.  
5.2.2 Discussion and theoretical implications   
The analysis in 5.2.1 shows that Moore’s model must be modified in order to correctly reflect 
the realities of the wind sector. The bell curve does simply not fit the industrial characteristics 
of the wind energy segment. Hence, the model can be revised according to figure 12. It shows 
crudely that there are only early majority, late majority and laggards in the wind energy 
market, in contrast to the original model that also includes innovators and early adopters. As 
illustrated, the chasm is now bigger and even more prevalent.   
Referring back to the theory review, Easingwood and Harrington (2002) agree on Moore’s 
research. They claim that products must be launched two times. First, when entering the 
innovator and early adopter market. Second, the product must be modified and re-launched 
before mainstream customers are inclined to adopt the new technology (cf. section 3.4.3). 
However, this is changed in the wind sector, as there are no innovators and early adopters in 
the market. Now, only a single product launch is warranted. Nevertheless, this implies a 
tougher commercialization process, since the market adoption rate is less incremental than 
before. Furthermore, there are fewer opportunities for companies to adjust the product 
before entering into mass-markets. In other words, barriers to entry are increased.  
As a final summary, proposition 1a is supported by several interviewees across multiple 
companies and external institutions. However, the chasm model must be customized for the 
wind energy business. The analysis in 5.2.1 shows several examples of case companies that 
have challenging issues with the chasm phenomenon. Chapdrive shows the extreme result of 
a market with no innovators and domination of risk-averse late majority customers. It is not 
implausible that Chapdrive could have still been in business today, if it had not been for few 
risk-willing customers in the Norwegian market.  
5.3 Proposition 1b – Minimal investment base 
This section discusses the proposition that Norwegian wind technology providers should 
minimize its initial investment base, in order to avoid early market exit and reduce the 
consequences of the death valley phenomenon. As explained in section 3.3, the term minimal 
investment base is used in conjunction with various cooperation strategies to pool risk and 
investments, and is discussed by Olleros (1986). As previously, this part starts off with an 
Figure 12: Adapted chasm model 
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empirical analysis and discussion of practical implications, before reflecting on how this is 
related to the extant theory.    
5.3.1 Empirical analysis and practical implications 
Multiple interviewees confirm that the death valley phenomenon is very much prevalent in 
the wind energy industry. One of Blaaster’s greatest challenges is that it is currently in the 
middle of the death valley. Furthermore, Dahlhaug (2014) states that the payback period is 
much longer in the wind industry, due to long periods of product verification (cf. section 4.7.5). 
This makes the effects of the phenomenon even more present. Clearly, the death valley issue 
creates market uncertainty, and is a threat to the survival of young start-ups. Indeed, a 
prerequisite for avoiding early demise is that the death valley either is avoided or its effects 
minimized. Schwenke (2014) and Øvrebø (2014) provide an example on how to avoid or 
minimize the consequences of the death valley phenomenon. The use of commercial 
partnership was mentioned in section 4.2.5 as being successfully utilized by SmartMotor as 
the company is now past the death valley. The agreement ensures early cash flow, a minimized 
fixed cost base and flexibility. The strategy is endorsed by Dale (2014) and Singstad (2014) as 
being effective. The former interviewee further elaborates that licensing and providing 
complementary services before product launch can generate early income for start-ups (cf. 
section 4.9.2). Stadaas (2014) supports the idea of using licensing to minimize the effects of 
death valley (cf. section 4.6.5). Øvrebø (2014) further argues that licensing reduces risk and 
the need for capital investments (cf. section 4.2.6). As a final example, Blaaster uses a small 
and lean technical team to reduce expenses during the critical phase (cf. section 4.4.8).              
Summarized, it is clear that the death valley phenomenon is strongly present and prevalent in 
the wind industry. It creates market uncertainty and is a threat to pioneering start-ups, and 
can potentially be the cause of early market exit. Five interviewees across two companies and 
two different external institutions, argue that this can be avoided or mitigated through risk 
and investment pooling. Relevant strategies that practitioners should consider are commercial 
partnership and licensing, and this contention should be included in proposition 1b. Based on 
this analysis, we can conclude that Norwegian wind technology providers should use 
cooperation strategies to minimize the investment base, thereby avoiding early market exit 
and reducing the consequences of the death valley phenomenon. Referring to table 6 and the 
sources who support this, the assertion is strongly supported.   
5.3.2 Discussion and theoretical implications   
Following the analysis in the previous section, the theoretical findings of Olleros (1986) is 
supported. As explained in section 3.3, he presents licensing, joint venture and subcontracting 
as possible strategies for minimizing the investment base. However, the empirical analysis 
only mentioned licensing as a possible strategy. This suggests that licensing might be more 
appropriate than joint venture and subcontracting, and that the theory of Olleros (1986) is not 
entirely transferable to the wind energy sector. Though, a more likely explanation is that 
licensing is widely used in the Norwegian wind industry (Dale, 2014) (cf. section 4.9.3.). Thus, 
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the interviewees are more biased towards this model compared to joint venture and 
subcontracting. In terms of commercialization performance, this does not imply that licensing 
is better than joint venture and subcontracting.   
The discussion so far suggests that cooperation is important during product 
commercialization. Olleros (1986) argues that firms should team up in various ways with other 
incumbents, whether large players or smaller companies. He also adds that this must be 
considered, even though there are some drawbacks with cooperation. For example, licensing 
leads to loss of the monopolistic product position. However, in a market where the death 
valley phenomenon is ever looming, this is sometimes a necessary sacrifice to make. Section 
5.9 further discusses the theme on cooperation, while 5.11.2 reflects on the relationship 
between proposition 1b and 6.                  
5.4 Proposition 1c – Complementary assets 
In this part, we discuss the proposition that Norwegian wind technology providers should gain 
a strong position in complementary assets, in order to avoid early market exit. It is related to 
the framework of Teece (1986*), as explained in section 3.3. The model is closely connected 
to the whole product concept, which was discussed in proposition 1a. Thus, there is some 
natural overlap between this section and 5.2. This is further elaborated in 5.11.1. As previous, 
empirical analysis is presented first, before a theoretical discussion.  
5.4.1 Empirical analysis and practical implications  
None of the case companies provide any explicit data that lack of complementary assets leads 
to early market exit. However, Ove Pettersen (2014) states that they are a necessity to 
successfully enter new markets, which is the reason why Blaaster is considering to undertake 
a turnkey delivery strategy (cf. section 4.4.4). Similarly, Windflip argues that complementary 
expertise and know-how within marine operations is necessary for their product’s success (cf. 
section 4.5.6) (Christophersen, 2014). The interviewee further adds that this competence 
must be accessed through external partners, since the company does not possess the 
capabilities in-house. Finally, Dale (2014) is also positive about the use of complementary 
assets and services, but does not clearly state that it is prerequisite for success.    
As mentioned in section 3.3, Teece (1986*) stresses that firms in environments with weak 
patent protection regimes, i.e. appropriability, are more likely to be subjected to imitation 
from competitors. He further states that strong regimes is an exception rather than the rule. 
Singstad (2014) argues that in a Norwegian context, the patent is only as strong as it is willing 
to defend it from competitors (cf. section 4.10.1). This implies that Norwegian wind 
technology providers must allocate significant resources to patent management in order to 
avoid infringement and erosion of competitive advantage. This must be developed together 
with a strong position in complementary assets. Only then can firms gain strong and 
sustainable market positions and avoid entrants from copying their technology and displace 
the incumbent company.   
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As a conclusion, no empirical data that lack of complementary assets lead to early market exit 
was found. On the other hand, interviewees from two companies and one external institution 
argue they are necessary for successful commercialization, hence indicating medium support. 
Thus, Norwegian wind technology suppliers should indeed gain a strong position in 
complementary assets. Nevertheless, since no examples showing the relationship between 
commercialization failure and lack of complementary assets was found, proposition 1c must 
be modified to the following: Norwegian wind technology providers should gain a strong 
position on complementary assets, in order to best commercialize its products.     
5.4.2 Discussion and theoretical implications 
The previous analysis shows that Teece’s focus on lack of complementary assets as a source 
of product commercialization failure is not necessarily justified. However, his theory is 
certainly relevant when discussing it in relation to commercialization success. This difference 
may be perceived as trivial, but is significant in terms of how practitioners and scholars should 
implement strategies and think.        
As mentioned earlier in 5.4, there is a connection between Moore (2002*) and Teece (1986*). 
Although they both argue that complementary assets are necessary to avoid early market exit, 
their point of departure is somewhat different. While Teece (1986*) contends that they are 
essential to avoid imitators displacing the innovator’s market leader position, Moore (2002*) 
stresses that complementary assets and services contribute to a whole product, which is 
critical for late majority customers. In other words, complementary assets are important both 
to fend off competitors and to cater to the mass market’s needs. This implies that the model 
of Teece (1986*) is not only related to product commercialization success, but also the 
creation of a whole product, which in turn is associated with lower probability of 
commercialization failure (cf. illustration in figure 14). This notion is also discussed in section 
5.11.1.        
5.5 Proposition 2 – Competitor orientation 
This proposition is related to the theory of Debryune et.al. (2002), which is described in section 
3.4.2. Section 5.5.1 analyses the contention that Norwegian wind technology providers should 
be competitor oriented, in order to best commercialize its products.  
5.5.1 Empirical analysis and practical implications  
The article of Debruyne et.al. (2002) bases its argument on the fact that two-thirds face 
competitive reactions after the product launch, but the case companies do not provide an 
unambiguous picture to this statement. SmartMotor, Fedem Technology, Windflip and 
Chapdrive state that they have few direct competitors and none of these mentions any major 
reactions from competitors. Although SmartMotor experienced some challenges from 
Chinese entrants in 2010 (cf. section 4.2.4), Mr. Øvrebø contends that the company faces few 
competitors today, especially in Norway, due to unique product characteristics (cf. section 
4.2.7). Windflip points out that the most viable competing alternatives are substitutes such as 
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tugboats. On the other hand, Larsen (2014) representing Blaaster claims that the competition 
in the wind turbine market is fierce, while Dale (2014) argues the same in the wind companies 
that he has been part of. It is apparent that the data does not lead to any conclusive answer. 
Since the case companies operate across quite different segments, it is reasonable to assume 
that the degree of competitiveness is dependent on the characteristics of the market the firm 
is operating in. Hence, it is not appropriate to generalize that all Norwegian wind technology 
providers should put efforts into being competitors oriented. Since the empirical data are too 
divergent, proposition 2 is not supported. The next section discusses how competitor 
orientation differs along the dimensions firm size and product type.  
5.5.2 Discussion and theoretical implications 
SmartMotor, Windflip and Chapdrive operate in niche markets, since they deliver smaller 
parts or solutions to wind turbines. On the other hand, Blaaster operates in a relative broad 
market space since they provide the whole wind turbine. It seems that the companies 
operating in niche markets have fewer competitors than the one in a broad market. At the 
same time, Debruyne et.al. (2002) stress that it is precisely in niche markets that the likelihood 
of competitor reaction is relatively low. Thus, there is some justification to their contention 
that niche-driven companies should be less concerned about being competitor oriented. 
Furthermore, some support to Debryune’s et.al. (2002) claim that incremental innovations are 
more likely to face reactions than radical products, is given. For example, the radical products 
of Chapdrive and Windflip met little competitive resistance, which is in line with Debryune 
et.al. (2002). On the other hand, Blaaster’s incremental innovation is fighting for survival in a 
market with many competitive players. However, it should be noted that the incremental 
innovations of Fedem Technology, SmartMotor and Statoil/Hywind have met relatively little 
competitive reactions. Thus, the case of Norwegian companies shows some contradictory 
results to the work of Debryune et.al. (2002). Debryune et.al. (2002) base their findings from 
the construction, chemicals and transportation industry in the US, UK and the Netherlands. It 
is possible that geographical and industrial differences explain the discrepancy between this 
study and Debruyne et.al. (2002).       
In summary, the degree of competiveness varies according to which market the company 
operates within. Thus, propositions 2 cannot be generalized for all Norwegian wind 
technology companies, and is not supported. Instead, each firm must customize its own 
competitive strategy taking into consideration the technology and segment it is operating in. 
The research confirms that ventures operating in niche markets developing radical 
technologies are less needed to be competitor oriented. On the other hand, there is mixed 
support for the assertion that firms marketing incremental innovations should be more 
competitor oriented.                 
5.6 Proposition 3 – Decisions alignment 
The third proposition analyzes the notion that Norwegian wind technology providers should 
align its strategic and tactical launch decisions, in order to best commercialize its products. It 
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is mainly associated with chapter 3.4.3. Relevant theories are presented by Hultink et.al. 
(1997), Hultink et.al. (1998), Benedetto (1999), Hultink and Robben (1999) and Frattini (2013). 
The first section starts off with an empirical analysis, while the second section discusses 
theoretical implications.  
5.6.1 Empirical analysis and practical implications 
Proposition three is a recurring theme in several articles in the theory review. Even though it 
is a well-established argument in the product launch and commercialization literature, it has 
been hard to arrive at any meaningful conclusions based on the case study analysis alone. Not 
enough reliable data was found during the empirical analysis, as no interviewees gave any 
clear answers to the questions related to the proposition. Furthermore, no one indicated 
decisions alignment as a success criterion when asked generally about what they considered 
as success factors in commercialization strategy. However, it should be remarked that some 
of the answers from the interviewees indicate that not all of them fully grasped the concept 
of decisions alignment. In other words, it is likely that some spurious results might have 
showed up. For this reason, these data points were not included in the case study presentation 
in chapter four. In hindsight, it is evident that some elements in the interview process could 
have been done differently. However, I believe that interviews are not the optimal research 
method to investigate proposition three, and that that other approaches might have yielded 
better results. The next section discusses this contention and its theoretical implications.  
5.6.2 Discussion and theoretical implications 
The most significant challenge in analyzing proposition three is that it is rather abstract, hard 
to bring to the surface and deeply embedded into a theoretical context. The use of semi-
structured interviews as done in this thesis, increase the chances for spurious results, 
especially when the conceptual questions are tricky to understand among interviewees. 
Alternatively, the use of quantitative deductive studies similarly to the papers of Frattini et.al. 
(2013) and Hultink et.al. (1998) are possible. Such methodology would provide objective 
measures and base on statistical generalizability, thus reducing the chance of errors. However, 
a major weakness with such a method is the bias in data input. A critical question remains 
about how to create a survey that does not influence the respondents’ answers in any 
particular directions.  
Evidently from the previous paragraph, basing research on the answers of practitioners will 
always be affected by their bias. One cannot guarantee that there is perfect consistency 
between what they say and what is done in practice. Thus, methods such as passive 
participant observations and causal mapping can be used as alternatives to interviews and 
surveys. These approaches give an impartial view of various managerial situations (Bryman & 
Bell, 2011: 437). For example, the researcher could participate as a fly on the wall during 
strategy sessions and board meetings, hence investigating how long-term strategic and short-
term tactical decisions are made in practice. The situations can be visualized through causal 
maps, thus providing a helpful research tool. However, the challenge remains on how to 
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connect the descriptive data to commercialization performance and that the study must be 
conducted over a longer time period in order to understand how decisions emerge and is 
related to product performance.                
In summary, proposition three cannot be concluded in either direction. There is simply too 
little data available based on the case studies. However, other research methodologies are 
believed to be more suitable. There are pros and cons with both qualitative and quantitative 
approaches, and future studies should have these in mind.      
5.7 Proposition 4 – Market information gathering activities 
This proposition discusses the assertion that Norwegian wind technology providers should 
utilize strong market information gathering activities, in order to best commercialize its 
products. It is connected to the paper of Benedetto (1999), who claims that this is a crucial 
element in the strategy planning process, along with long-term strategic decisions and short-
term tactical decisions. As explained in the theory review, Benedetto (1999: 539) regards 
customer feedback and market testing as central market information gathering activities. It is 
believed that product tests in the market, interpretation of the market test findings and 
studies of customer feedback are positively related to product launch success. These are 
important constituents in market orientation strategies, and the relationship between this and 
market information gathering is discussed in section 5.11.3. The next section analyzes 
proposition four based on the empirical data, while reflections on theoretical implications is 
included in 5.7.2.       
5.7.1 Empirical analysis and practical implications  
The case study research revealed that Blaaster and SmartMotor use activities such as 
participation in fairs, councils and dialog with industry players to stay updated on the market 
dynamism and trends. Although both Schwenke (2014) and Ove Pettersen (2014) argue that 
these are important activities, they do not explicitly state that they are critical for product 
commercialization success. However, interviewees from two different companies and one 
external institution emphasize the criticality of product testing and verification (Ekström, 
2014; Larsen, 2014; Dahlhaug, 2014). For example, Larsen (2014) stresses that product 
demonstration and a working prototype is necessary to achieve market acceptance, and thus 
commercial viability (cf. section 4.4.9). Furthermore, Dahlhaug (2014) emphasizes that 
customers in the wind industry demand proof of concept before adopting new products. 
Market testing is a tool to demonstrate and show proof of concept to customers and achieve 
product verification. It can contribute to higher probability of market adoption, since 
customer’s feedback are incorporated continuously during the product development and 
testing. This will in turn lead to higher likelihood of commercial success. In other words, 
market testing and the knowledge gained from it should be a decisive component in market 
information gathering strategies. Along this line, Norwegian wind technology providers should 
be aware of the challenges. Ekström (2014) points out that conservative customers lead to 
less willingness to test innovative products (cf. section 4.8.2), while Dahlhaug (2014) stresses 
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the long verification processes (cf. 4.7.4). Consequently, firms should allocate significant 
resources to the market testing process such that the activity perseveres throughout the long 
and complex verification process. 
In summary, only empirical evidence that market information gathering is an important 
activity in some Norwegian wind technology firms was found. The interviewees did not 
necessarily state that they are a source to product launch success. On the other hand, two 
firm interviewees and one external interviewee argue that product verification and 
demonstration is critical. In line with table 6, this contention is thus mediumly supported. 
Good market testing routines leads to higher likelihood of market acceptance, since feedback 
from the customers are actively used to improve the product. This in turn leads to higher 
probability of future sales, and consequently commercial success. Thus, we can reformulate 
proposition four to the following: Norwegian wind technology providers should utilize strong 
market testing activities, in order to increase likelihood of market adoption and consequently 
commercial success. Note that the revised proposition results in a second layer, as illustrated 
in figure 14 in section 5.14.       
5.7.2 Discussion and theoretical implications 
As previously analyzed, the notion of market information gathering activities is somewhat 
different in the wind energy market, compared to the theory of Benedetto (1999). Empirical 
studies show that market testing is a more prevalent success factor than other activities that 
Benedetto (1999) outline. Thus, a theoretical implication is that Benedetto’s theory cannot be 
generalized to the wind industry. Certain constituents are more valid than others in the wind 
sector. The fact that market testing is deemed a more of essential criterion to 
commercialization success than other activities can be explained by industry specific factors. 
For example, the risk-averse behavior of customers increases the need for market testing in 
order for them to adopt new products and technologies. Their demand for a proof of concept 
makes the use of market testing even more relevant and appropriate.                              
5.8 Proposition 5 – Market orientation 
The fifth proposition is related to the notion that Norwegian wind technology providers should 
be market oriented, in order to best commercialize its products. It discusses the role of market 
targeting, understanding customers and delivering value to them. Relevant extant theory was 
presented in section 3.4.3 with researchers such as Mu and Benedetto (2011), Langerak et.al. 
(2004) and Lin et.al. (2006), and in section 3.2.1 by Jolly (1997*) as well. The latter author 
explains that many commercialization efforts fail in the aspects of market orientation, thus 
showing how critical proposition five is. In the next section, proposition five is analyzed based 
on empirical data in chapter four, before a theoretical discussion in the section after.  
5.8.1 Empirical analysis and practical implications 
Proposition five is to a large degree confirmed by several sources in the case studies, such as 
Schwenke (2014) (cf. section 4.2.9), Christophersen (2014) (cf. section 4.5.9), Stadaas (2014) 
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(cf. section 4.6.8), Indrevær (2014) (cf. section 4.6.8), Ekström (2014) (cf. section 4.8.2), Dale 
(2014) (cf. section 4.9.4) and Singstad (2014) (cf. section 4.10.4). When asked generally about 
what a successful commercialization strategy consists of, all of the aforementioned 
interviewees answer market and customer orientation independently from each other. This 
indicates a strong support for proposition five, both from several respondents within the case 
companies and external interviewees.  
The interviewees provide different perspectives to proposition five. Schwenke (2014) argues 
that there must be consistency between the technical innovation and customer’s needs, and 
he states that the whole organization must be committed to this (cf. section 4.2.9). Stadaas 
(2014) elaborates that firms must understand their customers and how their needs change 
over time. Market intelligence and communication with customers must be prioritized. 
Furthermore, the case of the hired Danes in Chapdrive shows that leaders with in-depth 
market knowledge and understanding of customers can have a very positive impact on the 
organization (cf. section 4.7.4). Vik (2014) provides another successful example in section 4.7.9 
where he mentions OCAS, a company with a clear customer and targeting strategy coupled 
with compelling value propositions. Finally, Singstad (2014), Schwenke (2014), Stadaas (2014), 
Ekström (2014), Dale (2014) state that Norwegian companies are too technology and product 
focused during the commercialization phase, and that they must be more market oriented. 
This wide consensus among several corporate decision makers and industry interviewees 
illustrates one of the major challenges in the Norwegian wind energy industry. It is apparent 
that the wind technology providers must reorient themselves from the product itself and 
more to its customers.                 
The case of Windflip provides valuable insight to the notion of market orientation. As 
explained in section 4.5.4, Christophersen (2014) contends that the company was customer 
oriented from beginning through the cooperation with Statoil. However, the lack of relevant 
customers in an immature market inhibited further feedback from customers and the market. 
Windflip entered the market early, which in hindsight contributed to the fact that the firm 
today is on hold. There are two lessons from this experience. First, Norwegian technology 
providers must get feedback from several customers in order to reflect the market as realistic 
as possible. Second, they must enter the market in a time when there are enough potential 
customers to get a correct sense of the market’s needs. Firms that choose to develop their 
own markets with few existing customers and little infrastructure must be able to navigate in 
a complex landscape with little available customer information.        
Proposition five is not only confirmed by several sources in this thesis, but also by the study 
of Holgersen and Lillebo (2002*), which was presented in section 3.7. Recall that this section 
was not used to formulate propositions, but rather to elaborate them based on specific 
empirical findings found in the literature review. Thus, the following argument must not be 
perceived as circular reasoning. Based on interviews of Norwegian IT companies, the authors 
conclude that successful firms are characterized by market orientation and good 
understanding of the customers. This culture permeates throughout the whole organization. 
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Although the study is within the ICT industry, it is reasonable to transfer the findings to the 
wind energy industry. Both of the sectors are technology intensive, competitive and the 
research by Holgersen and Lillebo (2002*) is performed in Norway. The findings further 
confirm the findings in the case study research in chapter four.    
The discussion so far confirms that market orientation is vital for commercialization success. 
Thus, the next question is what firms can do to be market oriented. The previous section about 
market information gathering activities provides some means to achieve this. A thorough 
presentation of this can be found in section 5.11.3, where relationship between the 
propositions are discussed.      
As a conclusion, proposition five is strongly supported. Indeed, Norwegian wind technology 
providers should be market oriented, in order to best commercialize their products. Seven 
interviewees from three case companies and three external institutions confirm this. Note 
that all of the external interviewees are in agreement with each other. Furthermore, the 
proposition is backed by Holgersen and Lillebo (2002*). Still, as was pointed by five 
interviewees, Norwegian companies have potential for improvement within this area.  
5.8.2 Discussion and theoretical implications 
The theory on market orientation is to a large extent confirmed to be crucial for product 
commercialization. In other words, this study is one of many works that argues the 
prominence of focusing on customers and delivering superior value to them. Due to the large 
degree of consensus, it is not unlikely that the same conclusions can be drawn from other 
geographical markets than the Norwegian industry. Furthermore, the literature on market 
orientation is dominant in both B2B and B2C industries, thus making it very much possible that 
proposition five is also relevant for commercialization in other industries than wind energy.           
5.9 Proposition 6 – Cooperation  
This proposition discusses the assertion that Norwegian wind technology providers should 
cooperate with external parties, in order to best commercialize its products. The contention is 
mainly related to section 3.5 in the theory review. Researchers such as Holgersen and Lillebo 
(2002*), Gans and Stern (2003), Kollmer and Dowling (2004), Hsu (2006), Aggarwal and Hsu 
(2009), Golicic and Sebastiao (2011) and Walsh (2012) provide different perspectives to this 
issue. The contents in these articles are synthesized together with the findings from the case 
studies. As before, 5.9.1 discusses the validity of the proposition using empirical data, while 
5.9.2 is devoted to theoretical models and implications.  
5.9.1 Empirical analysis and practical implications  
The first paragraph below gives a short description of cooperation modes used by the case 
companies in chapter four. The second, third and fourth paragraph discuss the role of 
cooperation as a success criterion, and which collaboration modes are the most appropriate. 
The fifth paragraph provide some more insights and lessons from the Chapdrive case that are 
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relevant for practitioners. In the paragraph thereafter, it is argued that cooperation should 
not only be done across firms, but also with various stakeholders. Finally, this section 
concludes on the validity of proposition six.   
The case study companies from chapter four utilize a wide variety of cooperation modes. 
SmartMotor uses a licensing strategy (cf. section 4.2.6), while Fedem Technology has 
outsourced its distribution channels to DNV GL (cf. section 4.3.6). Windflip used a rather 
informal cooperation mode consisting of knowledge sharing with Statoil (cf. section 4.5.6). 
During its existence, Chapdrive had some industrial partners with varying degree of success 
(cf. section 4.7.6). On the other hand, Statoil/Hywind and Blaaster do currently not have any 
formal collaborative agreements, but both aim to enter high commitment industrial 
partnerships (cf. section 4.6.6 and 4.4.6 respectively). It seems that Norwegian wind 
technology providers use an even mix of high and low commitment collaborative strategies. 
On the contrary, Dale (2014) contends that licensing strategies are most widely utilized (cf. 
section 4.9.3).     
Several interviewees including Ove Pettersen (2014) (cf. section 4.4.6), Torolf Pettersen (2014) 
(cf. section 4.4.6), Larsen (2014) (cf. section 4.4.6), Stadaas (2014) (cf. section 4.6.6), Ekström 
(2014) (cf. section 4.8.3) and Singstad (cf. section 4.10.4) support the notion of proposition 
six. Evidently, Norwegian wind technology providers should enter cooperative agreements in 
order to successfully commercialize their products. Start-ups often lack the resources and 
knowledge to operate alone in a complex and dynamic market. Cooperation provides the 
means to share knowledge, pool risk, gain resources and finances and achieve scale and 
synergies. However, the respondents disagree on what cooperation mode is the most 
effective and appropriate. On one hand, Torolf Pettersen (2014), Larsen (2014) and Ekström 
(2014) argue that high commitment modes such as industrial partnership and joint ventures 
are more effective than low commitment strategies such as licensing. For example, Ekström 
(2014) contends that they provide better basis for technology collaboration and knowledge 
sharing. Blaaster prefers industrial partners because they can provide long-term financing. 
This is contrary to the works of Kollmer and Dowling (2004) and Aggarwal and Hsu (2009), 
which state that licensing is appropriate for both integrated and non-integrated start-ups. 
They argue that liability of newness and smallness make licensing more relevant for small 
ventures. It is clear that there is some gap in the strategic thinking between scholars and 
practitioners. On the other hand, Singstad (2014) especially sees potential in licensing, as it 
provides opportunities to outsource manufacturing, which are activities that Norwegian wind 
companies have less competence within. This is supported by Dale (2014), but he also points 
out that licensing leads to lower customer contact (cf. section 4.9.3), which in section 5.9 was 
found to be critical for successful commercialization. Furthermore, Schwenke (2014) states 
that licensing reduces risk and need for capital investments, but that it also decreases the 
proprietorship of the technology when licensed to several partners (cf. section 4.2.6). 
The empirical review in section 3.7 also gives support to proposition six. The article of Walsh 
(2012) constructs a framework that identifies which commercialization strategies are the most 
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suitable in various environments. Norway is found to be an innovation push cluster 
characterized by high degree of market sophistication and relatively low renewable energy 
demand. Due to demand uncertainty and strong bargaining positions among technology 
providers, innovation push clusters call for use of strategic alliances and cooperation with 
major incumbent firms. The interviewees have mostly emphasized internal firm specific 
factors when arguing that cooperation is a prerequisite for commercialization success. 
However, Walsh (2012) has shown that there are external factors as well that justifies the use 
of collaboration across firms. Furthermore, his research also specifies which type of firms 
technology providers should cooperate with, namely large and well-established incumbents. 
This is indeed because smaller firms reduce their risk when allying themselves with larger 
players in a market with high degree of uncertainty and complexity. Still, Norwegian 
technology providers must recognize that entering partnership with large incumbents are 
difficult in practice, as the case of Chapdrive clearly shows evidence of. Finally, Holgersen and 
Lillebo (2002*) also provide relevant empirical findings in a Norwegian context. They argue 
that network relations and cooperation are decisive for finding capital and gaining knowledge. 
This is in line with the case of Chapdrive and the hired Danes, which was mentioned in section 
4.7.8.      
Appropriability is a relevant term when discussing which cooperation mode to utilize in 
different external environments, and is mentioned by Aggarwal and Hsu (2009), Kasch and 
Dowling (2008) and Gans and Stern (2003). For example, Ulla (2014) points out that close 
collaboration can lead to dilution of patents, since the partner gains access to proprietary 
knowledge and assets. In business environments with little patent protection, the chance of 
expropriation in such cooperative modes is larger. There are pros and cons with both high and 
low commitment cooperative strategies. As the discussion so far shows, there is no clear 
answer to what modes are the most effective. Norwegian wind technology providers need to 
analyze its strengths, weaknesses and environment, before assessing which collaboration 
method is the most effective and relevant for the company. 
Chapdrive provides an important lesson for Norwegian wind technology providers. The firm 
had all the prerequisites to succeed in the market; a promising technology, a strong and 
committed management, financing from venture funds and support from knowledgeable 
people. Yet, the company ended up exiting the market after only seven years in business. As 
discussed in section 4.7.6, much of this explained by the lack of partnership agreements. 
Chapdrive was dependent on larger industrial players to scale up its technology, and did not 
have the resources to pursue the large investments alone. The case shows how important it 
is for Norwegian companies in the wind industry to engage in cooperation, in one form or 
another. Earlier identified industry characteristics such as high up-front investment costs, long 
verification processes, fierce competition and risk-averse customers reinforces this assertion. 
As a result, firms should have a clear and committed strategy to engage in partnerships. As 
the case of Chapdrive shows evidence of, the process must start early since it takes time, and 
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managers must persevere long periods with few fruitful results. Section 5.9.2 explains that 
venture funds can be helpful in this process.   
Firms should not only cooperate with other companies, but also with external stakeholders. 
In addition, substantial resources must be gathered from them, such that the product is 
further financed in its development and commercialization process. Elaborating this, Stadaas 
(2014) exemplifies that Statoil works closely with governments in relation to wind site licenses 
(cf. section 4.6.9). On the other hand, Indrevær (2014) calls for the need of large customer 
networks, such that sales are not only dependent on one buyer (cf. section 4.5.5). A relevant 
contact network can be established through participation in councils and fairs (Schwenke, 
2014) (cf. section 4.2.4).   
In summary, proposition six is strongly supported by a majority of the interviewees, both 
among the case companies and the external industry respondents. Norwegian wind 
technology providers should indeed cooperate. However, it is clear that both scholars and 
practitioners do not agree on what the most appropriate cooperation mode is. Thus, the 
central strategic question that managers in the wind industry must consider is not if to 
cooperate, but rather on how to cooperate. This decision must be based on analysis of the 
firm’s strengths, weaknesses and external environment. Even though we cannot conclude on 
how Norwegian wind technology providers should cooperate, we can nevertheless state that 
they indeed should cooperate with both firms and other stakeholders in order to best 
commercialize their products.     
5.9.2 Discussion and theoretical implications 
The empirical analysis support the contention of Holgersen and Lillebo (2002*), Gans and 
Stern (2003), Kollmer and Dowling (2004), Hsu (2006), Aggarwal and Hsu (2009), Golicic and 
Sebastiao (2011) and Walsh (2012) that firms should cooperate in order to successfully 
commercialize new products. The analysis also supports the notion that there is not a simple 
answer on how to cooperate, and that firms must individually assess which mode is the most 
appropriate one.   
The Windflip technology can be regarded as a discontinuous innovation (cf. section 3.2.2), 
since the product has little supporting infrastructure to diffuse into mainstream markets. 
Frattini et.al. (2012) and Jolly (1997*) recommends companies experiencing this to enter 
partnership agreements to overcome the challenges of discontinuous innovations. An 
interesting connection to the work of Gans and Stern (2003) can be found here. They argue 
that costly complementary assets often is the key wedge between the capabilities of start-ups 
and incumbents. Consequently, the use of cooperation is a viable alternative to wholly owned 
investment in order to access complementary assets. This supports the view of Frattini et.al. 
(2012) that cooperation should be utilized when commercializing discontinuous innovations.    
Recall in the previous section the challenges that Chapdrive had in finding a commercial 
partner to support their technology development. In accordance with Hsu (2006), venture 
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funds can be an important resource during this demanding phase. He argues that active 
investors reduce search costs by utilizing its own networks, lessen expropriation potential and 
enhance cooperative relationship skills among the companies it is involved in. However, 
Chapdrive was owned by several venture funds and still did not manage to engage any 
industrial partners that could bring them to the next step in commercialization. Thus, venture 
capitalists alone cannot guarantee the achievement of successful collaborative agreements. 
The finding also implies that the recommended strategy of Hsu (2006) will not always succeed. 
The relationship between venture capital and cooperation, i.e. proposition six and seven, is 
further discussed in section 5.11.4.                         
5.10 Proposition 7 – Financing from venture capital funds 
Proposition seven reflects on the contention that Norwegian wind technology providers 
should cooperate with venture capital funds in order to best finance and commercialize its 
products, and is associated with section 3.6 in the theory review. Relevant theory is provided 
by Timmons and Bygrave (1986), Hellmann and Puri (2000), Hsu (2006), Widding et.al. (2009*) 
and Erikson et.al. (2009*). Section 5.10.1 empirically analyzes the validity of proposition 
seven, discusses pros and cons of venture funding and tries to explain the differing opinions 
between the interviewees. Finally in 5.10.2, the empirical findings are discussed in relation to 
a selected number of theoretical models.  
5.10.1 Empirical analysis and practical implications 
Multiple sources provide support for proposition seven. Based on own experience, Øvrebø 
(2014) and Dahlhaug (2014) are positive about VC cooperation. Both argue that they are useful 
in terms of financing, networking and competence, while the latter interviewee further states 
that they have provided help regarding business development and corporate governance. 
Specifically, venture funds can through their networks provide references and entry into larger 
firms that wind technology providers can cooperate with. In other words, the major challenge 
of conservative customers in the wind industry, as discussed in section 5.2, are mitigated with 
the use of VC. The venture capital interviewee Ekström (2014), argues that benefits from 
venture financing are good access to capital, early stage partner collaboration and network 
relations. Dale (2014), being a respondent from an external institution, provides a more 
neutral view. He mentions close follow-up of management, knowledge transfer and network 
access as positive effects of VC. All of the aforementioned arguments are in line with Timmons 
and Bygrave (1986), Hellmann and Puri (2000) and Hsu (2006).  
On the other hand, a number of sources point out several drawbacks with venture capital 
collaboration. Larsen (2014), Torolf Pettersen (2014), Singstad (2014) provide some critical 
remarks. The two first interviewees representing Blaaster prefer long-term industrial partners 
rather than VC for financing. They argue that venture capitalists are shortsighted in nature 
and that they lack in-depth knowledge of the wind industry (cf. section 4.4.5). The venture 
capital interviewee, Ekström (2014), along with Singstad (2014) agree that the investment 
time frame might be too short, which can lead to less optimal strategic choices. Moreover, 
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Holgersen and Lillebo (2002*) state that venture capital provides little more value than 
financing. This is contrary to the research of Timmons and Bygrave (1986), Hellmann and Puri 
(2000) and Hsu (2006).   
It should be noted that venture fund financing is not appropriate for all companies. For 
example, Statoil is large enough to finance its commercialization processes from its own 
balance sheet. Venture capital would then just be an expensive type of financing. However, 
for those start-ups that consider venture capital, there are a couple of elements they should 
be aware of. First, as stated by Vik (2014), Furuseth (2014), Dahlhaug (2014), Larsen (2014), 
Dale (2014) and Singstad (2014), venture funding within the wind industry has significantly 
dried up after the financial crisis. This implies that managers must expect a much tougher 
financing environment in the future. Second, decisions makers must allocate significant 
resources into persuading venture capitalists that their firm is a good investment. Venture 
funds use meticulous means to identify the right investment objects. Chapdrive’s method of 
referring to patents to gain support from VC can be a reasonable approach.  
In summary, there are quite mixed views on the effects that venture funds have on 
commercialization performance. This is in line with the conclusion of Holgersen and Lillebo 
(2002*). Although several sources argue that they have a positive effect, others question this 
assertion. Thus, proposition seven cannot be confirmed on a general basis. It seems that that 
the appropriateness of venture capital cooperation is dependent on corporate strategy. 
Norwegian wind technology providers must analyze on an individual basis whether venture 
funds provide enough value added to justify time and resources used during the agreement. 
In next section, this contention is discussed in relation with the theory in 3.6.  
5.10.2 Discussion and theoretical implications  
The empirical findings from the case interviews are more divergent than the discussions in the 
venture capital literature, which views venture funds as mostly positive. However, it should 
be noted that the sample of VC-relevant articles in the literature review is rather limited, and 
that inclusion of more papers could have revealed several works that are critical to venture 
funds. Nevertheless, a major weakness with the sample of VC literature is that it is far too 
general. It does not discern between various firm and product characteristics when 
recommending start-ups to enter VC agreements. Future research should take this into 
consideration. Another relevant observation is that the papers of Timmons and Bygrave 
(1986), Hellmann and Puri (2000) and Hsu (2006), which are based in the US, are generally 
positive to VC. On the other hand, the article of Widding et.al. (2009*) based in Norway, is 
more balanced and critical. A possible explanation is that the US venture capital environment 
is better functioning than the Norwegian one. However, more research in this topic is 
warranted before any conclusions are drawn.           
The work of Hellmann and Puri (2000) provide a possible explanation for why the case study 
companies disagree on whether venture funds are positively correlated to commercialization 
performance. They contend that the appropriateness of choosing active investors depend on 
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the firm strategy. As apparent from the firm descriptions in chapter four, the companies have 
quite different business strategies. For example, Blaaster refrains from licensing and focuses 
on long-term industrial relationship, thus making the shortsighted investment periods of 
venture funds less relevant. On the other hand, SmartMotor focuses on licensing and are less 
concerned about long-term industrial partnership. As a result, this company relies on venture 
fund and are generally positive to them. The examples show support to the contention that 
the decision to enter into VC agreements is dependent on firm strategy and long-term goals.  
While the venture capitalist Ekström (2014) is rather positive to venture capital, other firm 
interviewees are less. This shows some support to the finding of Widding et.al. (2009*) that 
investors perceive their contributions as more value adding than entrepreneurs do. However, 
more research is warranted in order to come at a final conclusion. 
5.11 Relationship between selected propositions  
So far, little has been said about the relationships between the previously discussed 
propositions. This part aims to analyze findings and implications across the elements in the 
theoretical framework in figure 9. In other words, this section brings the discussion to a holistic 
level. Note that the method in table 6 used to conclude on the degree of support in findings 
is not necessarily used in neither this section nor in 5.12 and 5.13. First, 5.11.1 reflects on the 
relationship between the chasm theory, whole product (P1a) and complementary assets (P1c). 
Second, 5.11.2 elaborates on the tie between minimal investment base (P1b) and cooperation 
(P6). Third, 5.11.3 discusses the connection between market information gathering activities 
(P4) and market orientation (P5). Finally, the link between cooperation (P6) and financing from 
venture funds (P7) is analyzed in 5.11.4. The resulting findings and conclusion are 
implemented into the revised framework in 5.14.  
5.11.1 P1a and P1c – Chasm, whole product and complementary assets 
Section 5.2 concluded that the chasm is very much prevalent in the wind industry, and that 
firms need to create whole products to cross this gap. It also referred to the statements of 
Ove Pettersen (2014), Dale (2014) and Schwenke (2014), who all argued that complementary 
assets and services are needed to cater to the needs of the mass-market customers. 
Obviously, a parallel can be drawn to section 5.4 about proposition 1c. Here it was concluded 
that a strong positions in complementary assets is needed to achieve successful product 
commercialization. Based on the discussions so far, complementary assets not only 
strengthens the company’s current market position by fending off potential competitors, but 
it is also a precondition to cross the chasm and enter larger mass markets. Thus, we can 
conclude that there is a positive relationship between proposition 1a and 1c. However, note 
that the relationship is only valid from P1a to P1c, as reflected in figure 14.    
5.11.2 P1b and P6 – Minimal investment base and cooperation 
As concluded in section 5.3, minimizing the company’s investment base is necessary to avoid 
or mitigate the market uncertainty of the death valley phenomenon. Furthermore, 
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cooperation was found to be the most appropriate approach to achieve this. On the other 
hand, cooperation was in section 5.9 concluded to be necessary for commercialization 
success. Since it is also contributes to minimize initial investments and pool risk, proposition 
six has a positive impact on proposition 1b. This is illustrated with an implication arrow from 
P6 to P1b in figure 14. The case of the early demise of Chapdrive is an example of a firm that 
did not manage to pool large investments costs due to the lack of cooperators. From this 
lesson, it is clear that Norwegian wind technology providers should reduce up-front 
investment costs as much as possible in order to reduce the likelihood of early market exit. In 
this respect, cooperation is a viable strategic option.             
5.11.3 P4 and P5 – Market testing and market orientation 
Section 5.7 found that specifically market testing activities are related to commercialization 
success, while the notion of market orientation was confirmed in 5.8. In this section, it is 
argued that proposition four and five are interrelated and mutually support each other. 
Market testing activities lead to a higher degree of market orientation. Widespread use of 
market testing provides more contact to customers and increased understanding of their 
needs. Consequently, firms are provided with a better understanding of the market and are 
thus more inclined to make strategic decisions that are customer- and market driven. This is 
in line with Stadaas (2014) in section 4.6.9, who points out that market intelligence and 
communication with customers should be prioritized as part of the market strategy. 
Conversely, I believe that market orientation has positive impact on market testing. Firms with 
a corporate mind-set that focuses and values market orientation are more likely to undertake 
market-testing activities. Based on this discussion, we can state there is an implication arrow 
both ways between proposition four and five, as illustrated in figure 14.       
On a different note, the article of Mu and Benedetto (2011), which was presented in 3.4.3, 
argues that several strategic orientations are complementary and support each other. For 
example, it is believed that market and network orientation are related to each other. A 
connection between this and empirical findings in chapter four can be found. Schwenke (2014) 
argues that market information from networks are important to get a good picture of market 
dynamism and temperature. In other words, networks provide the means for gaining market 
knowledge, which in turn leads to increased market orientation. Thus, the research of Mu and 
Benedetto (2011) is somewhat empirically supported by Schwenke (2014).     
5.11.4 P6 and P7 – Cooperation and venture fund financing 
As explained in section 3.6, venture fund financing is merely a special case of cooperation. As 
evident by the discussion in section 5.10 about VC, most of the interviewees focus on the non-
financing benefits of VC cooperation. For example, Widding et.al. (2009*) argue that venture 
funds can through their networks provide references and entry into larger firms that wind 
technology providers can cooperate with (cf. section 3.6). This network aspect is also 
supported by Øvrebø (2014) and Dale (2014). Hsu (2006) further contends that venture 
capitalists reduce cost of searching potential cooperators, lessen expropriation potential and 
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improve cooperative relationship skills (cf. section 3.5). All of this indicates that VC has a 
positive impact on cooperation. Their active involvement reduce the efforts of finding new 
partners and enhance the cooperative relationship. As opposed to the three former sections, 
this relationship is not illustrated in figure 14, since proposition 7 is not supported. 
5.12 Differences in product and firm characteristics 
Surprisingly, the extant literature says very little about how commercialization strategy varies 
with different types of companies and products. Thus, this section aims to contribute to close 
this theoretical gap. As presented in 2.2.2, this is part of the research design. First, variations 
between radical and incremental innovations are analyzed in 5.12.1. In accordance with table 
1, this is discussed in relation to whether the product strategy is successful or not. Second, in 
5.12.2, variations between start-ups and mature firms are reflected on and is related to the 
latter case. Finally, theoretical and practical implications are holistically discussed in 5.12.3.  
5.12.1 Incremental innovations compared to radical innovations 
The forthcoming discussion is associated with table 1. Based on the summary in table 9 and 
the discussions so far in this chapter, we can organize the case companies according to table 
10. Note that the degree of success in product strategy is solely related to how the offering 
performs in the wind industry. For example, the analyzed products of SmartMotor and Fedem 
Technology have success in other sectors they operate in, but not in the wind industry, which 
I am concerned about. Finally, observe that it is too early to conclude on the degree of product 
strategy success in Blaaster and Statoil/Hywind. Although their innovations have achieved 
technical success, their products are not yet launched. The question about commercial success 
is still open.     
Table 10: Categorization of case companies 
 Incremental innovation Radical innovation 
Successful product strategy - - 
Failed product strategy 
SmartMotor 
Fedem Technology 
Chapdrive 
Windflip 
Too early to conclude on the 
degree of product success 
Blaaster 
Statoil/Hywind 
- 
The most interesting finding revealed by table 10 is that no companies in the case sample 
seem to have succeeded with their product commercialization. Furthermore, there are equally 
many failed cases in both incremental and radical innovations. However, the radical cases 
represented by Chapdrive and Windflip are currently out of business, while the incremental 
innovations are not. Although we cannot conclude or generalize based on this finding alone, 
this supports the contention of Frattini et.al. (2013: 186) that the more radical the product is, 
the greater likelihood of an early market exit.  
Differences between successful and failed strategies have been discussed in depth throughout 
the thesis. Thus, the rest of this section focuses on variations between incremental and radical 
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innovations. Summary of the arguments in the next paragraphs is provided in table 11 in 
section 5.12.3. First, as already discussed in 5.5, incremental innovations face more stiff 
competition, and must therefore focus more on being competitor oriented than companies 
marketing radical technologies.   
Second, section 5.2 pointed out the importance of verification and product testing. It also 
emphasized the non-existence of early innovator customers. Risk-averse customers shun 
adoption of radical technologies, thus firms commercializing these kind of products will 
experience higher barriers to succeed in the market. Chapdrive illustrates this contention very 
well. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that radical products have longer verification 
phases, an assertion that is supported by the case of Chapdrive (cf. section 4.7.3). Since we 
have already argued that product testing is critical before launch, this means that radical 
products will suffer longer time to market. In turn, this implies that the death valley gap is 
further widened. This is critical, since radical innovations are more likely to require more 
investments. In other words, the combinations of long time to market and large up-front 
investments significantly increases the payback time. The strategic implication of this is that 
companies commercializing radical technologies must be even more aware of liquidity issues 
during product development. 
Third and related to the previous paragraph, recall that market testing is a tool to demonstrate 
and show proof of concept to customers and achieve product verification. This is often done 
in collaboration with the customers. However, they are also risk-averse, as explained in 5.2.1. 
This means that testing radical innovations are tougher than incremental products, since 
conservative customers want to avoid the uncertainty of breakthrough technologies. This 
contention is supported by Ekström (2014) (cf. section 4.8.2). Furthermore, start-ups will have 
a hard time to test their innovations together with risk-averse customers, since they have a 
less proven track record and experience in comparison to large and mature firms. The 
customers would choose the safe alternative rather than the new option.  
Finally, radical innovations are often rather discontinuous because new technologies have 
little supporting infrastructure to be accepted by the market. According to Frattini et.al. (2012: 
7), supporting infrastructure is needed before the product diffuses into mass markets. The 
case of Windflip, a radical innovation, illustrates this in section 4.5.6. They were in need of 
complementary expertise such as marine operations to provide infrastructure before product 
launch. Hence, complementary assets are key for commercialization success, and to a larger 
degree for radical innovations. These can be acquired through partnership and strategic 
alliances (Frattini et.al., 2009: 6). Thus, Norwegian wind technology providers should make 
efforts in identifying potential cooperators with complementary assets.  
5.12.2 Mature firms compared to start-ups 
Among the case companies, Statoil, Fedem Technology and SmartMotor can be regarded as 
relative large and mature players, while Chapdrive, Blaaster and Windflip are small start-ups. 
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An obvious difference between these types of players is that large firms have much more 
financial resources. For example, Statoil has financed most of its Hywind product development 
from its own balance sheet (cf. section 4.6.5). Hence, they are able to burn more cash before 
income is generated compared to start-ups. Clearly, mature firms are less affected by the 
death valley phenomenon and can undertake investments on expensive radical technologies 
to a greater extent. This means that proposition 1b about minimizing the initial investment 
base is less relevant for large corporations compared to start-ups.  
Another implication of resource differences is that the barriers to entry are lower among large 
and resourceful companies. They can to a greater extent test their products in-house and 
without the need of cooperators, which on the other hand is necessary for start-ups. 
Furthermore, financing from the balance sheet is much cheaper than venture capital. VC has 
thus not been a viable alternative for Statoil (Indrevær, 2014) (cf. section 4.6.5). Large 
companies with established routines and management are also less likely to benefit from the 
active ownership of venture funds. Therefore, VC is less of a precondition for success among 
mature firms compared to start-ups. This is in line with extant literature, which is mainly 
concerned with VC financing of start-ups and small companies. Finally, the appropriateness of 
various cooperation modes are likely to differ with firm size. For example, Dale (2014) argues 
that licensing is especially appropriate among start-ups seeking to generate early income. 
However, the contention lacks empirical testing and must be further researched.  
5.12.3 Theoretical and practical implications 
Following the discussions in the two previous sections, we can summarize the findings in table 
11. As illustrated, five of the originally nine formulated propositions have various practical 
implications for different corporate decision makers. Essentially, Norwegian wind technology  
Table 11: Differences in propositions between firm and product type 
Firm and product 
typology 
P1b P1c P2 P4 P7 
Incremental and 
start-up 
Important Important 
Important in 
some cases 
Hard to 
perform 
Appropriate 
Incremental and 
mature firm 
Less 
important 
Important 
Important in 
some cases 
Less hard to 
perform 
Less 
appropriate 
Radical and start-up 
Very 
important 
Very 
important 
Less 
important 
Very hard to 
perform 
Appropriate 
Radical and mature 
firm 
Important 
Very 
important 
Less 
important 
Hard to 
perform 
Less 
appropriate 
providers should be aware of which category of firm and products they belong to. Strategies 
must then be formulated accordingly and in line with table 11. It shows which strategic 
elements decision makers in different firms should prioritize. For example, start-ups 
commercializing radical innovations should allocate significant time and resources to minimize 
initial investment base, gain a strong position in complementary assets, while competitor 
orientation should be less prioritized. They should also recognize that it is harder to perform 
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market testing compared to firms with incremental innovations. VC is appropriate, but the 
decision to enter such partnership must be evaluated together with other company strategies. 
The next few paragraphs provide a holistic discussion on product and firm differentiations, 
together with practical and theoretical implications.  
First, certain propositions and theories discussed in this study are more valid when they are 
utilized in specific settings and contexts in the wind technology industry. Table 11 implies the 
need to differentiate the theories in chapter three with respect to various firm and product 
variables. The selection of extant literature in chapter three is too general and neglect how 
fundamentally different start-ups, mature firms, radical and incremental innovations are. This 
leads to rather generic recommendations for practitioners, which are less customized to the 
realities they face. For example, the research of Timmons and Bygrave (1986) does not 
differentiate the appropriateness of venture funding with respect to product radicalness and 
firm size. They are generally positive to VC, but the empirical research shows that VC is more 
relevant for smaller start-ups and companies that do not desire industrial partners (cf. the 
discussion about Blaaster). However,  it should be noted that Hellman and Puri (2000) discern 
between innovators and imitators, but not on firm size and product radicalness (cf. section 
3.7). Furthermore, neither Teece (1986*) nor Olleros (1986) provide any insights into firm and 
product differentiation in their respective theories on crossing the chasm and minimal 
investment base.       
Based on the previous discussion, the major theoretical implication is that future literature to 
a greater extent should take into account the differences between various firm and product 
specific factors. Only the theory of Debruyne et.al. (2002) (P2) does this to a certain degree.  
The theories on minimal investment base (P1b) (Olleros, 1986), complementary assets (P1c) 
(Teece, 1986*), market testing (P4) (Benedetto, 1999) and venture capital (P7) (Timmons & 
Bygrave, 1986; Hellmann & Puri, 2000; Hsu, 2006; Widding et.al., 2009*; Erikson et.al., 2009*) 
should be revised. At least, researchers should investigate whether the framework in table 11 
is valid across other industries than the wind technology segment. Moreover, it is not unlikely 
that the theories of crossing the chasm (P1a), strategic alignment (P3), market orientation (P5) 
and cooperation (P6) also need revisions, since they also do not discern between product and 
firm characteristics. However, no specific findings and implications about this was found. Thus, 
future research should investigate further into these works before making any final 
conclusions.   
Second, it can been seen from table 11 that small companies and start-ups should rely more 
on external players and actors than larger and more mature firms should. Thus, start-ups are 
to a higher degree at the mercy of external factors than big firms to succeed with product 
commercialization in the wind sector. For example, small companies like Windflip are more 
dependent on initial funding in order to not suffer early demise due to the death valley 
phenomenon. Venture capital is an appropriate way to acquire capital and competence in 
early stages, but as previously discussed, the decisions to enter such agreements must be in 
91 
 
accordance with the overall company strategy. Nevertheless, a strong venture capital 
environment with solid competence on renewables is needed to contribute to a healthy and 
sustainable industry. Furthermore, a question is whether the  start-up supporting schemes in 
Norway are adequate, and if they are not, the government should contemplate on what new 
measures should be undertaken. Today, most of the public support mechanisms are provided 
through monetary grants, but start-ups should also be given advices on strategic issues such 
as cooperation, financial management and access to networks. Innovation Norway do offer 
these services to entrepreneurs (Innovation Norway, 2014), but a critical review of their 
effectiveness should be done. However, this theme is somewhat outside the boundary of this 
study, and should hence be a topic for further research.        
Third, companies commercializing radical innovations should focus on internal issues such as 
developing and providing complementary assets, performing market testing activities, 
reducing initial investment base and less on external forces such as competitors. This is 
because wind technology firms launching radical offerings to a larger degree enter 
uncontested market space, which is less mature than other markets. Internal capabilities must 
be built in order to successfully develop these segments. Finally, start-ups with radical 
products should be especially aware of death valley issues.         
5.13 Considering external factors 
Throughout this thesis so far, external environmental factors have played a minor role 
compared to internal factors. However, in accordance with 2.2.3, it is within the scope if this 
study to investigate factors that constitute a variable to firms’ commercialization 
performance. As opposed to internal factors, companies have little control over this and must 
form their commercialization strategy accordingly. This section discusses this and focuses 
especially on the strategic implications for practitioners.   
Figure 13 shows which external 
factors that affect product 
commercialization process in firms. 
First, as discussed in section 5.2, risk-
averse and conservative customers is 
an external force that makes it 
challenging to conduct market testing 
on innovative products. Specifically, 
they should be aware of the lack of 
early innovators, which increases 
barriers to entry and likelihood of 
succeeding on long term. Corporate decision makers must take this into account when 
formulating their market- and customer driven strategies. Industrial partnerships that 
collaborate on product development and market testing can be a possible solution to the 
challenge. Second, the empirical analysis revealed that several companies such as Blaaster, 
Figure 13: External factors influencing product commercialization 
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Statoil/Hywind, Chapdrive and Windflip have received funding from governmental bodies 
such as Innovation Norway and Enova. Thus, it is clear that stakeholders such as the 
government are willing to support new and innovative ideas. Therefore, a strategic implication 
is that Norwegian wind technology providers should make efforts in applying for 
governmental support. This is especially important in the early phase of start-ups when the 
threat of death valley is present. Furthermore, the recommendation is in line with Stadaas 
(2014) who claims that a success criterion is the cooperation with external stakeholders (cf. 
section 4.6.9). Third, some of the case study companies operate in immature and uncertain 
market segments. This is especially the case for Windflip, Statoil/Hywind and to some extent 
Chapdrive. The two aforementioned companies have created and developed new market 
spaces, which for Windflip led to a less successful product launch. On the other hand, Blaaster 
operates in an established industry with fierce competition. SmartMotor’s investments in the 
wind segment ended up with little return, mostly because of rising costs on permanent 
magnets, which is an important input factor in motors (cf. section 4.2.4). Magnet is a 
commodity, thus SmartMotor had little control over its own costs. From this, we can 
generalize that the wind industry is uncertain, dynamic and complex. This might also explain 
why many of the case companies have not succeeded with their product commercialization. 
Fourth, as can be seen in table 9, competition intensity is rather mixed among the companies. 
Proposition 2 in section 5.5 concluded that companies marketing incremental innovations face 
more competition. The strategic implication is that Norwegian wind technology companies 
with incremental products should be more competitor oriented than those with radical 
innovations.       
5.14 Summary and revised framework 
This chapter has analyzed and synthesized the theory from chapter three together with the 
empirical data from chapter four. Specifically, section 5.2 to 5.10 discussed each of the nine 
formulated propositions. Some of them were found to be strongly supported by empirical 
data, while others lacked enough evidence to be confirmed. The results are summarized in 
table 12. Note that it includes the revised propositions from this chapter, and not the originally 
formulated ones. Furthermore, 5.11 brought the discussion to a holistic level and reflected on 
the relationship between the previously supported propositions. Based on the 
aforementioned sections, the theoretical framework in figure 9 is revised and presented as a 
final generic model in figure 14. The structure is similar as the initial framework, but some 
propositions have either been altered or removed. Explanation of each element and its 
relating implication arrows was presented in each proposition’s respective section. The 
generic model will provide a useful tool for both practitioners and scholars. As far as the 
author knows, such a model in a Norwegian industry context does not exist, and is thus a new 
contribution to the research on product commercialization. Although the model is generic, 
practitioners should take into account the variations in certain propositions between firm and 
product type, as previously illustrated in table 11 in section 5.12. It provided an illustration on 
how various companies with different product characteristics should differentiate its strategy 
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in order to maximize the likelihood of success. This topic has not to a significant extent been 
researched by scholars, and this thesis provides insight into this issue. Finally, section 5.13 
considered external factors in relation to the problem statement of this thesis. Although it is 
not the main focus of the study, it is clearly a variable influencing product commercialization.  
Table 12: Propositions and results 
Proposition  Result 
P1a: Norwegian wind technology providers should develop a whole product and 
cross the chasm, in order to avoid early market exit.    
Strongly supported 
P1b: Norwegian wind technology providers should use cooperation strategies to 
minimize the investment base, thereby avoiding early market exit and reducing 
the consequences of the death valley phenomenon. 
Revised   
Strongly supported 
P1c: Norwegian wind technology providers should gain a strong position on 
complementary assets, in order to best commercialize its products.     
Revised   
Mediumly supported 
P2: Norwegian wind technology providers should be competitor oriented, in 
order to best commercialize its products. 
Not supported 
P3: Norwegian wind technology providers should align its strategic and tactical 
launch decisions, in order to best commercialize its products. 
Inconclusive 
P4: Norwegian wind technology providers should utilize strong market testing 
activities, in order to increase likelihood of market adoption and consequently 
commercial success. 
Revised   
Mediumly supported 
P5: Norwegian wind technology providers should be market oriented, in order to 
best commercialize its products.   
Strongly supported 
P6: Norwegian wind technology providers should cooperate with external 
parties, in order to best commercialize its products.    
Strongly supported 
P7: Norwegian wind technology providers should cooperate with venture capital 
funds, in order to finance and best commercialize its products.       
Not supported 
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Figure 14: Revised generic commercialization model  
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6. Conclusion: implications and further research 
This final part provides a bird’s eye view and conclusion of the thesis. The overarching goal of 
the work has been to study how Norwegian wind technology providers best can commercialize 
their products, a topic that has not been investigated thoroughly by researchers. Through 
analysis and synthesis of theoretical articles, company interviews and firm documents, a 
holistic and practical picture of product commercialization in the wind energy sector has been 
provided. The frameworks in figure 14 and table 11 is my contribution to an important field of 
research. Section 6.1 summarizes the strategic and practical implications of the discussions in 
chapter five, while 6.2 sums up the implications of the theories in chapter three in relation to 
the empirical findings. Finally, further research areas of interest are identified in 6.3, before 
the thesis is rounded off with a couple of concluding remarks in 6.4.  
6.1 Strategic and practical implications 
The discussion of the propositions in chapter five yielded several strategic and practical 
recommendations that are relevant for corporate decision makers in the wind energy 
industry. Due to the chasm phenomenon, which is further reinforced by risk-averse customers 
and few early innovators, Norwegian wind technology providers should develop whole 
products. This reduces the likelihood of early market exit. Complementary assets are believed 
to contribute to a whole product, in addition to strengthening the competitive position of the 
company. In accordance with proposition 1b, Norwegian wind technology providers should 
minimize its investment base when developing and commercializing new products. The death 
valley phenomenon is very much present in the wind industry and its market uncertainty 
effects can be reduced through cooperation with partners.  
Even though the degree of competition varies in the wind industry, firms should take their 
behavior and market positions into account when developing and marketing new products. 
This applies especially to firms with incremental innovations. Furthermore, the discussion of 
proposition four concluded that Norwegian wind technology providers should be aware of 
how critical market testing and product verification are. Strong market testing activities are 
needed to increase the likelihood of market adoption, and thus commercialization success. 
They also impact how market and customer oriented firms are, which is concluded to be highly 
important for commercialization success. Wind technology providers must ensure that 
feedback from a representative customer base is incorporated into the product, and that the 
whole organization is committed to satisfy their needs. Next, cooperation is essential for 
commercialization success. Corporate decision makers must not address the question of 
whether to collaborate or not, but how. There are pros and cons with various cooperation 
modes, and practitioners should base their decisions on an analysis of the company’s 
strengths, weaknesses and external environmental. Finally, mixed support was found for 
venture funding. Whether the company will benefit with such a relationship depends on firm 
characteristics, the corporate strategy and its long-term goals. However, corporate decision 
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makers should be aware that venture capitalists could provide better foundation for 
cooperation with other firms.  
On a final note, managers should take into consideration the size of the company and what 
type of technology it is commercializing when launching new products. Small companies are 
often at the mercy of external factors to succeed, and should thus focus on turning these 
elements into their own advantage or mitigate them. Specifically, start-ups are more 
susceptible to the death valley phenomenon, and should cooperate to reduce this risk. Due to 
their size and lack of equity, they should also consider venture capital agreements to a larger 
extent than large corporations should. Moreover, radical innovations experience longer 
payback time, more challenges in terms of market adoption and market testing, and need 
substantial complementary assets in order to have a supporting infrastructure. Since 
companies with radical technologies often enter uncontested market space, they should focus 
on internal resources and capabilities to develop the market. Finally, managers should also be 
aware of external factors such as the government and an immature and dynamic industry. It 
was argued that start-ups are more reliant on government support, both in terms of monetary 
grants and strategic advices.      
6.2 Theoretical implications  
Following the discussion of the empirical data, there are a number of theoretical implications 
in this thesis. First, due to industry specifics such as risk-averse and conservative customers, 
the chasm model of Moore (2002*) must be revised for the wind sector. The non-existence of 
early innovators implies that opportunities for early sales are smaller, while barriers to entry 
are higher. In other words, the chasm has even more serious consequences in the wind 
industry. Second, 5.3.2 argued that licensing is the most used and proven cooperation model 
in the Norwegian industry when the aim is to pool risk and investments. Thus, the suggestion 
of Olleros (1986) that joint venture and subcontracting are also relevant might be less 
prominent in a Norwegian industry context. Third, Teece (1986*) contends that the lack of 
complementary assets is related to early market exit. However, no support for this assertion 
was found. Rather, in a Norwegian context the theory must be revised as the empirical analysis 
found that a strong position in complementary assets is related to commercialization success 
instead. The work of Teece (1986*) was also found to be closely related to Moore (2002*) and 
the concept of whole product. Fourth, mixed empirical support is given to the theory of 
Debruyne et.al. (2002). The notion of higher competition in niche markets were supported, 
while the assertion that incremental innovations face tougher competition than radical ones 
was not found to be entirely supported.  
Fifth, this study did not find any meaningful data about the decisions alignment proposition, 
but argued that passive observation and causal mapping might be appropriate methods for 
future research. Sixth, in the wind industry, market testing is found be more important than 
other market information gathering activities referring to the article of Benedetto (1999). This 
implies that his theory is not entirely transferable to the wind industry segment. Industry 
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specific factors such as risk-averse customers explain this.  Seventh, the case study companies 
confirm the notion that the commercialization literature have on the prominence of market 
orientation. This is in line with the extant literature, and it is not unlikely that the proposition 
is valid in other industries and geographies as well. Eight, both empirical data and theory 
confirm that the important decision to make is not whether to cooperate, but which modes 
that are the most effective. Finally, the interviewees are more critical to venture capital than 
the literature is. This implies that their significance is not as prominent as the theory claims. 
The theory should to a larger degree discern between various firm and product characteristics 
when recommending and discussing venture capital. Since the US literature is generally more 
positive than the Norwegian papers, it could be that the Norwegian venture capital 
environment is less functioning than the US one.  
Last but not least, the theories in chapter three were deemed to be at a too generic level of 
analysis. Few of them consider the fundamental differences between start-ups, large and 
mature firms, radical and incremental innovations. The final propositions in figure 14 are more 
valid and sensible when considered together with the findings of table 11. The theoretical 
implication is that future research to a larger extent should discern between firm and product 
specific variables. This will make the commercialization literature more relevant and less 
generic for corporate decision makers.  
6.3 Further research  
Not all relevant elements have been analyzed and discussed in this thesis. These should be 
subject to further research. The following issues are of special interest. First, too little relevant 
data was found to conclude anything about the proposition on decision alignment. A case 
study was deemed a less appropriate method to analyze this proposition, making other 
methods such as passive observation and causal mapping more relevant. Second, a number 
of success criteria presented by the interviewees (cf. table 9) such as human resources, value 
propositions, product launch timing, management and cost was not analyzed, since it fell 
outside the scope of the propositions. The relation between these elements and 
commercialization performance should be analyzed. Third, the role of patents and how they 
relate to firm strategy has not been fully explored, and should also be subject to further 
discussions. Fourth, the thesis has focused less on product strategy elements such as 
differentiation and positioning. Again, this is not within the scope of the propositions, and is a 
possible area of further research. Fifth, a different theoretical framework can be used in 
similar studies as this one by other researchers. This would have most likely led to different 
propositions. For example, Holgersen and Lillebo (2002*) utilize a resource-based view (RBV) 
to formulate their propositions. RBV argues that valuable, rare, inimitable and non-
substitutable resources provide the foundation for sustainable competitive advantage. This 
theoretical framework could have led to more emphasis on internal factors such as human 
resources and knowledge as sources of commercialization success. Sixth, it is not unlikely that 
the chasm theory (P1a), strategic alignment (P3), market orientation (P5) and cooperation (P6) 
should be differentiated with respect to firm and product variables. However, no specific 
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findings and implications were found in this thesis. Future research should look deeper into 
this. Seventh, more research on support to start-ups is warranted, and especially on how 
effective Innovation Norway is and what they can do differently. Finally, the fact that this study 
is limited to the Norwegian wind technology industry reduces the external validity of the 
thesis. Thus, scholars can extend the research to other geographies and industries. I would 
recommend future researchers to look into whether table 11 and figure 14 can be generalized 
across other industries and geographies.       
6.4 Concluding remarks 
Norwegian companies launching new wind technology products will inevitably face a though 
and competitive environment. Historically, few firms have succeeded with their 
commercialization strategies, a trend that is not unlikely to continue in the future as more 
players discover the market opportunities in the renewable sector. Still, future prospects of 
success in the wind technology market is not that gloomy. This study shows that a number of 
measures can be undertaken to increase the likelihood of commercialization success. In other 
words, there is certainly hope that sustainable values can be created in the clean energy 
industry. 
99 
 
7. References 
Adressa (2010): 86 mill. inn i Chapdrive. Available from: 
http://www.adressa.no/nyheter/okonomi/article1468121.ece [29.04.14].   
Aggarwal, V. A., & Hsu, D. H. (2009): Modes of cooperative R&D commercialization by start‐ups. 
Strategic Management Journal, 30(8), 835-864. Available from Scopus. 
Balachandra, P., Kristle Nathan, H. S., & Reddy, B. S. (2010): Commercialization of sustainable energy 
technologies. Renewable Energy, 35(8), 1842-1851. Available from Google Scholar.  
Beard, C., & Easingwood, C. (1996): New product launch: marketing action and launch tactics for 
high-technology products. Industrial Marketing Management, 25(2), 87-103. Available from Google 
Scholar.  
Benedetto, C. A. (1999): Identifying the key success factors in new product launch. Journal of product 
innovation management, 16(6), 530-544. Available from Google Scholar.  
Blaaster (2014): Available from http://www.blaaster.no/ [01.04.14].  
Bower, J. L., & Christensen, C. M. (1995): Disruptive technologies: catching the wave. Harvard 
Business Review, 73(1), 43-53. Available from Google Scholar.  
Bryman, A. & Bell, E. (2011): Business Research Methods. 3rd edition. New York: Oxford University 
Press.  
Chapdrive (2012): Hydraulisk transmisjon for vindturbiner. Available from: 
http://www.energinorge.no/getfile.php/FILER/KALENDER/Foredrag%202012/PTK2012/Onsdag_7._M
ars/Sesjon_B_Vind/01_Aasmund_Grytting_Furuseth.pdf [29.04.14].   
Christensen, C. (1997): The innovator's dilemma: when new technologies cause great firms to fail. 
Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Available from Google Scholar.  
Christophersen, A. (2014): Interview with Founder Ane Christophersen at Windflip, Telephone-
interview [07.04.14].  
Dale, J. (2014): Interview with Business Development Manager Jørgen Dale at Scatec, Telephone-
interview [07.04.14].  
Dahlhaug, O.G. (2014): Interview with Professor Ole Gunnar Dahlhaug at NTNU, Trondheim 
[25.04.14]. 
De Wit, B., & Meyer, R. (2010): Strategy: Process, content, context: An international perspective. 
London: Cengage Learning EMEA. 
Debruyne, M., Moenaert, R., Griffinc, A., Hart, S., Hultink, E. J., & Robben, H. (2002): The impact of 
new product launch strategies on competitive reaction in industrial markets. Journal of Product 
Innovation Management, 19(2), 159-170. Available from Scopus.  
Easingwood, C., & Beard, C. (1989): High technology launch strategies in the UK. Industrial Marketing 
Management, 18(2), 125-138. Available from Scopus.  
100 
 
Easingwood, C., & Harrington, S. (2002): Launching and re-launching high technology products. 
Technovation, 22(11), 657-666. Available from Scopus.  
Ekström, L. (2014): Interview with Investment Manager Lars Ekström at Verdane Capital, Oslo 
[25.03.14].  
Erikson, T., Sørheim, R., & Berg-Utby, T. (2009): Relasjonsbasert eierstyring i venturekapital-
finansierte teknologibedrifter. In A. Aspelund et.al. (Eds.) Teknologibasert nyskaping i Norge, pp 89-
102. Trondheim: Tapir Akademisk Forlag. 
European Commission (2013): What is the EU doing about climate change? Available from: 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/eu/index_en.htm [28.05.14]. 
Fedem Technology (2014a): About Us. Available from: http://www.fedem.com//om-oss [11.04.14]. 
Fedem Technology (2014b): Renewable Energy. Available from: 
http://www.fedem.com/prosjekter/fornybar-energi/ [11.04.14].  
Fedem Technology (2014c): Fedem Windpower. Available from 
http://www.fedem.com/software/fedem-windpower/ [11.04.14].   
Frattini, F., Chiesa, V., Cassia, L., Campopiano, G., & De Massis, A. (2012): Bringing to Market 
Technological Innovation: What Distinguishes Success from Failure. International Journal of 
Engineering Business Management, 4(2). Available from Scopus.  
Frattini, F., Dell'Era, C., & Rangone, A. (2013): Launch Decisions and the Early Market Survival of 
Innovations: An Empirical Analysis of the Italian Mobile Value‐Added Services (VAS) Industry. Journal 
of Product Innovation Management, 30(S1), 174-187. Available from Scopus.  
Gans, J. S., & Stern, S. (2003): The product market and the market for “ideas”: commercialization 
strategies for technology entrepreneurs. Research policy, 32(2), 333-350. Available from Scopus.  
Gjølmesli, S. (2014): Interview with Chief Technology Officer Svein Gjølmesli at Fedem Technology, 
Trondheim [02.04.14].  
Golicic, S., & Sebastiao, H. J. (2008): Supply chain strategy for nascent firms in emerging technology 
markets. Journal of Business Logistics, 29(1), 75-91. Available from Scopus. 
Hellman, T., & Puri, M. (2000): The interaction between product market and financing strategy: The 
role of venture capital. Review of Financial studies, 13(4), 959-984. Available from Google Scholar.  
Holgersen, N. & Lillebo, H. (2002): Kommersialiseringsstrategi: «Hva gjør de beste?» - norske 
gründere avslører sine forretningshemmeligheter! Steinkjer: Gründerparken.  
Hsu, D. H. (2006): Venture capitalists and cooperative start-up commercialization strategy. 
Management Science, 52(2), 204-219. Available from Scopus.  
Hultink, E. J., & Robben, H. S. (1999): Launch strategy and new product performance: an empirical 
examination in the Netherlands. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 16(6), 545-556. 
Available from Scopus.  
101 
 
Hultink, E. J., & Schoormans, J. P. (1995): How to launch a high-tech product successfully: an analysis 
of marketing managers' strategy choices. The Journal of High Technology Management Research, 
6(2), 229-242. Available from Scopus. 
Hultink, E. J., Griffin, A., Robben, H. S., & Hart, S. (1998): In search of generic launch strategies for 
new products. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 15(3), 269-285. Available from Scopus. 
Hultink, E. J., Griffin, A., Hart, S., & Robben, H. S. (1997): Industrial new product launch strategies and 
product development performance. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 14(4), 243-257. 
Available from Scopus.  
IEA (2013a): Climate Change. Available from: http://www.iea.org/topics/climatechange/ [28.05.14]. 
IEA (2013b): Tracking clean energy progress 2013. Available from: 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/TCEP_web.pdf [28.05.13].  
IEA (2013c): World Energy Outlook 2013 – Chapter 6 Renewable Energy. Available from 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2013/WEO2013_Ch06_Renewables.pdf 
[27.01.14]. 
Indrevær, N. E., (2014): Interview with Business Developer Niklas Eric Indrevær at Statoil, Oslo 
[25.03.14].  
Innovation Norway (2014): Vind og hav – pur kraft. Available from: 
http://www.innovasjonnorge.no/no/energi-og-miljo/Kontakt-vare-fagteam/Vind-og-
hav/#.U48C6_l_vdA [04.06.14]. 
IPCC (2012): Special report on Renewable Energy and Climate Change Mitigation. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Jesson, J. K., Matheson, L. & Lacey, F. M. (2011): Doing your literature review. 1st edition. London: 
SAGE Publications.  
Jolly, V. K. (1997): Commercializing new technologies: getting from mind to market. Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press. Available from Google Books.  
Kasch, S., & Dowling, M. (2008): Commercialization strategies of young biotechnology firms: An 
empirical analysis of the US industry. Research Policy, 37(10), 1765-1777. Available from Scopus.  
Kollmer, H., & Dowling, M. (2004): Licensing as a commercialization strategy for new technology-
based firms. Research Policy, 33(8), 1141-1151. Available from Scopus.  
Kvale, S. (1996): InterViews: An introduction to qualitative research interviewing. London: Sage 
Publications.    
Laird, I., & Sjoblom, L. (2004): Commercializing technology: why is it so difficult to be disciplined? 
Business Horizons, 47(1), 65-71. Available from Scopus.  
Langerak, F., Hultink, E. J., & Robben, H. S. (2004): The impact of market orientation, product 
advantage, and launch proficiency on new product performance and organizational performance. 
Journal of Product Innovation Management, 21(2), 79-94. Available from Scopus.  
102 
 
Larsen, C.J. (2014): Interview with Administration Manager Camilla Jørås Larsen at Blaaster, 
Trondheim [25.03.14].  
Lin, B. W., Lee, Y., & Hung, S. C. (2006): R&D intensity and commercialization orientation effects on 
financial performance. Journal of Business Research, 59(6), 679-685. Available from Scopus.  
Mazzarol, T., & Reboud, S. (2006): The strategic decision making of entrepreneurs within small high 
innovator firms. International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, 2(2), 261-280. Available 
from Scopus.  
Moore, G.A. (2002): Crossing the chasm. 3rd edition. New York: Harper Collins.  
Mu, J., & Di Benedetto, C. A. (2011): Strategic orientations and new product commercialization: 
mediator, moderator, and interplay. R&D Management, 41(4), 337-359. Available from Scopus.  
Mueller, D. C., & Tilton, J. E. (1969): Research and development costs as a barrier to entry. The 
Canadian Journal of Economics, 2(4), 570-579. Available from Google Scholar. 
NORWEA & Energi Norge (2013). Available from: http://www.vindinfo.no/ [25.05.14]. 
Olleros, F. J. (1986): Emerging industries and the burnout of pioneers. Journal of Product Innovation 
Management, 3(1), 5-18. Available from Scopus.  
Pettersen, O. (2014): Interview with Technical Manager Ove Pettersen at Blaaster, Trondheim 
[25.03.14].  
Pettersen, T. (2014): Interview with founder and CEO Torolf Pettersen at Blaaster, Trondheim 
[25.03.14].  
Reve, T., & Jacobsen, E. W. (2001): Et verdiskapende Norge. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
Roessner, J. D. (1984): Commercializing solar technology: The government role. Research Policy, 
13(4), 235-246. Available from Scopus.  
Sage (2013): Sage Research Methods. Available from: 
http://srmo.sagepub.com/publicstart?authRejection=true [25.05.14]. 
Schwenke, T., (2014): Interview with Director of Business Development Trond Schwenke at 
SmartMotor, Trondheim [19.03.14]. 
Singstad, I. (2014): Interview with Head of Wind Marine Renewables Ivar Singstad at Innovation 
Norway, Telephone-interview [08.04.14]. 
Slater, S. F., & Mohr, J. J. (2006): Successful development and commercialization of technological 
innovation: insights based on strategy type. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 23(1), 26-
33. Available from Scopus.  
SmartMotor (2014): Available from http://www.smartmotor.no/ [27.03.14].  
Stadaas, J.F. (2014): Interview with Technology Manager Jan Fredrik Stadaas at Statoil, Oslo 
[25.03.14]. 
103 
 
Statoil (2014a): About Statoil. Available from http://www.statoil.com/en/about/pages/default.aspx 
[08.04.14].  
Statoil (2014b): Hywind – the world’s first full-scale floating wind turbine. Available from 
http://www.statoil.com/en/TechnologyInnovation/NewEnergy/RenewablePowerProduction/Offshor
e/Hywind/Pages/HywindPuttingWindPowerToTheTest.aspx [09.04.14] 
St.meld. nr 1 (2009-2010): Nasjonalbudsjettet 2010. Oslo: Ministry of Finance. Available from: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fin/dok/regpubl/stmeld/2009-2010/meld-st-1-2009-
2010/3/8/1.html?id=579807# [28.05.14]. 
Sætertrø, K. (2014): Interview with engineer Kristian Sætertrø at Fedem, Trondheim [02.04.14]. 
Talke, K., & Hultink, E. J. (2010): The Impact of the Corporate Mind‐set on New Product Launch 
Strategy and Market Performance. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 27(2), 220-237. 
Available from Scopus.  
Teece, D. J. (1986): Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, 
collaboration, licensing and public policy. Research policy, 15(6), 285-305. Available from Google 
Scholar.  
Teece, D. J. (2006): Reflections on “profiting from innovation”. Research Policy, 35(8), 1131-1146. 
Available from Scopus.  
Teknisk Ukeblad (2010): Vinkraftpionér med ny turbin. Available from: 
http://www.tu.no/kraft/2010/11/04/vindkraftpioner-med-ny-turbin [02.04.2014]. 
 
Thomson Reuters ISI Web of Knowledge - Journal Citation Reports (2012). Available from:  
http://admin-apps.webofknowledge.com/JCR/JCR [07.03.14]. 
Timmons, J. A., & Bygrave, W. D. (1986): Venture capital's role in financing innovation for economic 
growth. Journal of Business Venturing, 1(2), 161-176. Available from Scopus.  
Ulla, T. (2014): Interview with Head of Business Development – Floating Wind at Statoil, Telephone-
interview [04.04.14].  
Verdane Capital (2013): Verdane sells permanent magnet motor specialist SmartMotor to Rolls-
Royce. Available from http://www.verdanecapital.com/artikel/286/verdane-sells-permanent-
magnet-motor-specialist-smartmotor-to-rolls-royce.html [30.03.14].  
Vik, J. (2014): Interview with Partner Jostein Vik at Viking Venture, Trondheim [29.04.14].  
Walsh, S. T., Kirchhoff, B. A., & Newbert, S. (2002): Differentiating market strategies for disruptive 
technologies. Engineering Management, IEEE Transactions on, 49(4), 341-351. Available from Scopus.  
Walsh, P. R. (2012): Innovation Nirvana or Innovation Wasteland? Identifying commercialization 
strategies for small and medium renewable energy enterprises. Technovation, 32(1), 32-42. Available 
from Scopus.  
104 
 
Widding, Ø., Landsgård, M. & Sørheim, R. (2009): Smarte penger? Ikke-finansielle bidrag fra norske 
risikokapitalister. In A. Aspelund et.al. (Eds.) Teknologibasert nyskaping i Norge, pp 71-87. 
Trondheim: Tapir Akademisk Forlag.  
Wind Power Monthly (2013): Statoil's Hywind project gets go ahead off Scotland. Available from 
http://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1222226/statoils-hywind-project-gets-go-ahead-off-
scotland [09.04.14].  
Windcluster Norway (2014): Supplier overview. Available from 
http://supplier.windcluster.no/search#2 [28.04.14].  
Yin, R. K. (2014): Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 5th edition. New York: Sage Publications. 
Øvrebø, S., (2014): Interview with CTO Sigurd Øvrebø at SmartMotor, Trondheim [19.03.14].
i 
 
8. Appendix 
8.1 Case study protocol  
Last revised 29.03.14 
 Problem statement: How can Norwegian companies successfully commercialize new 
wind energy technologies? There is little research available within this field, thus a 
holistic approach is used in order to shed light on a rather complex topic.   
 Goal: to establish a best practice model on how to commercialize wind energy 
technologies, and give tangible recommendations to firms launching their new 
products. Discuss commercialization strategies among existing Norwegian companies. 
Operationalize academic theories. 
 Relevant topics: venture capital, financing, B2B marketing, product strategy, customer 
targeting, value chain strategy, competiveness, strategic alliances and cooperation, 
market orientation, new product, innovation diffusion, distribution channels.  
 Case study: holistic multiple case study, using five case firms. The case firms are chosen 
in order to reflect the whole dimension of radical to incremental products and 
successful to failed products. However, the choice is also based on convenience.   
 Unit of analysis: supplier industry (technology providers), new technologies, 
Norwegian companies, both domestic and abroad, both start-ups and mature 
companies, introduction phase in the product lifecycle, focus on wind energy.  
 Level of analysis: main focus on product level, but company and sometimes industry 
level are regarded when deemed relevant.   
 Methods: data triangulation, cross-case synthesis, systematic literature review, 
propositions, final model built on the strengthened propositions, discussing rivalling 
models to mine. 
 Literature review keywords: commercialization, product launch strategy.  
 Research tools: case study protocol, interview guide, personal notes, key informants.   
 Data sources: 
o In order to increase construct validity, multiple sources of evidence is used.  
o Findings from the case companies: Statoil (Hywind), Blaaster, Windflip, Fedem 
Technology and SmartMotor. 
o Publically available information on the case companies, e.g. websites, press 
releases etc.   
o Semi-structured interviews with case companies, in addition to control 
interviews with a venture capital fund, an industry- and a government 
interviewee. Minimum twelve interviews. Use of key informant approach and 
case study draft reviews to ensure data consistency. Focus on interviewees 
with a firm knowledge of the problem statement, and also people with various 
backgrounds. For interview questions, see the separate interview guide.     
o Grey literature from IEA, EWEA, IPCC and Center for Sustainable Energy 
Studies. Use of snowball sampling to find relevant documents.  
o Journal articles – Scopus and Google Scholar databases. Using only peer-
reviewed high-quality articles.   
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 Traditional measures of data quality is used (Yin, 2014):  
o Internal validity: rival explanation, cross case synthesis.  
o External validity: less important and outside the scope and intention of the 
thesis.  
o Construct validity: convergence of multiple data sources using triangulation, 
key informant reviews of the case study drafts, chain of evidence.  
o Reliability: use of case study protocol, clear and specific citations of where the 
exact piece of information was found. 
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8.2 Overview of articles used in literature theory review 
Author(s) Title Year Journal Method Theoretical background 
and perspective 
Aggarwal V.A., Hsu D.H. Modes of Cooperative R&D Commercialization 
by Start-ups 
2009 Strategic Management Journal Deductive TCE, RBV and cooperation  
Beard C., Easingwood C.  New Product Launch: Marketing Actions and 
Launch Tactics for High-Technology Products  
1996 Industrial Marketing 
Management 
Interviews and 
survey 
Technology-orientation 
rather than market-
orientation  
Benedetto C.A.  Identifying the Key Success Factors in New 
Product Launch  
1999 Journal of Product Innovation 
Management 
Survey Strategic and tactical 
decisions 
Bower, J.L., & Christensen 
C.M. 
Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave 1995* Harvard Business Review Conceptual Disruptive and sustaining 
technologies 
Christensen C.M.  The innovator’s dilemma: when technologies 
cause great firms to fail.  
1997* Publisher: Harvard Business 
Review Press 
Conceptual Disruptive and sustaining 
technologies 
Debruyne M., Moenaert 
R., Griffin A., Hart S., 
Hultink E.J., Robben H.  
The Impact of New Product Launch Strategies 
on Competitive Reaction in Industrial Markets  
2002 Journal of Product Innovation 
Management 
Deductive Competitive reactions 
Easingwood C., Beard C.  High Technology Launch Strategies in the U.K. 1989 Industrial Marketing 
Management 
Conceptual, 
interviews and 
press analysis 
Various strategies for 
radical innovations 
Easingwood C., Harrington 
S. 
Launching and Re-launching High Technology 
Products 
2002 Technovation Conceptual Chasm-theory, whole 
product 
Erikson, T., Sørheim, R., 
Berg-Utby, T. 
Relasjonsbasert eierstyring i venturekapital-
finansierte teknologibedrifter 
2009* Publisher: Tapir Akademisk 
Forlag 
Interviews and 
survey 
Venture capital, 
cooperation 
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Frattini F., De Massis A., 
Chiesa V., Cassia L., 
Campopiano G.  
Bringing to Market Technological Innovation: 
What Distinguishes Success from Failure 
2012 International Journal of 
Engineering Business 
Management  
Historical 
analysis 
B2C, strategies for 
successful 
commercialization  
Frattini F., Dell’Era C., 
Rangone A. 
Launch Decisions and the Early Market Survival 
of Innovations 
2013 Journal of Product Innovation 
Management 
Deductive Product survival, tactical 
and strategic launch 
decisions, B2C 
Gans J.S., Stern S.  The Product Market and the Market for 
“Ideas”: Commercialization Strategies for 
Technology Entrepreneurs    
2003 Research Policy Conceptual  Commercialization  
environment 
Golicic S.L., Sebastiao H.J. Supply Chain Strategy in Nascent Markets: The 
Role of Supply Chain Development in the 
Commercialization Process 
2011 Journal of Business Logistics Multiple case-
study 
Supply chain issues, 
relationships 
Hellmann T., Puri M. The Interaction Between Product Market and 
Financing Strategy: The Role of Venture Capital 
2000 The Review of Financial 
Studies 
Deductive Venture capital and 
financing 
Hsu D.H.  Venture Capitalists and Cooperative Start-up 
Commercialization Strategy 
2006 Management Science Deductive Venture capital and 
cooperation  
Hultink E.J., Robben H.S.J. Launch Strategy and New Product 
Performance: An Empirical Examination in The 
Netherlands 
1999 Journal of Product Innovation 
Management 
Survey Lunch strategy, market 
characteristics, product 
performance 
Hultink E.J., Schoormans 
J.P.L. 
How to Launch a High-Tech Product 
Successfully: An Analysis of Marketing 
Manager’s Strategy Choices  
1995 The Journal of High 
Technology Management 
Research  
Survey, cluster 
analysis  
Impact of pricing, 
promotion, competitive 
advantage and product 
variety on product success 
Hultink E.J., Griffin A., 
Robben H.S.J., Hart S. 
In Search of Generic Launch Strategies for New 
Products  
1998 International Journal of 
Research in Marketing 
Deductive B2C, strategic and tactical 
launch decisions, generic 
strategies  
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Hultink E.J., Griffin A., Hart 
S., Robben H.S.J.  
Industrial New Product Launch Strategies and 
Product Development Performance 
1997 Journal of Product Innovation 
Management 
Survey, 
interviews 
B2B, strategic and tactical 
launch decisions, 
strategies and product 
performance 
Jolly V.  Commercializing New Technologies: Getting 
from Mind to Market 
1997* Publisher: Harvard Business 
Press 
Conceptual Theory review 
Kasch S., Dowling M.  Commercialization Strategies of Young 
Biotechnology Firms: An Empirical Analysis of 
the U.S. Industry  
2008 Research Policy Deductive TCE, RBV, property tights 
theory, cooperation 
Kollmer H., Dowling M. Licensing as a Commercialization Strategy for 
New Technology-based Firms 
2004 Research Policy Deductive Licensing 
Laird I., Sjoblom L. Commercializing Technology: Why is it so 
Difficult to be Disciplined? 
2004 Business Horizons Conceptual Strategies to avoid 
commercialization failure 
Langerak F., Hultink E.J., 
Robben H.S.J. 
The Impact of Market Orientation, Product 
Advantage, and Launch Proficiency on New 
Product Performance and Organizational 
Performance 
2004 Journal of Product Innovation 
Management 
Deductive Market orientation, 
product performance, 
customer value 
Lin B.W., Lee Y., Hung S.C. R&D Intensity and Commercialization 
Orientation Effects on Financial Performance 
2006 Journal of Business Research  Deductive R&D orientation, 
commercialization 
orientation, firm 
performance 
Mazzarol T., Reboud S.  The Strategic Decision Making of 
Entrepreneurs Within Small High Innovator 
Firms 
2006 International 
Entrepreneurship and 
Management Journal 
Conceptual, 
survey 
Rent configurations, 
strategic environment, 
innovation management 
Moore G.  Crossing the Chasm  2002* Publisher: Harper Collins Conceptual Chasm, whole product 
vi 
 
Mu J., Benedetto C.A. Strategic Orientations and New Product 
Commercialization: Mediator, Moderator and 
Interplay 
2011 R&D Management Deductive Strategic orientations, 
commercialization 
performance  
Mueller, D.C & Tilton , J.E.  Research and Development Costs as Barrier to 
Entry.  
1969* The Canadian Journal of 
Economics 
Conceptual Industrial development 
Olleros F.J.  Emerging Industries and the Burnout of 
Pioneers 
1986 Journal of Product Innovation 
Management 
Conceptual External uncertainty, 
market survival 
Roessner J.D. Commercializing Solar Technology: The 
Government Role 
1984 Research Policy  Conceptual, 
review 
Industrial development, 
government 
Slater S.F., Mohr J.J. Successful Development and 
Commercialization of Technological 
Innovation: Insights Based on Strategy Type 
2006 Journal of Product Innovation 
Management 
Conceptual  Chasm-theory, innovator’s 
dilemma, strategic 
orientation 
Talke K., Hultink E.J. The Impact of the Corporate Mind-set on New 
Product Launch Strategy and Market 
Performance 
2010 Journal of Product Innovation 
Management 
Deductive B2B, corporate mind-set 
on market performance 
Teece D.J. Profiting from Technological Innovation 1986* Research Policy Conceptual Complementary assets, 
imitators 
Teece D.J. Reflections on “Profiting from Innovation” 2006 Research Policy Conceptual, 
review 
Profiting from Innovation 
framework 
Timmons J.A, Bygrave 
W.D. 
Venture Capital’s Role in Financing Innovation 
for Economic Growth 
1986 Journal of Business Venturing Conceptual, 
review 
VC performance, decision-
making 
Walsh S.T., Kirchoff B.A., 
Newbert S. 
Differentiating Market Strategies for Disruptive 
Technologies 
2002 IEEE Transactions on 
Engineering Management 
Deductive Disruptive and sustaining 
technologies 
Widding, Ø., Landsgård, 
M. Sørheim, R. 
Smarte penger? Ikke-finansielle bidrag fra 
norske risikokapitalister. 
2002* Publisher: Tapir Akademisk 
Forlag 
Survey Venture capital, 
cooperation 
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8.3 Overview of articles used in empirical review 
Author(s) Title  Year  Journal  Method Theoretical background 
and perspective 
Balachandra P., Nathan 
H.S.K., Reddy B.S. 
Commercialization of sustainable 
energy technologies  
2010 Renewable Energy Conceptual review Technology diffusion, market 
dynamics, external factors 
stimulating commercialization 
Holgersen, N., Lillebo, H. Kommersialiseringsstrategi: «Hva 
gjør de beste?» - norske gründere 
avslører sine 
forretningshemmeligheter! 
2002* Publisher: 
Gründerparken 
Interviews Success criteria in 
commercialization  
Walsh P.R. Innovation Nirvana or Innovation 
Wasteland? Identifying 
Commercialization Strategies for 
Small and Medium Renewable 
Energy Enterprises 
2012 Technovation Conceptual Market dynamics, 
commercialization strategy 
based on innovation type and 
commercial risk 
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8.4 Interview guide sample 
Dato: Tirsdag 25. mars, Statoil Fornebu 
Intervjuobjekt: Jan-Fredrik Stadaas og Niklas Eric Indrevær, Statoil 
Problemstilling: 
 Hvordan kan norske selskaper best kommersialisere nye vind-energiteknologier?   
Avgrensninger: 
 Fokus på forretningsutvikling og konkurransestrategi, mindre på tekniske forhold. 
 Fokus på B2B, på produktnivå (utelukkende på Hywind). 
 Norske forhold, men gjerne i en europeisk kontekst. 
 Fokus på faktorer som bedriften selv kan påvirke. 
 
Generelle spørsmål til Hywind: 
 Hva er din bakgrunn? 
 Fortell mer om produktet med tanke på kundesegmenter, differensiering, distribusjon, 
prising og promotering.  
 Radikal eller inkrementell innovasjon?  
 Har produktet oppnådd kommersiell suksess? Har det nådd målene deres? 
 Hvordan har dere planlagt kommersialiseringen med tanke på markedsføring, prising, 
distribusjon, promotering, marked, kunder og posisjonering? 
Proposisjon-spørsmål: 
Norwegian wind technology providers should develop a whole product and cross the chasm, in order 
to avoid early market exit. 
 Er det stor avstand og forskjell mellom tidlig segmenter og massemarked? Har dere opplevd 
problemer knyttet til dette? 
 Hvor mye har tilhørende service og komplementære produkter å si for salg til mer risiko-
averse kunder?  
Norwegian wind technology providers should minimize its initial investment base, in order to avoid 
pioneer burn-out and early market exit. 
 Hvor viktig er fleksibilitet og reversibilitet i investeringene?  
 Hvordan unngår dere «the valley of death»? 
 Hva er de mest sentrale truslene ved oppstart og konkurranse med større selskaper?  
Norwegian wind technology providers should gain a strong position in complementary assets, in 
order to avoid early market exit.   
 Hvordan er IPR regimet i Norge?  
 Er det mange imitatorer i markedet? 
 Hvor viktig er det med komplementære produkter og service i deres produkt? 
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Norwegian wind technology providers should be competitor oriented, in order to best commercialize 
its products. 
 Hvor stor konkurranse er det i markedet?  
 Hvor sterk er konkurranseresponsen?  
Norwegian wind technology providers should align its strategic and tactical launch decisions, in order 
to best commercialize its products.   
 Hvordan foregår planleggingen av langtids korttids strategier for dere? Er dere bevisste på 
sammenhengen mellom disse? 
Norwegian wind technology providers should utilize strong market information gathering activities, 
in order to best commercialize its products. 
 Hvordan samles inn markedsinformasjon hos dere? Er dere bevisste på dette?  
Norwegian wind technology providers should be market oriented, in order to best commercialize its 
products.   
 Hvor viktig er kunder, respons til markedet? Markedsorientering?  
Norwegian wind technology providers should cooperate with external parties, in order to best 
commercialize its products. 
 Har dere inngått noen lisensieringsavtaler?  
 Andre former for samarbeidsavtaler med eksterne parter? Fordeler og ulemper? 
Norwegian wind technology providers should cooperate with venture capital funds, in order to best 
commercialize its products. 
 Hvordan er produktet finansiert?  
 Har samarbeid med noen private equity fond vært med i bildet?  
 Har finansieringen vært tilfredsstillende?  
 Andre mulige alternativer? 
Generelle industri-spørsmål: 
 Hva skiller en god kommersialisering fra en dårlig en?  
 Hva skiller vind-industrien fra andre segmenter dere er inne i? 
 Hva er viktige faktorer for suksess?  
 Hvor er forbedringspotensialet blant norske bedrifter?  
 Hva er viktige ressurser for å kommersialisere et produkt? 
 Spesielle utfordringer knyttet til kommersialisering av vindenergi? 
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8.5 Wind energy basics 
8.5.1 Introduction 
This appendix provides some basic background information about the wind industry. Readers 
that are not familiar with the sector will gain the necessary knowledge to understand the 
analysis and discussions in chapter four and five. Not all industry details are included in this 
appendix, but rather the essentials needed to appreciate the contents in this thesis. However, 
note that an overview of the wind technology value chain is given in 4.1 instead of here, and 
provides an understanding of who the customers in the industry are. First, section 8.5.2 gives 
a short introduction to the Norwegian market and its current status. Second, 8.5.3 provides 
details about wind turbine design and related technicalities, which is fundamental in order to 
understand the products of case companies such as Blaaster, Chapdrive and SmartMotor. 
Third, part 8.5.4 presents current trends in wind technology innovation and development. 
Finally, 8.5.5 provides the references used in this appendix, and can be regarded as further 
reading material for those who are interested.              
8.5.2 The Norwegian market 
Although Norway has one of the best wind blowing conditions in Europe spread over a large 
area (NVE, 2013a), the Norwegian market for wind power is small and still immature 
compared to countries such as Denmark and Germany. Referring to figure A-1, accumulated 
wind power production was 1 569 GWh in 2012, while installed capacity mounted to 704 MW 
(NVE, 2013b: 5). This represents 1.1% of total electricity generation in Norway in 2012. This 
low rate is explained by the fact that Norway has access to cheap hydropower, and that wind 
power needs to be subsidized in order to be profitable (NORWEA & Energi Norge, 2013). 
However, this is expected to change in the near future. According to NORWEA & Energi Norge 
(2013), another 97.5 MW will be installed in 2013, leaving a total production of around 2 000 
GWh. In addition, several onshore concessions was granted by the Norwegian government in 
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August 2013 in mid-Norway. The permissions involve the building of eight wind farms with a 
potential of 1 300 MW capacity and 3 700 GWh electricity (Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 
2013). If these concessions are developed by the operators, Norway’s output from wind 
energy will drastically increase in the future.  
8.5.3 Wind turbine design 
In the past 30 years, wind power technology has developed tremendously fast. In the 1980s, 
commercial wind turbines produced 50 kW and had a rotor blade diameter of 15 meters (UCS, 
2013). Today, typical onshore wind turbines have a capacity of 1-3 MW with a rotor diameter 
of around 100 meters. Even larger turbines can be found offshore, which are scaled up to a 
capacity of 3-7 MW (SBC Energy Institute, 2013: 13). The larger size compared to onshore 
turbines is mainly because operators wants to offset the higher cost in building foundation 
and installation. The trend in increasing turbine and rotor size is expected to continue in the 
future, with capacities and rotor blade diameters reaching 10-20 MW and 150-250 meters, 
respectively (UCS, 2013).  
A major trend within the 
offshore segment is that 
wind turbines are installed 
on deeper water depths 
and farther away from the 
shore (EWEA, 2011: 27). 
Most of the projects that 
have come online so far 
have water depth less than 
20 meters and are situated 
less than 20 km from the 
shore. Newly consented 
projects are expected to be 
built on water depths 
exceeding 60 meters and 
more than 60 km from the 
shore (EWEA, 2011: 27). The design of the wind turbine varies with the use and 
appropriateness. The most common type has three blades with the axis horizontally oriented 
to the ground, but vertical designs do exist. As seen in figure A-2, a wind turbine consists of 
three main parts: the tower, the rotor blades and a machinery house behind the blades called 
a nacelle (UCS, 2013). The components transforming mechanical to electrical energy are 
situated inside the nacelle. The blades are attached to a low-speed shaft that runs into a 
gearbox. The shaft rotates at a low speed, but with a high torque. The gearbox increases the 
numbers of rotations, thus reducing the torque. A high-speed shaft is connected to a 
generator, which converts the mechanical energy to electricity (UCS, 2013). However, some 
small-scale turbines utilize a direct-drive system, which eliminates the need for a gearbox. 
Figure A-2: Wind turbine design (IPCC, 2012: 552) 
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These turbines avoid mechanical problems associated with gearboxes, but are on the other 
hand significantly heavier and more expensive (AWEA, 2013). Significant R&D in reducing 
weight and increasing performance of drive trains has been undertaken (SBC Energy Institute, 
2013: 29). Finally, electricity is transmitted from the generator down the tower to a 
transformer at the base of the tower (SBC Energy Institute, 2013: 11). This is connected to the 
central power grid via cables. The wind turbine design itself is very much the same in both 
onshore and offshore sites.     
Wind is the most important input factor for wind turbines. Energy content of the wind is 
proportional to the cube of the win speed, thus small fluctuations in wind speed yields a great 
change in energy output (IEA, 2008: 1). Therefore, a good wind speed site is crucial to the 
financial viability of a project (IEA, 2008: 1). Since wind speed increases with height, taller 
towers allows more energy to be produced (AWEA, 2013). The wind is fairly unstable, thus 
wind turbines are equipped with a yaw drive, which allows the turbine to be oriented in the 
same direction as the wind flow. Furthermore, the blades can be rotated by a pitch drive to 
reduce the amount of lift when wind speeds become too great (AWEA, 2013).        
8.5.4 Innovation and technology development 
Traditionally, R&D on wind has focused on three objectives: maximizing energy capture, 
minimizing cost per unit of capacity and meeting grid requirements (SBC Energy Institute, 
2013: 27). The first point is driven by access to better wind resources and better exploitation 
of lower-quality resource sites. To influence these drivers, R&D has developed larger wind 
turbines with variable speed and better resistance to extreme environmental conditions (SBC 
Energy Institute, 2013: 27). The second element is driven by reduced investment-, O&M-, and 
production costs. To satisfy this, innovation has come up with solutions such as lighter 
components, gearless turbines and pitch systems to avoid excessive fatigue (SBC Energy 
Institute, 2013: 27). The final point is driven mainly by system stability, voltage control and 
predictable forecasts. Better computational tools, communication and pitch control are main 
contributors to this (SBC Energy Institute, 2013: 27).  
In 2011, global R&D spending in wind energy was 1.2 billion USD compared to 4.1 billion USD 
in solar energy (SBC Energy Institute, 2013: 34). Corporate R&D expenses has remained flat in 
the period 2008-2011, while public funding has fluctuated. However, more R&D has been 
pushed in the direction of offshore innovations. This is evident by the fact that offshore 
accounted for the largest share of wind-related patents between 2000 and 2010 (SBC Energy 
Institute, 2013: 34). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that offshore is much more innovation 
intense than onshore.  
According to EWEA (2009a: 7), there is a greater profitability of innovative designs for the 
offshore market than for the onshore market. In addition to the fact that offshore wind 
turbines are driving towards larger capacities than onshore turbines, foundation design is an 
important axis of R&D development (SBC Energy Institute, 2013: 30). Operators can capitalize 
greatly from improvements within these areas. Specifically, offshore wind turbines requires 
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innovations in weather resistance, floating structures, ease of maintenance and increased 
reliability to drive down costs (SBC Energy Institute, 2013: 30). The Hywind pilot project 10 km 
off the southwest cost of Norway, the world’s first floating offshore wind turbine, is an 
example of a recent innovation in the offshore industry (Statoil, 2013).     
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8.6 Overview of interviewees  
Interviewee  Position in case firm Case Company 
Sigurd Øvrebø Chief Technology Officer (CTO) 
SmartMotor 
Trond Schwenke Director of Business Development 
Kristian Sætertrø Engineer 
Fedem Technology 
Svein Gjølmesli Chief Technology Officer (CTO) 
Camilla Jørås Larsen Administration Manager 
Blaaster Ove Pettersen Technical Manager 
Torolf Pettersen  Founder and CEO 
Ane Christophersen Co-founder and General Manager Windflip 
Jan Fredrik Stadaas Technology Manager 
Statoil/Hywind Niklas Eric Indrevær Business Development 
Trine Ulla Head of Business Development 
Ole Gunnar Dahlhaug Co-founder and Technical Leader 
Chapdrive Åsmund Grytting  Co-founder and CEO 
Jostein Vik  Board member (Partner, Viking Venture) 
Lars Ekström  Investment Manager Verdane Capital 
Advisors 
Jørgen Dale Business Development Manager Scatec 
Ivar Singstad Head of Wind and Marine Renewables Innovation Norway 
 
 
